Lawyerdude's explanation of Void for Vagueness

5989 renamed “vagueness” renamed “vague2" Upgraded Fri, Nov 10, 2006

Lawyerdude 541 476 8954 Lawyerdude1989@yahoo.com Dlawyerdude@gmail.com

Lawyerdude Explains “Void for Vagueness”

Vagueness is a Powerful Concept in Legal Defense against bad laws. Vagueness and Overbreadth go hand in hand. Both vagueness and overbreadth are the product of human nature. Bad laws invite pretextual arrests and unbridled police discretion. Bad laws also invite administrative pretext and unbridled discretion in the hands of petty bureaucrats and even internet moderators. Larken Rose should have used this defense in his section 861 case. He ignored my offer of help and suffered a prison sentence. Same with Schiff. “ . . .if doubt exists as to the construction of a taxing statute, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer” - Hassett v. Welch, 303 US 303, 314 (1938) http://laws.findlaw.com/us/303/303.html .

This page is: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/vague2.html and http://www.fu.gq.nu/vagueness.html It may be identical to http://www.fu.gq.nu/vague2 and http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/vagueness.html

Vagueness Motions that you can use:

List of Vagueness Motion: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/8116.html

See also: “Void for Vagueness” is discussed on the internet. It is also discussed in basic criminal law books such as the classic text by Perkins on Criminal Law which can be purchased used at Amazon.com maybe. May also be at your law library. It is published by Foundation Press as I recall. West Criminal law hornbook will likely discuss it also as will Am Jur and the Supreme Court Digest. It is often hidden in the index under “14^th amendment”

Overbreadth page: http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5409.html

Enjoining a criminal prosecution: Dombrowski theory: http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/dombrowski.html

Grayned v City of Rockford, Illinois http://www.fu.gq.nu/grayned.html

Please join my newest Yahoo group for discussion or legal self help litigation. Here is the link to the link: http://www.lawyerdude.8k.com/6346.html

Do you have questions? Join our Discussion group: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/the_lawyerdude

Highlights of this article: (The following items are hyperlinks. Just click on them and go.)

Contents:

Each of these arguments can be converted into a jury instruction.

"All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter."

".if doubt exists as to the construction of a taxing statute, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer..."

"It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application."

Larry Becraft’s list of cases using the concept of “Void for Vagueness”

Links for your Empowerment! Self help Litigation forms, instructions, cases, and samples.

Each of the following case can be converted into a jury instruction.

Thanks to Bob Minarik - patriots for liberty - 5288 N. 1000 W. Rochester Indiana 46975 ph. 574-542-9065 for researching the annotations to the Fourteenth Amendment.

List of 20 Case where Void-for-Vagueness concept overturned the statutethorities cited herein:

U.S. Supreme Court cases cited herein:

*Connally v General Construction (1926) 269 U.S. 385

*due process

American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468 , 35 L. ed. 821, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 55
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14 of 16

Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 , 508-509 (1964).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 15 of 16

Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14 of 16

Benziger v. U.S., 192 U.S. 38 (1904).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 14 of 16

City of Mesquite v. Alladin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 of 16

Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 47 S. Ct. 681 (1927). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 14 of 16

Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 ( 1971).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 14 of 16

Collins v. Kentucky (1914) Tobacco case. http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/vague14.html 234 U.S. 634, 638 , 34 S. Ct. 924 [269 U.S. 385, 393]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13 of 16

Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 of 16

Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania (1966) 382 U.S. 399; 86 S.Ct. 518.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13 of 16

Gould v. Gould, 245 US., 151 (1917). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 13 of 16

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108-09 & n. 4 http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/grayned.html
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 of 16

International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 , 34 S. Ct. 853. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 13 of 16

Karlan v. City of Cincinatti, 416 U.S. 924 (1974).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 14 of 16

Marbury v. Madison (1803) http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/marbury.html 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137. Page 15 of 16

NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 15 of 16

NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). A vague statute may be overbroad if its uncertain boundaries leave open the possibility of punishment for protected conduct and thus lead citizens to avoid such protected activity in order to steer clear of the uncertain proscriptions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 15 of 16

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville (1971) http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/papachri.html 405 U.S. 156. Vague laws defeat the intrinsic promise of, and frustrate the essence of, a constitutional regime.. . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 14 of 16,
Page 15 of 16

Rector, Etc., Of Holy Trinity Church v. United States (1892) http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/vague92.html 143 U.S. 457; 12 S.Ct. 511. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 13 of 16

Sewell v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 14 of 16

Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 of 16

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 , 90-91, 15 L. Ed.2d 176 (1965) http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5089.html (Includes photograph of Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14 of 16

Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 15 of 16

United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 ( 1954).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 14 of 16

United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, Fed. Cas. No. 16,690.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14 of 16

Winters v. People of State of New York (1948) 333 U.S. 507; 68 S.Ct. 665.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13 of 16

Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967), quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). "Overbreadth, on the other hand, 'offends the constitutional principle that 'a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.”Page 15 of 16

Connally vs. General Construction Co. (1926) http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/vague26.html 269 U.S. 385

The question whether given legislative enactments have been thus wanting in certainty has frequently been before this court. In some of the cases the statutes involved were upheld; in others, declared invalid. The precise point of differentiation in some instances is not easy of statement; but it will be enough for present purposes to say generally that the decisions of the court, upholding statutes as sufficiently certain, rested upon the conclusion that they employed words or phrases having a technical or other special meaning, well enough known to enable those within their reach to correctly apply them - Supreme Court in 1926 in Connally v Gen. Construction.

That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a well- recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.

International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 , 34 S. Ct. 853; Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 , 34 S. Ct. 924 [269 U.S. 385, 393] http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/vague14.html ...

The dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be left to conjecture. The citizen cannot be held to answer charges based upon penal statutes whose mandates are so uncertain that they will reasonably admit of different constructions. A criminal statute cannot rest upon an uncertain foundation. The crime, and the elements constituting it, must be so clearly expressed that the ordinary person can intelligently choose, in advance, what course it is lawful for him to pursue. Penal statutes prohibiting the doing of certain things, and providing a punishment for their violation, should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizen may act upon the one conception of its requirements and the courts upon another.'

Rector, Etc., Of Holy Trinity Church v. United States (1892)

http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/vague92.html 143 U.S. 457; 12 S.Ct. 511 :

Winters v. People of State of New York (1948) 333 U.S. 507; 68 S.Ct. 665:

"Men of common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of penal enactment. "In determining whether penal statute is invalid for uncertainty, courts must do their best to determine whether vagueness is of such a character that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning. "Where a statute is so vague as to make criminal an innocent act, a conviction under it cannot be sustained." - Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507; 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948)

Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania (1966) 382 U.S. 399; 86 S.Ct. 518:

"Law fails to meet requirements of due process clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves public uncertain as to conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case." - Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399; 86 S.Ct. 518 (1966)

Gould v. Gould, 245 US., 151 (1917):

"In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes, it is THE ESTABLISHED RULE NOT TO EXTEND their provisions, by implication, BEYOND THE CLEAR IMPORT OF THE LANGUAGE USED, OR TO ENLARGE their operations SO AS TO EMBRACE MATTERS NOT SPECIFICALLY POINTED OUT"

Benziger v. U.S., 192 U.S. 38 (1904):

"This provision of the statute should be liberally construed in favor of the importer, and if there were any fair doubt as to the true construction of the provision in question, the courts should resolve the doubt in his favor. American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468 , 35 L. ed. 821, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 55; United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, Fed. Cas. No. 16,690; Rice v. United States, 4 C. C. A. 104, 10 U. S. App. 670, 53 Fed. 910."

U.S. v. De Cadena, 105 F.Supp. 202, 204 (1952):

"The essential purpose of the "void for vagueness doctrine" with respect to interpretation of a criminal statute, is to warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their conduct. ... Criminal statutes which fail to give due notice that an act has been made criminal before it is done areunconstitutional deprivations of due process of law."

Hassett v. Welch (1938) 303 US 303, pp. 314 - 315, 82 L Ed 858:

" . . . .if doubt exists as to the construction of a taxing statute, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer..."

Sewell v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 982 (1978):

As we said in Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972): "It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment [435 U.S. 982 , 986] is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." See also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 47 S. Ct. 681 (1927); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).

Karlan v. City of Cincinatti, 416 U.S. 924 (1974):

"These cases all involve convictions under ordinances and statutes which punish the mere utterance of words variously described as 'abusive,' 'vulgar,' 'insulting,' 'profane,' 'indecent,' 'boisterous,' and the like. The provisions are challenged as being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The 'void for vagueness' doctrine is, of course, a due process concept implementing principles of fair warning and non-discriminatory enforcement. Vague laws may trap those who desire to be law-abiding by not providing fair notice of what is prohibited. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 ( 1954). They also provide opportunity for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement since those [416 U.S. 924 , 925] who apply the laws have no clear and explicit standards to guide them. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 ( 1971); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 , 90-91, 15 L. Ed.2d 176 (1965) - http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5089.html (Includes photograph of Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth). Further, when a vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of First Amendment freedoms,' it 'operates to inhibitthe exercise of [those] freedoms.' Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." - Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972), quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 [1964 loyalty oath case], and Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)."

"Overbreadth, on the other hand, 'offends the constitutional principle that 'a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." - Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967), quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).

A vague statute may be overbroad if its uncertain boundaries leave open the possibility of punishment for protected conduct and thus lead citizens to avoid such protected activity in order to steer clear of the uncertain proscriptions. Grayned v. City of Rockford supra, 408 U.S. at 109; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). A statute is also overbroad, however, if, even though it is clear and precise, it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 , 508-509 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)."

City of Mesquite v. Alladin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982):

" Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (emphasis [455 U.S. 283, 290] added) *fn12... [ Footnote 12 ] The Court of Appeals summarized the relevant authorities as follows: "A law is void for vagueness if persons `of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application . . . .' Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 n. 8, quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 . See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960). The offense to due process lies in both the nature and consequences of vagueness. First, vague laws do not give individuals fair notice of the conduct proscribed. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 . Accord Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 & n. 3. Second, vague laws do not limit the exercise of discretion by law enforcement officials; thus they engender the possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108-09 & n. 4 http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/grayned.html ; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville (1971) http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/papachri.html , 405 U.S. at 168-70. Third, vague laws defeat the intrinsic promise of, and frustrate the essence of, a constitutional regime. We remain `a government of laws, and not of men,' Marbury v. Madison (1803)

http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/marbury.html 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 163, only so long as our laws remain clear." - 630 F.2d, at 1037."

Appendix C - Link to Story about Ed Czuprynski, one of my other do-nothing local lawyers:

http://www.injusticeline.com/Czu.html

Proof of Service

I, Douglas Palaschak, declare the following under penalty of perjury: I attempted to obtain the fax number for the court at 8:10 a.m. on Tuesday, October 10, 2006. Michelle at 989-895-4265 said that they don’t accept any faxes. Thereafter I found a fax number for the court in my files. I faxed version 1.000 of this motion at 8:30 a.m. to Judge Caprathe’s court at 989-895-4099. I emailed a link to this to Attorney Paul Beggs at beggsandschisler@sbcglobal.net at 8:24 a.m. having pre-advised them yesterday October 9^th that I would do so. At 8:25 a.m. I called the Beggs office at 989 893 3221 and talked to Bruce Manico (phonetic). He said that the secretaries would be there in 5 minutes maybe. I left my number. I explained that I faxed a link to them that would link to Ron Fox’s motion for today. Bruce said he would leave a message but he did not have access to the email. Thereafter at 8:35 I called back and talked to Donna at the office of Paul Beggs. She remembered me talking to her yesterday. She said she would check the email and download the motion and “see what [she] could do”. She is only 5 minutes from the court house. I suggested that she find a way to get that motion to court.

Thereafter at 8:57 a.m. I called the court at 895 4265 They transferred me to Judge Caprathe’s court. I asked the clerk to ask Attorney Paul Beggs to call his office. She said he was just there. I told her that I faxed a motion to the court and that the Ron Fox trial would be premature and that I emailed a motion to the office of Attorney Beggs and that cell phones are usually off in court. She said that she would relay the message to Attorney Beggs if she saw him.

Thereafter at 9:07 a.m. I called the office of Attorney Paul Beggs at 893 3221. I was put on hold. I talked to Donna. Yes, she has indeed printed out the motion that I sent her. However, she refused to even write down the number for the court. Although the court is only 5 minutes away there is nobody to drive there. She says that Paul Beggs may call her and then she will tell him about the motion.

Thereafter at 9:15 I talked to Deputy Walzac at the jail at 989 895 4066. I explained the situation to her. She said that Ron was still there and had not gone to court. Of course she is not permitted to give any message to Ron. She said that the best thing to do would be to call the court - which is what I had previously done.

Thereafter I called Art Schupback and he said that he lives on the other side of town and it is too far to drive.

Thereafter at 9:40 a.m. (6:40 a.m. Pacific time) I dropped 4 copies into the postal drop box and sending them to Ron in jail by priority mail.

Signed ________________ Douglas Palaschak. Tuesday, October 10, 2006

Void for Vagueness

Connally vs. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a well- recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.

International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 , 34 S. Ct. 853; Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 , 34 S. Ct. 924 [269 U.S. 385, 393] ... The dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be left to conjecture. The citizen cannot be held to answer charges based upon penal statutes whose mandates are so uncertain that they will reasonably admit of different constructions. A criminal statute cannot rest upon an uncertain foundation. The crime, and the elements constituting it, must be so clearly expressed that the ordinary person can intelligently choose, in advance, what course it is lawful for him to pursue. Penal statutes prohibiting the doing of certain things, and providing a punishment for their violation, should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizen may act upon the one conception of its requirements and the courts upon another.' Rector, Etc., Of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457; 12 S.Ct. 511 (1892): "All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter." [Rector, Etc., Of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457; 12 S.Ct. 511 (1892)] Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507; 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948): "Men of common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of penal enactment. "In determining whether penal statute is invalid for uncertainty, courts must do their best to determine whether vagueness is of such a character that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning. "Where a statute is so vague as to make criminal an innocent act, a conviction under it cannot be sustained." [Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507; 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948)] Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399; 86 S.Ct. 518 (1966):

"Law fails to meet requirements of due process clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves public uncertain as to conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case." [Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399; 86 S.Ct. 518 (1966)] Gould v. Gould, 245 US., 151 (1917):

"This provision of the statute should be liberally construed in favor of the importer, and if there were any fair doubt as to the true construction of the provision in question, the courts should resolve the doubt in his favor. American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468 , 35 L. ed. 821, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 55; United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, Fed. Cas. No. 16,690; Rice v. United States, 4 C. C. A. 104, 10 U. S. App. 670, 53 Fed. 910." U.S. v. De Cadena, 105 F.Supp. 202, 204 (1952)

"The essential purpose of the "void for vagueness doctrine" with respect to interpretation of a criminal statute, is to warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their conduct. ... Criminal statutes which fail to give due notice that an act has been made criminal before it is done are unconstitutional deprivations of due process of law." Hassett v. Welch http://laws.findlaw.com/us/303/303.html 303 US 303, pp. 314 - 315, 82 L Ed 858. (1938)

".if doubt exists as to the construction of a taxing statute, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer..." Hassett v. Welch http://laws.findlaw.com/us/303/303.html 303 US 303, 314 (1938).

As we said in Grayned v. City of Rockford, http://www.fu.gq.nu/grayned.html 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972):

See also

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972);

Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 47 S. Ct. 681 (1927);

Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).

Karlan v. City of Cincinatti, 416 U.S. 924 (1974) "These cases all involve convictions under ordinances and statutes which punish the mere utterance of words variously described as 'abusive,' 'vulgar,' 'insulting,' 'profane,' 'indecent,' 'boisterous,' and the like. 1 The provisions are challenged as being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

The 'void for vagueness' doctrine is, of course, a due process concept implementing principles of fair warning and non-discriminatory enforcement. Vague laws may trap those who desire to be law-abiding by not providing fair notice of what is prohibited.

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972);

United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 ( 1954). T

They also provide opportunity for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement since those who apply the laws have no clear and explicit standards to guide them.

Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 ( 1971);

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 , 90-91, 15 L. Ed.2d 176 (1965).

Further, when a vague statute "abuts upon sensitive areas of First Amendment freedoms,' it 'operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.' Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." - http://www.fu.gq.nu/grayned.html Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972), quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964), and Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)."

"Overbreadth, on the other hand, 'offends the constitutional principle that 'a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." - Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967), quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).

A statute is also overbroad, however, if, even though it is clear and precise, it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 , 508-509 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)." City of Mesquite v. Alladin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982): " Grayned v. City of Rockford http://www.fu.gq.nu/grayned.html 408 U.S. 104, 108 (emphasis [455 U.S. 283, 290] added) *fn12... [ Footnote 12 ] The Court of Appeals summarized the relevant authorities as follows: "A law is void for vagueness if persons `of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application . . . .' Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 n. 8, quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 . See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960).

The offense to due process lies in both the nature and consequences of vagueness. First, vague laws do not give individuals fair notice of the conduct proscribed. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 . Accord Grayned v. City of Rockford http://www.fu.gq.nu/grayned.html 408 U.S. 104, 108 & n. 3. Second, vague laws do not limit the exercise of discretion by law enforcement officials; thus they engender the possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Grayned v. City of Rockford http://www.fu.gq.nu/grayned.html 408 U.S. at 108-09 & n. 4; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. at 168-70. Third, vague laws defeat the intrinsic promise of, and frustrate the essence of, a constitutional regime. We remain `a government of laws, and not of men,' Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 163, only so long as our laws remain clear." 630 F.2d, at 1037 (citations abbreviated)." xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ICE - Investigating Curious Evidence Web site: 1. http://iresist.com/ice/ E-mail: ice@i... ***************************************************** IceBucket Information Updates List Subscription: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ice-bucket/ Subscribe: ice-bucket-subscribe@yahoogroups.com Unsubscribe: ice-bucket-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

6732 Lawyerdude 805 815 3599 Lawyerdude@adelphia.net Lawyerdude1989@yahoo.com

Vagueness is a Powerful Concept in Legal Defense against bad laws.

This page is: http://www.fu.gq.nu/vague2.html .

Related pages: My other vagueness page: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/vagueness.html

My successful demurrer using this concept: http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5067.html

Defense to drunk driving using this concept:

Larry Becraft’s list of cases using the concept of “Void for Vagueness”

This list of cases was compiled by Attorney Larry Becraft and listed here: http://home.hiwaay.net/%7Ebecraft/Vagueness.html

(Updated by Attorney Larry Becraft Nov. 22, 2004. Upgraded by Attorney Douglas Palaschak on Jan 28, 2005)

This file briefly summarizes and links cases posted on the Net which concern the "void for vagueness" legal doctrine. The cases are listed by jurisdictions and as more posted decisions are found, they will be summarized and linked here.

I. SUPREME COURT

Lawyerdude says: I have arranged these cases in order of importance:

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/papachri.html , 405 U.S. 156 (1972): A vagrancy ordinance, under which petitioners were convicted, is void for vagueness, in that it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions, it makes criminal activities that by modern standards are normally innocent, and it places almost unfettered discretion in the hands of the police. "If some carefree type of fellow is satisfied to work just so much, and no more, as will pay for one square meal, some wine, and a flophouse daily, but a court thinks this kind of living subhuman, the fellow can be forced to raise his sights or go to jail as a vagrant." Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, [405 U.S. 156, 171] Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 Crim. L. Bull. 205, 226 (1967)

Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965): State laws concerning “subversive organization" were void. http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/dombrowski.html

Thornhill v. Alabama 1940 http://laws.findlaw.com/us/310/88.html 310 U.S. 88 (1940): State law which completely prohibited picketing was void.

Connally v. General Const. Co. http://laws.findlaw.com/us/269/385.html 269 U.S. 385 (1926): Wage law was vague.

Cline v. Frink Dairy Co. (1927) http://laws.findlaw.com/us/274/445.html 274 U.S. 445 (1927): The Court found the Colorado Antitrust Act void because it failed to provide an ascertainable standard of guilt.

Lanzetta v. New Jersey 1939 http://laws.findlaw.com/us/306/451.html 306 U.S. 451 (1939): A New Jersey law provided as follows: "Any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or who has been convicted of any crime, in this or in any other State, is declared to be a gangster." Held void.

Jordan v. De George 1951 http://laws.findlaw.com/us/341/223.html 341 U.S. 223 (1951): This case has a short explanation of the development of the doctrine:

The essential purpose of the "void for vagueness" doctrine is to warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their conduct. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 , decided April 23, 1951; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103 -104 (1945). This Court has repeatedly stated that criminal statutes which fail to give due notice that an act has been made criminal before it is done are unconstitutional deprivations of due process of law. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).

Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963): Breach of peace convictions vacated. See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).

Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964): Oath invalid that required teacher to promote respect for the flag and the institutions of the United States. Reason: could apply to criticism of government.

This class action was brought by members of the faculty, staff, and students of the University of Washington for a judgment declaring unconstitutional 1931 and 1955 state statutes requiring the taking of oaths, one for teachers and the other for all state employees, including teachers, as a condition of employment. The 1931 oath requires teachers to swear, by precept and example, to promote respect for the flag and the institutions of the United States and the State of Washington, reverence for law and order and undivided allegiance to the Government of the United States. The 1955 oath for state employees, which incorporates provisions of the state Subversive Activities Act, requires the affiant to swear that he is not a "subversive person": that he does not commit, or advise, teach, abet or advocate another to commit or aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow or alter, or assist in the overthrow or alteration, of the constitutional form of government by revolution, force or violence. "Subversive organization" and "foreign subversive organization" are defined in similar terms and the Communist Party is declared a subversive organization.

Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971): Loitering ordinance was unconstitutionally vague.

Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971): Cincinnati ordinance making it a criminal offense for "three or more persons to assemble . . . on any of the sidewalks . . . and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by," which has not been narrowed by any construction of the Ohio Supreme Court, held violative on its face of the due process standard of vagueness and the constitutional right of free assembly and association.

Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972): Breach of peace law was overbroad.

Grayned v. City of Rockford http://www.fu.gq.nu/grayned.html 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972): law upheld banning noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace and good order of a school. Reason: state courts would apply only to actual or imminent interferences with peace or good order of the school.

"It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that a man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing a fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application."

Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974): The Court voided law making it a crime to publicly mutilate, trample upon, deface or treat contemptuously the flag of the United States. Reason: contemptuously was unclear, particularly when flag commonly used for ornate purposes.

Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979): Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act was vague.

Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489 (1982): Drug law was not vague.

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983): Loitering ordinance was vague.

Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987): Court invalidated statute making it an offense to interrupt a police officer in the performance of his or her duties. The Court said that a significant amount of verbal criticism directed a police officers is protected expression.

Bd. of Airport Comm. of City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987): Court struck law banning any person from engaging in First Amendment activities in the Los Angeles International Airport. Court noted that the law prohibits even talking or reading, or the wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing.

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997): Indecency and the Net.

Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999): Loitering ordinance was unconstitutionally vague.

II. LOWER FEDERAL

Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969): University disciplinary proceedings based upon misconduct was void.

Collins v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978): Ordinances prohibiting demonstrations by members of National Socialist Party were unconstitutional.

Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1980): Dade County loitering ordinance was void.

Leonardson v. City of East Lansing, 896 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1990): Police ordinance was void.

Springfield Armory v. City of Columbus, 29 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1994): Columbus banned named guns and "models by the same manufacturer with the same action design that have slight modifications or enhancements." The Sixth Circuit pointed out that guns varied widely in design, function and power; it was impossible to determine how much of a difference it took to make something not of "the same action design."

Kirkeby v. Furness, 52 F.3d 772 (8 th Cir. 1995): Abortion protesters attacked and prevailed on issue that "Restricted Picketing Zone" was vague.

Women's Medical Prof. Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997): State abortion law found unconstitutional.

Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 1998): Abortion protesters prevailed against overly broad ordinance.

Peoples Rights Organization, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 1998): Assault weapons ban provisions held unconstitutional.

United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority, 163 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 1998): Prohibition against union advertisements on buses found unconstitutional.

Belle Maer Harbor v. Charter Township of Harrison, 170 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999).

United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251 (3rd Cir. 2001): A blanket prohibition on “pornography” is unclear and unconstitutionally vague.

Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002): Ordinance prohibiting travel by certain persons in parts of city void.

Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. DoJ and Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003): Terrorism law’s phrase “material support” was vague. This decision is in PDF.

ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2003): Fremont Street is a public forum and ordinance was unconstitutional.

III. ALABAMA

IV. ALASKA

V. ARIZONA

VI. ARKANSAS

Shoemaker v. State of Arkansas, 343 Ark. 727, 38 S.W.3d 350 (Ark. 2001): The court held that “abusive language” statute was unconstitutional because a “fighting words” limitation would not be the only possible interpretation.

Ark. Tobacco Control Bd. v. Sitton, (2004):

VII. CALIFORNIA

In re Newbern, 53 Cal.2d 786, 3 Cal.Rptr. 364, 350 P.2d 116: Criminal law applicable to "common drunk" was void.

Ketchens v. Reiner, (1987) 194 Cal. App. 3d 470, 239 Cal. Rptr. 549: Verbal abuse statute was vague.

Gatto v. County of Sonoma, (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744: Dress code was void for vagueness and facially overbroad.

VIII. COLORADO

Leonardo v. State, 728 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Colo. 1986): Court noted that "[s]uspicion does not rise to the level of belief or knowledge... It encompasses the apprehension of something without proof or upon little evidence."

IX. CONNECTICUT

X. DELAWARE

XI. FLORIDA

Lachs v. State, 366 So.2d 1223, 1226 (Fla.App. 1979): Court noted that "[m]ere suspicion is no better than random selection, sheer guesswork, or hunch, and has no objective justification."

Easy Way of Lee County, Inc., v. Lee County, 674 So. 2d 863 (Fla.App. 1996): Court found the language of a sound ordinance overly broad and vague when the conduct made illegal music played in such a way that it was "unreasonably loud, raucous, jarring, disturbing, or a nuisance to persons within the area of audibility." Id. at 867. The court reasoned that this standard "represents exactly such a `subjective standard, prohibiting a volume that any individual person "within the area of audibility" happens to find personally disturbing'."

Daley v. City of Sarasota, 752 So.2d 124 (Fla. 2d 2000):

XII. GEORGIA

XIII. HAWAII

XIV. IDAHO

State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 798 P.2d 43 (1990): Loitering ordinance was vague.

State v. Bonner, 61 P.3d 611 (Idaho App. 2002): Sexual battery case.

XV. ILLINOIS

People v. Monroe, 515 N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ill. 1987): Illinois drug paraphernalia prohibition was void because it failed to afford fair notice of the prohibited conduct and it lent itself to arbitrary enforcement.

People v. Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d 379, 537 N.E.2d 751 (1989): The term "midwifery," was vague.

City of Harvard v. Gaut, 277 Ill. App. 3d 1, 660 NE.2d 259 (IL.App. 2 Dist. 1996): Gang colors ordinance was void.

People v. Lee, (3rd 2004): Drug and loitering law was vague.

XVI. INDIANA

Healthscript, Inc. v. State, 770 N.E.2d 810 (Ind. 2002): Medicaid fraud law was vague.

Vaughn v. State, 782 N.E.2d 417 (Ind.App. 2003): Phrase, “is or was living as if a spouse of the other person,” in domestic battery statute is vague. See also Fitzgerald v. State, 805 N.E.2d 857 (Ind.App. 2004).

Foster v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind.App. 2004): Phrase “sexually explicit materials” was vague.

XVII. IOWA

XVIII. KANSAS

Luna v. City of Ulysses, 28 Kan. App. 2d 413, 17 P.3d 940 (2000): "We conclude the loud noise ordinance of the City does not give fair warning to those potentially subject to its reach because there are no objective standards imparted. Loaded phrases and words in the ordinance 'unnecessarily loud,' 'excessive,' 'mentally annoying,' and 'disturbing' do not provide fair warning to an individual of prohibited conduct.

"The ordinance also provides that if the noise is disturbing to 'another person or persons,' then the individual responsible for the noise is in violation, regardless if the complainants have reasonable grounds to complain. As was true in Bryan, the absence of an objective standard subjects the defendant to the particular sensibilities of the complainant. The door is left open to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of noisy speech, thus, potentially ensnaring constitutionally protected speech."

XIX. KENTUCKY

Lexington Fayette County Food & Bev. Assn. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Govt., 131 S.W.3d 745 (2004): Smoking paraphenalia law was vague.

XX. LOUISIANA

State v. Muschkat, 706 So. 2d 429 (La. 1998): Loitering law was void.

State v. Miller, 857 So.2d 423 (La. 2003): "contraband".

XXI. MAINE

XXII. MARYLAND

XXIII. MASSACHUSETTS

XXIV. MICHIGAN

State v. Boomer, (Mich. App. 2002): Law against swearing held vague.

XXV. MINNESOTA

XXVI. MISSISSIPPI

Davis v. Mississippi, 806 So.2d 1098 (Miss. 2001): The Mississippi Supreme Court declared here the cruelty to animals statute to be unconstitutional on the grounds that it is too vague to be understood by ordinary persons because it does not require a guilty mind or bad motive as part of the offense.

XXVII. MISSOURI

Bd. of Ed. of the City of St. Louis v. State of Missouri, 47 SW.3d 366 (Mo. 2001): Election process for board members was vague.

XXVIII. MONTANA

State v. Stanko, 1998 MT 321, 292 Mont. 192, 974 P.2d 1132 (1998): Here, the Montana Supreme Court struck down for vagueness a traffic statute making it a violation to operate a motor vehicle at a speed “greater than is reasonable and proper under the conditions existing at the point of operation, taking into consideration the amount and character of traffic, condition of brakes, weight of vehicle, grade and width of highway, condition of surface, and freedom of obstruction to the view ahead.”

XXIX. NEBRASKA

According to Nebraska case law, the “void-for-vagueness doctrine” requires that a statute define a criminal offense with a sufficient amount of definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and the language it uses does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. State v. Hookstra, 10 Neb. App. 199, 630 N.W. 2d 469 (2001). The test for determining whether a statute is vague is whether it forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and may differ as to its application. State v. Irons, 254 Neb. 18, 574 N.W.2d 144 (1998). In State v. Lynch, 223 Neb. 849, 394 N.W.2d 651 (1986), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be left to conjecture. The crime and elements constituting it must be so clearly expressed that an ordinary person can intelligently choose in advance what course is lawful for him to pursue. Lynch, 394 N.W.2d at 661.

XXX. NEVADA

In re T.R., 80 P.3d 1276 (Nev. 2003): Phrase "rehabilitated to the satisfaction of the court" was vague.

XXXI. NEW HAMPSHIRE

XXXII. NEW JERSEY

State of New Jersey v. Golin, 363 N.J.Super. 474, 833 A.2d 660 (App. Div. 2003): Public nuisance ordinance was void.

XXXIII. NEW MEXICO

XXXIV. NEW YORK

Schlager v. Phillips, 985 F. Supp. 419 (S. D. N. Y. 1997).

XXXV. NORTH CAROLINA

Malloy v. Cooper, 162 N.C.App. 504, 592 S.E.2d 17 (N.C. 2002): pigeon shooting.

XXXVI. NORTH DAKOTA

XXXVII. OHIO

City of Columbus v. Thompson, 25 Ohio St.2d 26, 266 N.E.2d 571 (1971): The word “suspicious”.

Akron v. Rowland, 67 Ohio St.3d 374, 618 NE.2d 138 (1993): loitering; Akron v. Rasdan, 105 Ohio App.3d 164, 663 N.E.2d 947 (1995).

XXXIII. OKLAHOMA

Hayes v. Municipal Court of Oklahoma City, 487 P.2d 974, 976 (Okl.Cr. 1971): Loitering ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.

Switzer v. City of Tulsa, 1979 OK CR 73, 598 P.2d 247 (1979): Tulsa loitering ordinance was vague.

In Re: Initiative Petition No. 366, State Question No. 689, 2002 OK 21, 46 P.3d 123 (2002): “Very similar to Petition No. 366 is the classic example of an unconstitutionally vague statute: 'It shall be a crime to say anything in public unless the speech is protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.' Such a statute is patently vague and will deter constitutionally protected conduct. A vague statute's prohibitions become clear only after 'courts [have] proceeded on a case-by-case basis to separate out constitutional from unconstitutional areas of coverage.' Because of its vagueness, Petition No. 366 would force citizens to refrain from exercising their right to freedom of speech. Thus, Petition No. 366, if adopted, would unconstitutionally abridge article 2, section 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution.”

XXXIX. OREGON

XL. PENNSYLVANIA

XLI. RHODE ISLAND

XLII. SOUTH CAROLINA

XLIII. SOUTH DAKOTA

XLIV. TENNESSEE

XLV. TEXAS

Margraves v. State, 996 S.W.2d at 302 (Tx.Cr.App. 2000): Court held that the official misconduct statute was unconstitutionally void for vagueness.

Coggin v. State, 123 S.W.3d 82 (Tex.App. 2003): Shooting "the bird."

XLVI. UTAH

I.M.L. v. State, 61 P.3d 1038 (Utah 2002): Criminal libel law was overbroad.

XLVII. VERMONT

XLVIII. VIRGINIA

Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 Va. App. 150, 462 S.E.2d 582 (1995): state law regarding child endangerment was unconstitutionally vague.

XLIX. WASHINGTON

Seattle v. Rice, 93 Wn.2d 728, 731, 612 P.2d 792 (1980): The phrase "lawful order" were "not sufficiently specific to inform persons of reasonable understanding of what conduct is proscribed."

State v. Hilt, 99 Wn.2d 452, 662 P.2d 52 (1983): Phrase "lawful excuse" is vague.

Spokane v. Fischer, 110 Wn.2d 541, 754 P.2d 1241 (1988): "A criminal prohibition against permitting a dog's frequent or habitual barking which 'disturbs or annoys' another person in the neighborhood is unconstitutionally vague insofar as it makes criminal liability dependent on the subjective determination of any person who hears the barking."

Washington v. Maxwell, 74 Wash.App. 688, 878 P.2d 1220 (1994): Helmet law.

City of Sumner v. Walsh, 148 Wn.2d 490 (2003): Curfew void.

Mays v. State, 116 Wash.App. 864, 68 P.3d 1114 (2003): Civil commitment law was unconstitutional.

WEST VIRGINIA

WISCONSIN

State v. Stevenson, 236 Wis.2d 86, 613 N.W.2d 90, 2000 WI 71 (Wis. 2000): Wis. “Peeping tom” law is void.

WYOMING

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