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Appendix #3 - Rios v Cozens 7 C 3d 792 (1972)

This page is www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/rios.html

This case is critical to Brief 392. It was in the appendix there: http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/392.html

Bell v Burson is applied at my well-researched Coram Nobis brief #392 at: http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/392.html

Bell v Burson http://www.circuitlawyer.8m.com/Burson.html

Brief that won the Bell v Burson case. And headnotes: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/bursonb.html

Anacker case: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/anacker.html

Pollion case: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/pollion.html

Rios case: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/rios.html

U.S. v Guest: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/guest.html

My page with links to 40 traffic motions: http://www.circuitlawyer.8m.com/5695.html

Motions 101: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6025.html

[Sac. No. 7916. In Bank. August 15, 1972.]

FREDERICO RIOS, a Minor, etc., Petitioner, versus

ROBERT C. COZENS, as Director, etc., et al., Respondents.

SUMMARY

The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident filed a report with the Department of Motor Vehicles claiming that he had incurred property damage of $260. The other driver, who also filed an accident report, and the department, apparently on the basis of such reports, found there was a reasonable possibility that a judgment might be recovered against the uninsured driver as a result of the accident. Upon his failure to deposit security, his license was suspended, and the department refused his demand for a hearing to determine whether there was any likelihood that he would be found liable.

On the uninsured driver's petition on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, the Supreme court ordered issuance of a writ of mandate directing the department to revoke the order suspending petitioner's license and to provide him, upon due notice, a hearing on such suspension. The court held in such a case, the licensee is entitled to a hearing at which he may review the reports or other evidence upon which the department contemplates determining his possible responsibility for the accident and may personally present reports or testimony to establish his claim of nonculpability, all within reasonable due process procedures the department may employ. It took the view that a person's interest in the retention of his driver's license and in the use of his motor vehicle represents a sufficiently important benefit to justify the requirement that he be accorded a hearing before he is deprived of those rights, to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment will be recovered against him. The court did not regard a determination on written reports only as sufficient to satisfy the hearing requirement, pointing out that many persons threatened with license suspension lack the ability to make an adequate written presentation of their position to the department and lack the resources to obtain professional help to forcefully prepare their assertions. It refused to compel the department to reinstate the licenses of other persons whose driving privileges had been previously suspended under the financial responsibility law pending hearing on their possible culpability, but it recognized that such persons were entitled to hearings upon request. (Opinion by Mosk, J., expressing the unanimous decision of the court.)

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HEADNOTES classified to McKinney's Digest

(1) Automobiles section 27 b(5) - Revocation or Suspension of Licenses - Hearing - Under Financial Responsibility Law. In determining whether there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment may be recovered against an uninsured motorist involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury or property damage in excess of $200 for purposes of suspension of his driver's license unless he satisfies the security requirements of the financial responsibility law (Vehicle Code sections 16000-16553), the Department of Motor Vehicles must afford the licensee a hearing within reasonable due process procedures at which me may review the reports or other evidence upon which the department contemplates determining his possible responsibility, and personally present reports or testimony to establish his claim of nonculpability. The retention of a driver's license and the use of a motor vehicle is a sufficiently important personal benefit to justify the hearing requirement, and, considering the inability of many persons threatened with license suspension to make an adequate written presentation or to obtain professional help therewith, a determination based on written reports only does not satisfy that requirement. (Overruling Escobedo v State of California 35 Cal 2d 870 and Orr v Superior Court 71 Cal 2d 220 insofar as they hold that a licensee is not entitled to a hearing, prior to the suspension of his license, to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment may be recovered against him.)

(See Cal Jur 2d Revised, Automobiles, section 145; Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, section 138.)

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Counsel

Eugene M. Swann and Ronald F. Coles for Petitioner (driver Rios).

Dennis R. Powell, Maurice R. Jourdane, David H. Kirkpatrick, Richard A. Gonzales and Fred H. Altschuler as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner (driver Rios).

Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, and Victor D. Sonenberg, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.

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OPINION

JUSTICE MOSK - Under the financial responsibility laws (Vehicle code section 16000-16553) the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter the department) will suspend the license of a driver who is involved in an automobile accident which has resulted in bodily injury or property damage in excess of $200 unless he either deposits security with the department sufficient in the opinion of the department to satisfy any final judgment against him up to a stated maximum or establish his exemption from the security requirement by one of several methods, such as by showing that he was insured at the time of the accident. However, as a condition of the suspension, the department must make a determination that there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment may be recovered against the driver, based on his potential culpability. (Orr v Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal 2d 220, 227, 454 P 2d 712.)

(Headnote 1) The question involved in this proceeding is whether the driver is entitled to a hearing on the issue of his potential culpability prior to the suspension of his license or whether the department may make its determination, as it now does, merely on the basis of written accident reports which the persons involved in the accident are required to file (§ 16000) without affording the driver an opportunity to personally appear. We conclude that the determination of possible culpability by the department without affording the licensee an opportunity for a hearing does not comply with the requirements of due process, in view of the United States Supreme Court decisions in Bell v. Burson (1971) 402 U.S. 535 [29 L.Ed.2d 90, 91 S.Ct. 1586] and Jennings v. Mahoney (1971) 404 U.S. 25 [30 L Ed 2d 146, 92 S.Ct. 180]. Petitioner is a minor who was involved in an automobile accident on March 18, 1971. The driver of the other vehicle in the accident filed a report with the department claiming that he had incurred property damage of #260. Petitioner also filed an accident report. The department, apparently on the basis of these reports, found there was a reasonable possibility that a judgment might be recovered against petitioner as a result of the accident. Since petitioner was uninsured and could not deposit security, his license was suspended. He asserted that he was not responsible for the accident and demanded a hearing to determine whether there was any likelihood that he would be found liable.

Upon the refusal of the department to grant a hearing, he filed a petition for a writ of mandate in an appellate court through his guardian ad litem. The petitioner seeks, on behalf of petitioner and others similarly situated, to compel respondents, the department and its director, to revoke the order of suspension issued to petitioner and others whose licenses were suspended without hearing, and to afford them notice and an opportunity to be heard on the question of their possible culpability.

Petitioner relies on numerous recent cases in which the United States Supreme Court and this court have recognized that an individual is constitutionally entitled to a hearing prior to being deprived of a significant interest. (Goldberg v Kelly (1970); Sniadach v Family Finance (1969); Randone v Appellate Department (1971)5 Cal 3d 536, 547.) This principle is applicable to a plethora of vital personal and property rights (see Randone v Appellate Department, above, footnote 8), but it has most frequently been applied in this state to invalidate statutes affording a creditor prejudgment remedies against a debtor without prior notice or hearing (see for example Blair v Pitchess (1971); McCallop v Carberry (1970); Cline v Credit Bureau of Santa Clara Valley (1970)).

The rule explicated in the foregoing cases is applicable to the instant circumstances. A person's interest in the retention of his driver's license and in the use of his motor vehicle represents a sufficiently important benefit to justify the requirement that he be accorded a hearing, before his is deprived of those rights, to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment will be recovered against him.

Petitioner emphasized that the rural and urban poor, who cannot afford to purchase insurance or to post security, are frequently faced with license suspension under the financial responsibility law, and that a person deprived of the right to drive may forfeit his employment and suffer other disabilities. If there had been any lingering doubt about the importance of the right to a driver's license, it has been dispelled by Bell v Burson, above, in which the court stated

"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees." Bell v Burson 402 US at 539, 29 L Ed 2d at 94.

We observe, as a 2nd factor justifying a presuspension hearing, that the primary purpose of the financial responsibility law is not to assure that careless drivers are denied the use of the highways - since the most grossly negligent drivers who can post security or are exempt from complying with the requirement may retain their licenses - but, rather, to afford monetary protection to those who suffer injury or property damage by virtue of the carelessness of financially irresponsible drivers. (Barrera v State Farm Mutual (1969). We do not denigrate the desirability of making whole the victims of automobile accidents. But viewed in this economic context, the purpose of the statutes under consideration bears a remarkable relationship to prejudgment creditor's remedies and therefore does not justify a difference in treatment with regard to the right to a pre-suspension hearing. [Note by Palaschak: We thus see that the legal foundation of Rios is more than mere procedural due process.]

Nevertheless, respondents argue, this court decided in Escobedo and Orr that due process is not violated by the suspension of a license without a prior hearing if the department's action is subject to subsequent judicial review.

Two years after our decision in Orr the United States Supreme Court heard Bell in which the precise question was whether the state of Georgia could validly suspend the driver's license of an uninsured motorist who could not post security without affording him a hearing prior to revocation on the question of his responsibility for the mishap. The high court determined that a driver may not constitutionally be deprived of his license without a prior hearing to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment would not be rendered against him as a result of the accident. Insofar as a determination of possible fault is required before suspension our earlier opinions in Escobedo and Orr are consistent with the principles of Bell.

The significance of Bell, however is that the decision not only requires a prior determination of culpability as a condition of suspension but that it leaves no doubt such a determination must be made in the context of a hearing. Georgia actually provided a hearing prior to suspension, but the proceeding was confined to such questions as whether the driver was in fact involved in the accident and whether he came within any of the statutory exemptions. The high court held that in providing a forum to decide the question of possible liability Georgia could elect to include this issue at the hearing already provided by in its laws (citation) and that the hearing required by due process must be meaningful (citations). The opinion concludes that the failure of Georgia's statutory scheme to afford the petitioner a hearing prior to suspension on the question of liability denied him due process of law.

We are called upon, then, to examine the procedure followed in this state to determine if it satisfies the requirements of Bell. Under our statutes as state above, any driver who is involved in an automobile accident which results in bodily injury or in property damage in excess of $200 must file a written accident report with the department within 15 days after the mishap. Vehicle code section 16000. The report contains an account of the driver's version of the accident, as well as information indicating whether he was insured, and estimating the amount of damage incurred. The department makes its determination of possible liability from the substance of these reports. A licensee is not entitled to a personal hearing, and it is not even clear that he is permitted, prior to suspension, to examine the information upon which the department has based its decision. [By Palaschak: In Palaschak's case, no basis for the suspension decision was revealed to Palaschak at the quasi hearing that Palaschak attended on 23 March 1992.]

We conclude that this procedure does not comply with the command of Bell v Burson, 402 US 535, that a hearing be granted prior to license suspension for a failure to comply with the financial responsibility law. In Jennings v Mahoney, above 404 US 25, decided a few month after Bell, the appellant [driver] challenged Utah's procedure for determining whether her driver's license should be suspended under that state's financial responsibility law. There, as here, the issue of liability for her accident was determined from the accident reports filed with the appropriate department, and the motorist was not given an opportunity to offer evidence and cross-examine witnesses. It was held that there was "plainly a substantial question whether the Utah statutory scheme on its face affords the procedural due process required by Bell v Burson." (404 US at 26, 30 L Ed 2d at 148.) However, the Supreme Court did not find the issue ripe for decision since the trial court, apparently doubtful of the due process qualities of the administrative proceedings, had stayed the suspension order and conducted a full judicial evidentiary hearing on the propriety of the suspension. At least 2 jurisdictions have interpreted Bell as imposing a requirement for a hearing prior to suspension under the financial responsibility law. (Pollion v Lewis (ND Ill 1971) 332 F Supp 777; MacBeth v State of Utah (C D Utah 1971) 332 F Supp 1191.)

Respondents do not seriously contend that the procedure followed by the department constitutes a hearing on the issue of possible culpability. They assert, however, that because of the scope of the determination to be made by the department is restricted to whether there is credible evidence of a reasonable possibility of the driver's culpability and the question of actual fault is not an issue, it is sufficient of the department makes its determination as the basis of the written reports. [By Palaschak: This and the following paragraph prove that the Anacker decision is wrong; Rios was decided when the DMV argued that statutorily it was not obligated to determine fault; therefore the Anacker allusion to a change in the statutory requirement of fault is mistaken - a specious basis for specious conclusion.]

The posture is in conflict with both Bell v Burson, above, 402 US 535, and Jennings v Mahoney, above, 404 US 25. Manifestly that the department is required only to decide whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment against the driver does not render a hearing inconsequential. Certainly it is not inconceivable that a licensee may be able to demonstrate to the department, if given the opportunity to do so at a hearing, that there is no reasonable possibility that a judgment will be rendered against him.

It necessarily follows that Escobedo v State of California, above, 35 Cal 2d 870 and Orr, above 71 Cal 2d 220 are overruled insofar as they hold that a licensee is not entitled to a hearing, prior to the suspension of his license, to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that a judgment may be recovered against him. We hold that a hearing is required and that at such a hearing the licensee is entitled to review the reports or other evidence upon which the department contemplates determining that he is possibly responsible for the accident, and to present reports or testimony to establish his claim of nonculpability, all within reasonable due process procedures which the department may employ.

The licensee must be afforded the opportunity to make his presentation personally rather than in writing, under the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Goldberg v Kelly, above 397 US 254, 268, 25 L Ed 2d 287, 299. In Goldberg, it was held that the New York Department of Social Services must permit a welfare recipient to appear personally at a hearing prior to the termination of public assistance payments. The high court reasoned, among other things, that the opportunity to make a written presentation was insufficient because many recipients do not possess the educational attainment necessary to write effectively and would find it difficult to obtain professional assistance. The same rationale is applicable to the situation involved in the present case. Many persons threatened with license suspension lack the ability to make an adequate written presentation of their position to the department and lack the resources to obtain professional help to forcefully prepare their assertions.

Petitioner is entitled to a writ of mandate commanding respondents to revoke the order suspending his license and to provide him with an opportunity for a hearing. He also seeks to compel respondents to reinstate the licenses of those persons whose driving privileges were previously suspended under the financial responsibility law, until respondents grant them a hearing on the issue of their possible culpability. We do not deem it necessary to require respondents to vacate suspension orders previously issued, other than the order issued to petitioner. However, those whose licenses are currently under suspension because of their failure to comply with the requirements of the financial responsibility law are entitled to a hearing if they so request.

Finally, petitioner prays for damages allegedly suffered as the result of the illegal suspension of his license. He cites no authority and has presented neither evidence nor argument to justify an award of damages in this mandamus proceeding. The denial or a damage award is proper.

Let a writ of mandate issue directing respondents to revoke the order suspending petitioner's license and to provide petitioner, upon due notice, a hearing on the suspensions of his license.

Chief Justice Wright, and Justices McComb, Peters, Tobriner, Burke, and Sullivan concurred.

Footnote 5 Petitioner [driver] asserts that the department's procedure provides him with no hearing whatever. [By Palaschak: Palaschak contends likewise. The hearing afforded him did not comport with the DMV's own statutes and California's Administrative Procedure's act.] He states that because the department is required to decide only whether it is reasonably possible that he was liable for the accident, almost any discrepancy between opposing reports would justify a decision against him. The others involved in the accident may omit pertinent matters or may simply falsify their reports in an attempt to force petitioner to pay their claims of damage or summer the suspension of his license. If he is not afforded the opportunity to challenge these errors or misstatements at a hearing before the department he is forever precluded from a meaningful opportunity to defend his version of the accident to avoid a suspension. He is not entitled to a trial de novo even if he seeks court review of the department's determination since on review a court must rely solely upon evidence submitted to the department. (Orr v Superior Court, above 71 Cal 2d 220, 228.)

Footnote 7 Respondents place great reliance upon Rivas v Cozens (ND Cal 1971) 327 F Supp 867 which was reconsidered in a memorandum decision published in the reports. Although the district court in its memorandum decision found the California procedure to be in conformity with Bell, that decision was rendered prior to the filing of the Supreme Court's opinion in Jennings, and we do not find the district court's reasoning to be persuasive.