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Winning Brief and Headnotes for Bell v Burson

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(From 29 L Ed 2d 918.)

Elizabeth Roediger Rindskopf of Atlanta, Georgia, argued the cause pro hac vice and with Howard Moore, Jr., Peter E. Rindskopf and William H. Taylor, all of Atlanta, Georgia, filed a brief for petitioner driver Paul Bell:

The freedom to make use of one's own property as a means of getting about from place to place, whether in pursuit of business or pleasure, is a liberty which under the 14th amendment cannot be curtailed by a state without due process of law. U.S. v Guest 383 http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/guest.html US 745, 16 L Ed 2d 239; Wall v King 206 F2d 878; Passenger Cases, 7 How 283, 12 L Ed 702.

Whether or not protection of a potential creditor's possible future claim is valid, it does not outweigh the individual rights to property, liberty, and interstate travel. Sniadich v Family Finance , 395 US 337, 23 L Ed 2d

Dorothy Beasley, Assistant AG of GA, argued the cause, with Arthur K. Bolton, AG, Harold N. Hills, Jr., Executive Assistant AG, and Courtney Wilder Stanton, Assistant AG, all of Atlanta, filed a brief for respondent Department of Public Safety:

The state has power to regulate the use of motor vehicles, including reasonable provisions to insure safety. Hendrick v Maryland, 235 US 610, 59 L Ed 385; Kane v New Jersey, 242 US 160, 61 L Ed 222; Hess v Pawloski, 274 US 352, 356, 71 L Ed 1091.

Safety is not the only object which may validly be promoted by the exercise of a state's police power. The state legislature has wide discretion in determining what is and what is not necessary in the exercise of the police power to protect the general welfare. It is an exercise of the sovereign rights of government to protect the general welfare of the people. East New York Savings Banks v Hahn, 325 US 230, 90 L Ed 23, 160 ALR 1279; Bode v Barrett, 344 US 583, 97 L Ed 567; Thornhill v Alabama, 310 US 88, 84 L Ed 1093; El Paso v Simmons, 379 US 497, 13 L Ed 2d 446, rehearing denied 380 US 926, 13 L Ed 2d 813.

Each case involving the constitutionality of an exercise of the police power by a state must turn on its own facts. Berman v Parker 348 US 26, 99 L Ed 27.

Requiring insurance as a condition of licensing would be a proper exercise of the police power. Continental Baking Co. v Woodring, 286 US 352, 365, 76 L Ed 1155, 81 ALR 1402; Ex Parte Poresky, 290 US 30, 32, 78 L Ed 2d 641; Reitz v Mealey, 314 US 33, 34, 86 L Ed 21; Turmon v Department of Public Safety, 222 Ga 843, 844, 152 SE 2d 884.

The motor vehicle responsibility law deals with the revocation of a privilege. Murphy v Dominy, 211 Ga 70, 73, 84 SE 2d 193. Even rights are subject to proper regulations. In the judicial application of the due process clause, a balancing of relevant and conflicting factors is a necessary process. Bartkus v Illinois, 359 US 121, 3 L Ed 2d 684; Nelson v State, 87 Ga App 644, 75 SE 2d 39; Re Groban, 352 US 330, 1 L Ed 2d 376; Kinsella V United States, 361 US 234, 4 L Ed 2d 268; Zemel v Rusk, 381 US 1, 14 L Ed 2d 179; Frank v Maryland, 359 US 360, 3 L Ed 2d 877.

Constitutional due process is not offended merely because a security deposit may be ordered by the commissioner without first determining fault. Perez v Tynan, 307 F Supp 1235, 1240; Cheek v Washington, 311 F Supp 956, 966; Trujillo & Montoya v DeBaca, Com. of Motor Vehicles, 320 F Supp 1038; Llamas v Dep. of Trans., 320 F Supp 1041; Latham v Tynan, 435 F 2d 1248.

BANCROFT-WHITNEY REFERENCES

7 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, section 138

3 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Forms 51-54

US L Ed Digest, Constitutional Law sections 695, 787, 803.5

ALR Digests, Automobiles and Highway Traffic sections 47, 48

L Ed Index to Annotations, Constitutional Law, Motor Vehicles and Carriers

ALR Quick Index, Automobile Insurance, Due Process of Law

Federal Quick Index, Automobile Insurance, Due Process of Law

35 ALR 2d 1011 Validity of Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act.

HEADNOTES

Classified to U.S. Supreme Court Digest, Annotated

Constitutional Law, section 695 - motor vehicle licenses:

1. The 14th amendment is not violated by a statute that bars the issuance of licenses to all motorists who do not carry liability insurance or who do not post security. [Observe carefully that Palaschak's complaint is that California not requires Palaschak to carry insurance but does not require insurance of the drive who crashed into Palaschak.]

Constitutional Law section 695 - due process - motor vehicle license:

2. A license issued to a motorist is not to be taken away by state action without that procedural due process required by the 14th amendment.

States, section 18 - constitutional restraints:

3. Relevant constitutional restraints limit state action to terminate an entitlement, whether the entitlement is denominated a "right" or a "privilege". [In other words, the court here exposes the logical fallacy of the right/privilege distinction.]

Constitutional Law section 695 - due process - motor vehicle license - suspension.

4. In connection with the suspension of a license of an uninsured motorist who was involved in an accident, the inquiry into the fault or liability requisite to afford the licensee due process need not take the form of a full adjudication of the question of liability. [Note that in Palaschak's case even the most cursory review would exonerate Palaschak since the other driver acknowledged fault and paid Palaschak.]

Constitutional Law section 695 - due process - motor vehicle license - suspension:

5. Before a state may suspend the license and registration of an uninsured motorist who was involved in an accident and who did not post security to cover the amount of damages claimed by the other party involved in the accident, procedural due process requires a determination whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against the motorist as a result of the accident, where liability, in the sense of an ultimate judicial determination of responsibility, plays a crucial role under the state's statutory scheme for motor vehicle safety responsibility.

Constitutional Law section 695 - due process - motor vehicle license - suspension:

6. A state's interest in protecting a claimant from the possibility of an unrecoverable judgment is not, within the context of the state's fault-oriented scheme of motor vehicle safety responsibility, a justification for denying procedural due process by suspending the license and registration of an uninsured motorist who has failed to post security, where there is no reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him in connection with an accident in which he has been involved. [Note that California indeed remains a fault-oriented state and there was no possibility of a judgment being rendered against the victim, Palaschak. Therefore due process precludes suspension.]

Constitutional Law section 787 - due process - sufficiency of hearing:

7. The fact that additional expense will be occasioned by an expanded hearing does not justify denying a hearing which meets the standards of procedural due process. [Note in Palaschak's case that the hearing officer was a DMV employee with departmental bias and that she was not a lawyer. Also note that California's administrative procedure's Act requires certain things that this hearing did not provide.]

Constitutional Law section 695 - motor vehicle license - suspension:

8. In reviewing state action in the area of suspension of motorists' licenses, the United States Supreme Court will look to substance, not to bare form, to determine whether constitutional minimums have been honored. [Application: California has a statute that portends to shift the burden by giving a motorist 10 days to ask for a hearing. This attempt around due process fails constitutional muster.]

Constitutional Law section 803.5 - due process - hearing - suspension of license:

9. Under a statutory scheme which makes liability an important factor in the state's determination to deprive an individual of his motor vehicle license, the state may not, consistently with due process, eliminate consideration of that factor in it hearing prior to the suspension of an uninsured motorist's license because he has been involved in an accident an has not posed security. [This is California's strongest point - that their scheme is not fault-related. However, they are fault related in other sections. Furthermore, even if the non-fault section is considered, it has so many exceptions that equal protection precludes enforcement. Example: Professional drivers are excluded as are sick people.]

Constitutional Law section 787 - due process - sufficiency of hearing:

10. The hearing required by the due process clause of the 14th amendment must be meaningful and appropriate to the nature of the case.[Point: Palaschak had office insurance that covered all employee drivers - possibly Palaschak also.]

Constitutional Law section 803.5 - due process - notice - hearing:

11. Due process requires that when a state seeks to suspend a motorists's license, it must afford, before the suspension becomes effective, notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. [Application: In Palaschak's case they sent the notice to the wrong address and furthermore, the hearing that they offer is defective in that 1) fault is not considered, 2) the hearing officer is biased and 3) the hearing does not even meet the state's own requirements as spelled out in the Administrative Procedures Act.]

OPINION OF THE COURT

Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the court.

Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act provides that the motor vehicle registration and driver's license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident shall be suspended unless he posts security to cover the amount of damages claimed by aggrieved parties in reports of the accident. The administrative hearing conducted prior to the suspension excludes consideration of the motorist's fault or liability for the accident The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's contention that the State's statutory scheme, in failing before suspending the licenses to afford him a hearing on the question of his fault or liability, denied him due process in violation of the 14th amendment: the court held that "'Fault' or 'innocence' are completely irrelevant factors." 121 Ga App 418, 420, 174 SE 2d 235, 236 (1970). The Georgia Supreme Court denied review. App 27. We granted certiorari. 400 US 963, 27 L Ed 2d 383 (1970). We reverse.

Petitioner is a clergyman whose ministry requires him to travel by car to cover three rural Georgia communities. On Sunday afternoon, November 24, 1968, petitioner was involved in an accident when 5-year-old Sherry Capes rode her bicycle into the side of his automobile. The child's parents filed an accident report with the Director of the Georgia Department of Public Safety indicating that their daughter had suffered substantial injuries for which they claimed damages of $5,000. Petitioner was thereafter informed by the Director that unless he was covered by a liability insurance policy in effect at the time of the accident he must file a bond or cash security deposit of $5,000 or present a notarized release from liability, plus proof of future financial responsibility , [Note by Palaschak: Observe that Palaschak could even have satisfied the Georgia statute because 1) there was no claim against him and 2) he could have produced a release.] or suffer the suspension of his driver's license. App 9. Petitioner [driver] requested an administrative hearing before the director asserting that he was not liable as the accident was unavoidable, and stating also that he would be severely handicapped in the performance of his ministerial duties by a suspension of his licenses. A hearing was scheduled but the director informed petitioner that "the only evidence that the department can accept and consider is: (a) was the petitioner or his vehicle involved in the accident; (b) has petitioner complied with the provisions of the Law as provided; or (c) does petitioner come within any of the exceptions of the law." [By Palaschak: Note the extreme similarity to the questions put forth in California.] App. 11. At the administrative hearing the director rejected petitioner's proffer of evidence on liability, ascertained that petitioner was not within any of the statutory exceptions, and gave petitioner 30 days to comply with the security requirements or suffer suspension. Petitioner then exercised his statutory right to an appeal de novo in the Superior Court. Georgia Code annotated section 92A-602 (1958). At that hearing, the court permitted petitioner to present his evidence on liability, and, although the claimants were neither parties nor witnesses, found petitioner free from fault.

As a result, the Superior Court ordered "that petitioner's driver's license not be suspended . . .[until] suit is filed against petitioner for the purpose of recovering damages for the injuries sustained by the child . . ." App 15. This order was reversed by the Georgia Court of Appeals in overruling petitioner's constitutional contention.

[Headnotes 1-3] If the statute barred the issuance of licenses to all motorists who did not carry liability insurance or who did not post security, the statute would not, under our cases, violate the 14th amendment. [Note by Palaschak: Amen. If California required all persons to post insurance before receiving their car registration, for example, then the law would not offend equal protection guarantees, but the law does not - it requires it only of those involved in a crash, and even that ground might be fair, but California goes one step further, and in Palaschak's case does not require insurance of the party who was insured even though that party was the cause of the crash.] Ex parte Poresky, 290 US 30, 78 L Ed 152 (1933); Continental Baking Co. v Woodring, 286 US 352, 76 L Ed 1155, 81 ALR 1402 (1932); Hess v Pawloski, 274 US 352, 71 L Ed 1091 (1927). It does not follow, however, that the amendment also permits the Georgia statutory scheme where not all motorists, but rather only motorists involved in accidents, are required to post security under penalty of loss of the licenses. [Note by Palaschak: Compare the mistaken words of Judge Lillie in Anacker: "Essentially [driver's] argument is that by requiring proof of financial responsibility from those drivers involved in accidents but not from those not so involved creates a classificatory scheme which bears no rational relationship to the purpose of the legislation." Judge Lillie's decision is directly contrary to the Bell court on this point. But Palaschak's case is distinguishable from Anacker's. Anacker was at fault; Palaschak was not.] See Shapiro v Thompson 394 US 618, 22 L Ed 2d 600 (1969); Frost and Frost Trucking Co. v Railroad Commission, 271 US 583, 70 L Ed 1101, 47 ALR 457 (1926). Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involved state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the 14th amendment. Sniadach v Family Finance 395 US 337, 23 L Ed 2d 349 (1969); Goldberg v Kelly 397 US 254, 25 L Ed 2d 287 (1970). This is but an application of the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a "right" or a "privilege." Sherbert v Verner 374 US 398, 10 L Ed 2d 965 (1963) (disqualification for unemployment compensation); Slochower v Board of Education, 350 US 551, 100 L Ed 692 (1956)(discharge from public employment); Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513, 2 L Ed 2d 1460 (1958) (denial of a tax exemption); Goldberg, above, (withdrawal of welfare benefits). See also Londoner v Denver, 210 US 373, 385, 52 L Ed 1103, 1112 (1908); Goldsmith v Board of Tax Appeals, 270 US 117, 70 L Ed 494, 70 L Ed 494 (1926); Opp Cotton Mills v Administrator, 312 US 126, 85 L Ed 624 (1941).

(Headnotes 4,5) We turn then to the nature of the procedural due process which must be afforded the licensee on the question of his fault of liability for the accident. A procedural rule that may satisfy due process in one context may not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case. Thus, procedures adequate to determine a welfare claim may not suffice to try a felony charge. Compare Goldberg V Kelly 397 US at 270, 25 L Ed 2d at 300, with Gideon V Wainwright 372 US 335, 9 L Ed 2d 799, 93 ALR 2d 733 (1963). Clearly, however, the inquiry into fault or liability requisite to afford the licensee due process need not take the form of a full adjudication of the question of liability. That adjudication can only be made in litigation between the parties involved in the accident. Since the only purpose of the provisions before us it to obtain security from which to pay any judgments against the licensee resulting from the accident, we hold that procedural due process will be satisfied by an inquiry limited to the determination whether there is a reasonable possibility of judgments in the amounts claimed being rendered against the licensee.

(Headnotes 6,7) The state argues that the licensee's interest in avoiding the suspension of his licenses is outweighed by countervailing governmental interests and therefore that this procedural due process need not be afforded him. We disagree. In cases where there is no reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against a licensee, [Note added: as in Palaschak's case] Georgia's interest in protecting a claimant from the possibility of an unrecoverable judgment is not, within the context of the state's fault-oriented scheme, a justification for denying the process due its citizens. Nor is the additional expense occasioned by the expanded hearing sufficient to withstand the constitutional requirement. " 'While the problem of additional expense must be kept in mine, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process.' " Goldberg v Kelly [citation] quoting Kelly v Wyman 294 F Supp 893, 901 (SDNY 1968).

(Headnotes 8,9) The main thrust of Georgia's argument is that it need not provide a hearing on liability because fault and liability are irrelevant to the statutory scheme. We may assume that were this so, the prior administrative hearing presently provided by the state would be "appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v Central Hanover Bank and Trust 339 US 306, 313, 94 L Ed 865, 872 (1950). But "in reviewing state action in this area . . . we look to substance, not to bare form, to determine whether constitutional minimums have been honored." Willner v Committee on Character, 373 US 96, 106, 10 L Ed 2d 224, 231, 2 ALR 3d 1254 (1963) (concurring opinion). And looking to the operation of the state's statutory scheme, it is clear that liability, in the sense of an ultimate judicial determination of responsibility, plays a crucial role in the safety responsibility act. If prior to suspension there is a release from liability executed by the injured party, no suspension is worked by the act. Georgia code annotated section 92A-606 (1958). The same is true if prior to suspension there is an adjudication of nonliability. Ibid. Even after suspension has been declared, a release from liability or an adjudication of nonliability will lift the suspension. Georgia code annotated section 92a-607 (supp 1970). Moreover, other of the acts exceptions are developed around liability-related concepts. [Note by Palaschak: California has a multitude of exceptions.] Thus, we are not dealing here with a no-fault scheme. Since the statutory scheme makes liability an important factor in the state's determination to deprive an individual of his licenses, the state may not, consistently with due process, eliminate consideration of that factor in its prior hearing. [Note by Palaschak: However, this case does not hold that a state may take a person's license without a hearing if they have a no-fault scheme; furthermore, California does not have a no-fault scheme when viewed in its totality; the exemption of everybody not involved in a crash is in itself a fault-orientation.]

(Headnote 10) The hearing required by the Due Process Clause must be "meaningful", Armstrong v Manzo, 380 US 545, 552, 14 L Ed 2d 62, 66 (1965), and "appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v Central Hanover [cited above] at page 313, 94 L Ed at 873. It is a proposition which hardly seems to need explication that a hearing which excludes consideration of an element essential to the decision whether licenses of the nature here involved shall be suspended does not meet this standard.

(Headnote 11) Finally, we reject Georgia's argument that it must afford the licensee an inquiry into the question of liability, that determination, unlike the determination of the matters presently considered at the administrative hearing, need not be made prior to the suspension of the licenses. While "many controversies have raged about . . . the Due Process Clause," Ibid., it is fundamental that except in an emergency situation (and this is not one) due process required that when a state seeks to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it must afford "notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case" before the termination becomes effective. Ibid. Opp Cotton Mills v Administrator, 312 US at 152-156, 85 L Ed at 639-641; Sniadach v Family Finance, above; Goldberg v Kelly, above; Wisconsin v Constantineau, 400 US 433, 27 L Ed 2d 515 (1971). [Emphasis by U.S. Supreme Court.]

(Headnote 5) We hold, then, that under Georgia's present statutory scheme, before the State may deprive petitioner of his driver's license and vehicle registration it must provide a forum for the determination of the question whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him as a result of the accident. We deem it inappropriate in this case to do more than lay down this requirement. The alternative methods of compliance are several. Georgia may decide merely to include consideration of the question at the administrative hearing now provided, or it may elect to postpone such a consideration to the de novo proceedings in the Superior Court. Georgia may decide to withhold suspension until adjudication of an action for damages brought by the injured party. Indeed, Georgia may elect to abandon its present scheme completely and pursue one of the various alternatives in force in other states. Finall, Georgia may reject all of the above and devise and entirely new regulatory scheme. The area of choice is wide; we hold only that the failure of the present Georgia scheme to afford the petitioner a prior hearing on liability of the nature we have defined denied him procedural due process in violation of the 14th amendment.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black, and Mr. Justice Blackmum concur in the result.

Note 1: Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, Georgia Code Annotated section 92A-601 et seq (1958). In pertinent part the statute provided that anyone involved in an accident must submit a report to the Director of Public Safety. Georgia Code Annotated section 92A-604 (Supp 1970). Within 30 days of receipt of the report the Director "shall suspend the licenses and all registration certificates and all registration plates of the operator and owner of any motor vehicle involved in the accident unless or until the operator or owner has previously furnished or immediately furnishes security, sufficient . . . to satisfy any judgments for damages or injuries resulting . . . and unless such operator or owner shall give proof of financial responsibility for the future as is required in section 92A-615.1 . . ." Georgia Code Annotated section 92A-605(a) (Supp 1970). Section 92A-615.1 (Supp 1970) requires that "such proof must be maintained for a one-year period." Section 92A-605 (a) works no suspension, however, (1) if the owner or operator had in effect at the time of the accident a liability insurance policy or other bond, Georgia Code section 92A-605 (c) (Supp 1970); (2) if the owner or operator qualifies as a self-insurer, ibid; (3) if only the owner or operator was injured, Georgia Code section 92A-606 (1959); (4) if the automobile was legally parked at the time of the accident, ibid.; (5) if as to an owner, the automobile was being operated without permission, ibid.; or (6) "if, prior to the date that the Director would otherwise suspend license and registration . . . there shall be filed with the Director evidence satisfactory to him that the person who would otherwise have to file security has been released from liability or been finally adjudicated not to be liable or has executed a duly acknowledged written agreement providing for the payment of an agreed amount in installments . . ." Ibid.

Note 3? Georgia Code Annotated section 92A-602 (1958) provides:

"The director shall administer and enforce the provisions of this chapter and may make rules and regulations necessary for its administration and shall provide for hearings upon request of persons aggrieved by orders or acts of the director under the provisions of this chapter. Such hearing need not be a matter of record and the decision as rendered by the director shall be final unless the aggrieved person shall desire an appeal, in which case he shall have the right to enter an appeal to the superior court of the county of his residence, by notice to the director, in the same manner as appeals are entered from the court of ordinary, except that the appellant shall not be required to post any bond nor pay the costs in advance. If the aggrieved person desires, the appeal may be heard by the judge at term or in chambers or before a jury at the first term. The hearing on the appeal shall be de novo, however, such appeal shall not act as a supersedeas of any orders or acts of the director, nor shall the appellant be allowed to operate or permit a motor vehicle to be operated in violation of any suspension or revocation by the director, while such appeal is pending. A notice sent by registered mail shall be sufficient service on the director that such appeal has been entered."

Note 4 Petitioner [driver Bell] stated at oral argument that while "it would be possible to raise [an equal protection argument] . . . we don't raise this point here." Transcript of Oral Argument, page 14. [By Palaschak: Regarding Anacker - observe that Bell is not founded merely an equal protection - which is the basis for Anacker not following Bell.]

Note 5 See, for example Fahey v Mallonee, 332 US 245, 91 L Ed 2030 (1947); Ewing v Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 US 594, 94 L Ed 1088 (1950).

Note 6 The various alternatives include compulsory insurance plans, public or joint public-private unsatisfied judgment funds, and assigned claims plans. See R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, After Cars Crash (1967).