Mike Andrus's Section 1983 complaint against angry local judge Carr in Hurricane Utah.

b. Bivens v Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1971) www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/bivens.html 29 L Ed 2^nd d 403 US 388, 91 S Ct 1999; and

c. This court has pendant Jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) for the breaches of duty and other common law offenses asserted herein.

2. Venue is proper here because all the parties work here and because the location of the civil rights injury/ deprivation/ denial is here.

Venue based on Location of Parties and Events

3. All parties are residents of this judicial district.

4. All events herein transpired in this judicial district.

List of Parties and their Nexus to the complaint - as specifically requested in this case.

5. I also list the specific defendants in the paragraphs listing the causes of action.

6. All human parties are over the age of 21.

7. I, Mike Andrus, am the aggrieved party.

8. I am a Private Attorney General as the term is defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Newman v Piggie Park (1968) 390 U.S. 400: http://www.tompeace.s5.com/piggie.html

9. I am not the only person aggrieved by traffic courts and angry out-of-control judges but I am the one who stands up today to say “Hey, this will not stand !”

10. When I do this for my own case I also do it as a public service to all other similarly situated persons.

11. This status of “Private Attorney General” entitles me to an award of attorney and expert fees pursuant to 42 USC 1988 et seq.

12. I am also entitled to fees pursuant to RICO 18 USC 1961 et seq.

13. I am entitled to triple damages pursuant to RICO.

14. I am entitled to punitive damages.

Definition of Class:

15. The class consists of all persons who have been assessed traffic fines by Defendant Judge Carr without disclosure that he is not a lawyer and that he is a long-time former highway patrol trooper.

Nexus: Defendant Angry Judge Carr: Section 1983,RICO, false arrest and imprisonment .

16. The actions of Judge Carr are described in the complaint at “All about Judge Carr”: Click here to go there.

17. Here are descriptions of the action of Defendant Carr in order to establish a nexus to the causes of action.

18. As more fully described below (at “All about Judge Carr”: Click here to go there ) Defendant Judge Carr obstructed justice in violation of 18 USC 1513 by obstructing the flow of my court paper to the court of appeal and then retaliating against me when I caught him red-handed.

19. Defendant Judge Carr compounded his crime by threatening to have me arrested if I did not immediately desist in questioning his clerk regarding her obstruction of the flow of my court paper to the next higher court.

20. Defendant Carr then failed to issue a warrant but made a false oral police call.

21. He ordered the police to bring me from out of the jurisdiction into his court.

22. He then ordered me to serve 5 days in jail without bail, or appeal, or any accouterments of due process.

23. He then conspired to have me tried again for the same event.

24. All of this is more fully set forth in the Chronology of operative events at “All about Judge Carr”: Click here to go there.

Nexus: Defendant Virginia Pectol, Clerk for Judge Carr.

25. Defendant Virginia Pectol is the clerk for Defendant Judge Carr.

26. Her actions are described in the chronology herein at “All about Clerk Virginia Pectol” Click here to go there.

27. She is also listed in those causes of action for which she is liable.

28. She is also listed in the Index of Defendants for your convenience.

29. Her nexus is that she conspired with Defendant Judge Carr to keep my court paper from going to the next higher court in the nature of appeal.

30. In doing so she committed a predicate crime to RICO, namely 19 USC 1512, obstruction of justice, as set forth more fully elsewhere herein.

31. She violated my rights under color of law.

32. She should have done her ministerial duty and delivered the appeal paper to the next higher court.

Nexus: Defendant Police Officers Thad Feltner and Brandon Beull.

33. Defendants Thad Feltner and Brandon Buell are employed as a peace officer by Hurricane City.

34. Their actions are described in the chronology herein.

35. They are also listed in those causes of action for which they are liable.

36. They are also listed in the Index of Defendants.

37. Their nexus is that they conspired with Defendant Judge Carr to obstruct justice thereby conspiring to deny my rights in violation of section 1983 and 1985.

38. More specifically they retaliated against me for my having attempted to bring to light the obstruction of justice previously committed by Defendant Carr in his obstruction of the flow of my court paper to a higher court.

39. They made a police stop without probable cause and without an arrest warrant.

40. They violated my rights; they are liable for that and conspiracy.

41. They are liable for common law false arrest and false imprisonment.

42. Defendant Officer Brandon Buell was the ride along officer in the car that pursued me at the request of Defendant Judge Carr despite Carr’s failure to have issued a warrant.

Nexus: City Prosecutor Christopher Edwards

43. Defendant City Prosecutor Christopher Edwards filed a false complaint against me as set forth more fully in “All about Defendant City Prosecutor Christopher Edwards”. Click here to go there.

44. The actions of Edwards that constitute the causes of action are more fully set forth in the chronology.

45. Edward is also listed in those causes of action for which he is liable.

46. He is also listed in the Index of Defendants for your convenience.

47. Christopher Edwards is the city prosecutor in the traffic case against my wife.

48. His nexus is that he breached his ethical duty as prosecutor and officer of the court to do the right thing.

49. He knew of the official corruption; my wife explained it to him.

50. He conspired by his failure to act.

51. He let me sit in jail for 5 days with neither a bail amount nor other niceties of due process. He was a party to the faux contempt hearing. He owes me a duty as officer of the court and as a witness to official corruption.

Nexus: Defendant Mayor Tom Hirschi

52. Defendant Tom Hirschi is the mayor by Hurricane City.

53. His address is 146 West 1070 South, Hurricane, Utah 84737.

54. The actions of Hirschi that constitute the causes of action are described in the chronology.

55. He is also listed in those causes of action for which he is liable.

56. He is also listed in the Index of Defendants.

57. Hirschi was aware that Judge Carr was a problem and that Carr had already violated the constitutional rights of those appearing in his court.

58. Hirschi should have replaced Carr years ago.

59. Hirschi’s inaction was indeed part of a specific policy of the city and county.

60. That policy was “let Judge Carr and the police have unbridled discretion”.

61. To that end he refrained from creating any written policy.

62. A policy of hands-off is a policy; this was the police of Hirschi and the city and county defendants herein.

63. What happened to me is the foreseeable result of the malfeasance of the mayor. He is out to get me and my wife.

64. A city acts only through its employees.

65. The city profited from the RICO acts of his employee, Defendant Judge Carr.

66. The mayor must be held accountable under RICO and the civil rights statutes for the foreseeable result of his continued employment of Carr after repeated complaints of Carr’s corruption, lack of training and incompetence.

Nexus: Unknown Bailiff of Carr’s court

67. The unknown bailiff’s actions are described in the chronology herein.

68. He is also listed in those causes of action for which he is liable.

69. He is also listed in the Index of Defendants.

70. He conspired to deny me my civil rights.

71. He falsely imprisoned me.

72. Defendant Unknown Bailiff of Carr’s court and Defendant Police Officer Raleigh Morris transported me to jail.

Nexus: Defendant Police Officer Raleigh Morris

73. Defendant Morris’s actions are described in the chronology herein.

74. He is also listed in those causes of action for which he is liable.

75. Defendant Morris transported me to jail and booked me.

76. He denied me my civil rights and also conspired with the other defendants and therefore is liable under section 1983 and 1985.

77. He is liable for false imprisonment.

Nexus: Defendant Police Chief Lynn Excell.

78. Defendant Excell is employed by Hurricane City as police chief.

79. He improperly trained, supervised, and hired defendant officers Beull and Feltner.

80. A corporation acts only by the acts and omissions of humans.

81. Defendant Excell should have trained his police to require a warrant or to look for probable cause.

Nexus: Sheriff Kirk and Washington County: Operators of an unconstitutional jail.

82. Sheriff Kirk Smith failed to release me from the illegal imprisonment.

83. His errors and omissions are and actual proximate cause of my having suffered false imprisonment and other injuries at his jail.

84. Washington county had a duty to establish policies for the jail. They failed.

85. The absence of a law library and medical procedures makes their jail per se violative of the standards for jails.

86. The facts pertaining to the nexus are set forth in more detail in the chronology.

Nexus regarding Municipal Defendants emphasizing policy and custom.

87. The actionable actions and policies of the cities and their officials are set forth in detail in the chronology herein at the section entitled “municipal court should have disclosed bias and educational deficiencies to traffic litigants”. Click here to go there.

88. The culpable municipalities and managers are also listed in those causes of action for which they is liable.

89. The official policy of hiring an ex highway patrol officer to hear traffic tickets is bad and actionable policy.

90. Failure to disclose to 12 years worth of traffic ticket litigants that their “Judge” Carr is NOT even a lawyer and IS an ex highway patrol officer constitutes actionable bad policy and a basis for retroactively dismissing all traffic tickets handled by Carr - and that is what I demand.

91. The court/ municipality should have handed each litigant a written notice that the “judge” in their case is merely a high school graduate and knows nothing more about the law than they do.

92. The court should have handed out a written notice to all traffic litigants that the “judge” is not really a judge - and furthermore he is biased in favor of traffic police having served most of his adult life as a traffic cop!

93. I demand herein that all the tickets from the past 12 years be dismissed.

94. As to written policy, it is unrealistic to expect me to know their written policy jot and tittle prior to discovery.

95. At any rate, the “policy” requirement pertains only to section 1983 complaints.

96. The policy applies neither to RICO nor to failure to properly hire/ supervise

97. All of the following deprivations of federal and state constitutional rights were perpetrated by defendants under the color of state law.

Plain Statement of Facts per rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Chronology of Operative Events

Defendant Judge Carr obstructed justice by intercepting my judicial appeal to a higher court; this constituted 18 USC 1512 a predicate crime under the RICO statute.

98. On about June 13, 2003, in Hurricane City, Utah the local police gave a traffic ticket to my wife.

99. My wife is Ruth Andrus.

100. She is not a party to this case.

101. The ticket told her to appear in the Hurricane City Justice Court for arraignment on the offense, a class C misdemeanor criminal offense.

102. Ruth Andrus first appeared in the Justice Court on July 16, 2003, for arraignment on the criminal offense.

103. Defendant Carr was acting as the justice of the peace in the Justice Court presiding in justice court over Ruth's arraignment.

104. Defendant Christopher Edwards was the City Prosecutor who represented Hurricane City in the actions against Ruth and, later, me.

All about Defendant Judge Carr:

105. On at least five occasions closely following the beginning of court proceedings against my wife, I complained in person to Defendant Major Hirschi about the unlawful habits and practices of Defendant Judge Carr and Defendant Prosecutor Edwards.

106. Defendant Carr is the main defendant.

107. His address is 726 South 180 West, Hurricane, Utah 84737.

108. At all pertinent times herein, he was employed as a justice court judge by Hurricane City, 147 North 870 West, Hurricane, Utah 84737.

109. The unconstitutional and criminal actions of Carr that constitute the causes of action are described in the chronology.

110. Carr is also listed in those causes of action for which he is liable.

111. Carr is also listed in the Index of Defendants.

Municipal court should have disclosed bias and educational deficiencies to traffic litigants.

112. This municipal court and the municipalities and city managers should have disclosed the bias and educational deficiencies of this “judge” to the traffic litigants.

The practice of hiring non-lawyers to be judges is bad and actionable policy.

113. Carr is not educated as a lawyer.

114. On information and belief I think that he is a high school graduate.

115. The unconstitutional policy of hiring high school graduates and retired police as judges is one of the issues of this case.

116. Although some frontier states continue to set the standard as “age of at least 18; able to read English” the municipalities are entitled to set higher standards where, as in Utah, this justice court judge is appointed and not elected.

117. In Utah municipalities are negligent if they do not hire a qualified lawyer to do the job especially where, as here, they have been informed that the seat holder is not of suitable judicial temperament and not adequately educated to do his job.

118. Although Carr is employed by Hurricane City, the other municipal defendants employ him to judge the cases in their court which uses the Hurricane City court for their court.

119. Carr is not elected; he is hired by each of the defendant municipalities and each of their mayors and city managers in exercise of actionable bad policy antagonistic to their constituents.

The policy of hiring an ex highway patrol officer to hear traffic tickets is bad and actionable policy.

120. Defendant Carr is an ex highway patrol officer.

121. He sits in judgment of people accused of offenses by his former employer.

122. This is bad policy.

123. Carr has been judge for at least 12 years.

124. For all this time he and the municipal defendants have perpetrated a fraud on the litigants in traffic court.

125. The court should have handed each litigant a written notice that the “judge” in their case is merely a high school graduate and knows nothing more about the law than they do.

126. The court should have handed out a written notice to all traffic litigants that the “judge” is not really a judge - and furthermore he is biased in favor of traffic police having served most of his adult life as a traffic cop!

127. I demand that all the tickets from the past 12 years be dismissed.

128. The municipalities and their managing executives are liable under RICO; they profit from the abuse caused by hiring this bias and incompetent judge for their collectively owned court.

129. They are out to get me and others like me.

130. A policy of hands-off is a nonetheless a policy. No policy is a policy of hands off.

131. The Magna Charta says: “We will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs, or bailiffs only such as know the law of the realm and mean to observe it well.”

132. Defendant Hurricane City has its office at 147 North 870 West, Hurricane, Utah 84737.

133. Despite having been previously warned by me and others that Defendant Judge Carr was out of control, Hurricane City did nothing.

134. A policy of “hands-off” is nonetheless a policy.

135. Their custom is a undue blind respect for judges and police - in this case even after reports and complaints regarding Defendant Judge Carr.

136. This policy and custom caused my injury.

137. Defendant LaVerkin City is at 111 South Main, LaVerkin, Utah 84745.

138. Defendant Town of Virgin is at 101 South Mill Street, Virgin, Utah 84779.

139. Defendant Rockville is at188 West Main Street, Rockville, Utah 84763.

140. Defendant Springdale Town at 118 Lion Blvd., Springdale, Utah 84767.

My incident began not in court but in the clerk’s office.

141. I was in the clerk’s office - not in court - on 5 November 2003 when Defendant Angry Judge Carr confronted me for exposing his obstruction of justice in a traffic case.

142. He had previously obstructed justice in my wife’s traffic ticket. He was now angry that I persisted in exposing him.

143. Judge Carr and Virginia committed the requisite 2 predicate crimes under RICO.

144. Judge Carr and Virginia violated 18 USC 1512 a2 when they obstructed my petition/ appeal in my wife’s case.

145. Section 1512 a 2 inculpates Judge Carr when he:

146. 18 USC 1512 read in pertinent part:

(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or . .

147. The complete text of section 1512 is at: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/1983.html

148. Carr and Virginia conspired and concealed my appeal document in my wife’s traffic case with the intent to impair the availability of the document to the higher court.

149. The pertinent RICO statutes and predicate crimes are defined at:

http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/1983.html

150. Judge Carr committed 18 USC 1513 b when he retaliated against me for investigating his violation of 18 USC 1512. He did so by filing a false police report and sending police to get me.

151. 18 USC 1513(b) Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby causes bodily injury to another person or damages the tangible property of another person, or threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate against any person for - (1) the attendance of a witness or party at an official proceeding, or any testimony given or any record . . .

152. The complete text of section 1513 is at: www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/1983.html

153. Carr filed a false police report by phone.

154. His phone call to the police constitutes wire fraud - a predicate RICO crime.

155. His intent was to interfere with commerce which he did by unlawful threat of force and use of force to prohibit me from vindicating my wife’s right to engage in commerce - or not.

156. His interference with commerce is the 5^th predicate RICO crime.

157. He falsely imprisoned me. He covered up his actions by intercepting and discarding my appeal from his decision as more fully set forth below in the chronology. He did this in retaliation for my having attempted to use his court. His actions are a cause of action under 1983 et seq and the common law.

158. Defendant Judge Carr and his clerks obstructed justice and thereby invited prosecution under RICO. The section 1983 and RICO laws are set forth at:

159. www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/1983.html

160. Ruth made a request in her Motion for Discovery that she be provided with a copy of Defendant Carr's Oath of Office as a justice court judge and her request was denied.

161. I did not know if the oath was required by law.

162. I did not know if the oath was on file with the city clerk.

163. On August 12, 2003, I went to the 5th District Court in St. George on behalf of my wife Ruth to deliver to the District Court for filing, a Petition for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order.

164. I have appended hereto a copy of that Petition as Exhibit 1.

165. The clerk at the District Court told me that she would not file the "appeal" and that "all appeals are filed with the Justice Court and must “come up from Justice Court."

166. The clerk informed me that he was the "head clerk" at the District Court.

167. He told me to take the Petition to the Justice Court and file it there, and that the Justice Court would forward it to the District Court.

All about Defendant Clerk Virginia Pectol.

168. I did as I was told; I delivered the petition to Defendant Virginia Pectol.

169. Defendant Virginia Pectol received my Petition that same day.

170. Defendant Virginia Pectol is the clerk of Judge Carr’s court.

171. Defendant Judge Richard Carr took possession of a copy of the Petition at the time that I filed it. I observed him reading it to himself.

172. It is apparent from later facts that Virginia violated her ministerial duty to forward my paper to the next higher court.

173. The actions of Judge Carr did not interfere with her.

174. As stated further below, she had custody and control of the paper when I visited her later to inquire.

175. Now we jump in our story from August 12 to September 9 - almost a month.

176. During this time Defendants Carr and his Defendant Clerk Pectol have obstructed justice by obstructing the flow of my paper to the higher court.

177. On September 9, 2003, my wife appeared for a pre-trial hearing on her case before defendant Judge Carr.

178. There defendant prosecutor Christopher Edwards told Judge Carr that an Interlocutory Appeal had been filed and that the pretrial should be stayed until the District Court ruled on the Petition.

179. In response, Judge Carr stated, "I didn't know that it had been forwarded. Who forwarded that?"

180. Judge Carr was expressing concern that someone had thwarted his attempt to obstruct justice in this case.

181. Defendant Judge Carr and Defendant Clerk Pectol had already obstructed justice.

182. Defendant Judge Carr and his clerk Defendant Virginia Pectol had already committed the predicate RICO crime of 18 USC 1512 which inculpates anybody who

183. (1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record,

document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent

to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an

official proceeding; or. . .

184. Carr then entered an order staying the Justice Court proceedings until the District Court ruled on the Petition.

185. As of the date of this Complaint that stay order has not been lifted.

186. The actions of Defendant Judge Carr constitute a violation of 18 USC 1951 a predicate RICO crime.

187. 18 USC 1951. Interference with commerce by threats or violence

Release date: 2005-08-03

(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

(b) As used in this section—

(1) The term “robbery” means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining.

(2) The term “extortion” means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.

188. It was his intent to obtain the monetary benefit of a traffic fine in violation of due process and other accouterments of the criminal justice system.

189. About two months later, without word from either court regarding the Petition, Mrs. Andrus received another pretrial summons from the Justice Court, requiring her to appear for a pre-trial hearing in the Justice Court on February 24, 2004.

190. On November 4, 2003, in order to determine the status of the Petition, I went to the District Court and asked the clerk about the Petition.

191. The clerk told me that there was no case in the District Court against a Ruth Andrus and that nothing had been forwarded from the Justice Court.

192. I immediately went to the Justice Court and spoke with defendant court clerk Virginia Pectol.

193. I asked Defendant Pectol where my petition was.

194. I informed her of my conversation with the District Court clerk.

195. I and told her that the District Court would be "hanging her out to dry" for having failed to forward the Petition to the District Court.

196. I informed Ms. Pectol of her duties regarding the filing of papers.

197. Defendant Clerk Pectol responded, "I just do what the judge tells me to do."

198. I again told her of her responsibilities and she stated, "I don't want to lose my job."

199. I am fully sympathetic to her predicament, but those in a position of trust are often thrust into a position where doing the right thing is not always pleasing to the perpetrator of a fraud.

200. With regarding to public servants I had a right to expect that the right thing be done.

201. My right is acknowledged in 18 USC 1512 which makes it a crime to obstruct the flow of that paper as Defendant Pectol obstructed it.

202. Defendant Judge Carr had previously directed Ms. Pectol to refrain from forwarding my petition to the District Court.

203. Ms. Pectol made a phone call and, still on the phone, asked me my name.

204. I responded "Mike."

205. Defendant clerk Pectol said, "Mike," into the phone, then informed me that she would set "it," meaning the Petition, on Judge Carr's desk.

206. This proves that she knowingly obstructed my petition to the higher court - my only avenue of appeal.

207. I asked Defendant Virginia Pectol when he might know where the Petition was.

208. She replied that the judge would be in the next day and that I could check with her at the end of that day.

209. The next day, November 5, 2003, at about 2:30 pm, while court was not in session, I went to the public counter of the clerk's office at the Justice Court to ask where the Petition was.

210. In response, Ms. Pectol said, "I'll get the judge."

211. I told her that he did not want to speak to the judge.

212. She turned to her left and said, "He does not want to speak to you."

213. Then Defendant Judge Carr, not wearing a judge's robe, and there being no court in session, stepped into view in the clerk's office.

214. I spoke to Defendant Judge Carr, stating, "My business is with the clerk, not with you."

215. Defendant Carr responded, "I am in charge here, you will talk to me."

216. Not being permitted to conduct my business with the clerk in peace, I asked Defendant Carr if he had forwarded the Petition to the District Court.

Defendant Carr admits sandbagging my petition - a violation of 18 USC 1512.

217. Defendant Carr responded, "I did not have to do anything with the Petition."

218. I asked Defendant Carr if he was refusing to forward the Petition and Carr repeated that he could ignore the Petition.

219. I again asked Defendant Carr if he was refusing to forward the Petition and Carr replied that he did not have to talk to me.

220. Defendant Judge Carr reminded me that I am neither the defendant nor counsel for the defendant.

221. Defendant Judge Carr said that the pre-trial was going to go forward, and that I had to leave or Carr would have him arrested for contempt of court.

222. I then told Defendant Carr that he was not in his court, but was in the clerk's office.

223. Defendant Judge responded, "I am in charge here and if you don't leave, I will have you arrested for contempt of court."

224. In so doing, Carr committed two predicate RICO crimes.

225. Carr threatened retaliation; this constitutes a predicate RICO crime: 18 USC 1513.

226. 18 USC 1513.(b) Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby causes bodily injury to another person or damages the tangible property of another person, or threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate against any person for -

227. (1) the attendance of a witness or party at an official proceeding, or any testimony given or any record, document, or other object produced by a witness in an official proceeding; or

228. (2) any information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation (FOOTNOTE 1) supervised release,, (FOOTNOTE 1) parole, or release pending judicial proceedings given by a person to a law enforcement officer; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

229. (c) If the retaliation occurred because of attendance at or testimony in a criminal case, the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense under this section shall be the higher of that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any offense charged in such case.

230. (d) There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section.

231. (e) (FOOTNOTE 2) Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful to any person, including interference with the lawful employment or livelihood of any person, for providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission or possible commission of any Federal offense, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. (FOOTNOTE 2) So in original. Two subsections (e) have been enacted

232. (e) (FOOTNOTE 2) Whoever conspires to commit any offense under this section shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.

233. He interfered with commerce by means of extortion, 18 USC 1951.

18 USC 1951. Interference with commerce by threats or violence

Release date: 2005-08-03

(b) As used in this section—

234. I stepped into the public hallway and asked Defendant Carr, "Is this your court too?"

235. Defendant Carr repeated his threat to arrest me and his demand that I leave the public hallway.

236. I thumbed my nose, walked out of the building and into the parking lot.

237. I got into my truck, and began to back out of my parking spot.

238. I then saw that Defendant Carr had followed me to the parking lot and continued to aggress against me.

239. Defendant Carr was animated and speaking rapidly.

240. I rebuke you in the name of Jesus Christ!

241. I got out of my truck, faced Defendant Carr, raised my right arm to the square, and based on my sincerely held religious belief that destruction naturally follows wickedness said, "I rebuke you in the name of Jesus Christ and tell you to cease your usurpations lest you be destroyed in the flesh."

242. I got back into my truck and drove away.

243. I drove east on State Road 59, where, between mileposts 14 and 15 (about 4 ½ miles outside the Hurricane City limits) I was subjected to a police stop.

Defendant Judge Carr committed his 2^nd counts of 1513 and 1951

244. This stop was made by Defendants Police Officer Thad Feltner and Police Officer Brandon Buell in a patrol car with lights flashing.

245. I had driven to that point without any police vehicles following me within a visible distance.

246. I waited in my truck for about 1½ minutes with no contact from the officers.

247. Then I got out, walked to the back of my truck.

248. I asked the officers, "What can I do for you?"

249. Defendant Thad Feltner, who was driving, said that he was investigating a disturbance at the city offices.

250. Defendant Carr had ordered the police to deliver me to him.

251. Carr did not issue an arrest warrant.

252. Carr did not specify what crime I had committed but I had committed no crime.

253. These two police from Hurricane City were out of their jurisdiction.

254. I said to Defendant Thad Feltner, "You're a little out of your jurisdiction, aren't you?"

255. Defendant Brandon Buell replied, "Fresh pursuit."

256. Defendants Feltner and Buell were outside their normal jurisdiction and did not notify and receive approval of local law enforcement to have powers under Utah Code 77-9-3.

257. They have not yet done so as of the date of this complaint.

258. Their ignorance of these procedures is not a mitigating factor but an aggravating factor.

259. I am reminded of these words from the Magna Charta:

260. http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/magnacharta.html :

261. “We will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs, or bailiffs only such as know the law of the realm and mean to observe it well.”

262. “No bailiff for the future shall, upon his own unsupported complaint, put anyone to his "law", without credible witnesses brought for this purposes.”

263. No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”

264. I immediately asked them if they were conducting a criminal investigation and they replied that they were.

265. I told them that I would need to speak to a lawyer.

266. The men responded that if I would not talk to them, they would arrest me.

267. I asked if he was under arrest.

268. One answered that I was not, but that I would be arrested if I did not talk to them.

269. I again asked if they were conducting a criminal investigation and they said that they were.

270. I again stated that I would need to speak to a lawyer.

Handcuffed and arrested and taken to the angry judge.

271. They then handcuffed me.

272. I told the officers that I was no threat to them and asked, "Why do you need to handcuff me?"

273. They responded that I was under arrest.

274. They neither stated a reason for my arrest nor responded by my request for a lawyer.

275. I have appended this police reported hereto as Exhibit 2.

276. It lists the arrest as a "warrant less arrest."

277. My son Jared Andrus, witnessed much of my conversation with the police and the arrest.

278. Jared drove my truck home; my truck was not impounded or otherwise towed.

279. The defendants involved in the above described violations knew or should have known that their actions were without lawful authority and were expressly forbidden by statute and constitutional Amendment.

280. Their ignorance of lawful procedures is not a mitigating factor but is an aggravating factor.

281. Defendants Feltner and Beull took me in handcuffs to the courtroom of angry defendant judge Carr.

Summary Contempt “hearing” with no record and no requisites of due process.

282. I had not previously been present in that courtroom that day; therefore this was not a contempt hearing.

283. Defendant municipal police Buell and Feltner brought me in handcuffs into the Hurricane City Justice Court

284. They took me to this unfair tribunal without lawful authority.

285. They had no warrant in violation of UC 77-9-3, Utah Constitution Article I, section 14, and the Fourth Amendment.

286. They unlawfully seized me and ultimately my signature and photograph without warrant and without a court order and without due process, in direct violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and as explained in Davis v. Mississippi (1969) 394 U.S. 721 http://laws.findlaw.com/us/394/721.html

287. Defendant Carr came into the courtroom, in his black robe, and sat on the bench, the court having been called into session by the bailiff.

288. Carr asked several questions of me.

289. I exercised my right to remain silent.

290. Despite my having indicated my intention to remain silent Carr told me "If you don't want to speak to me, you can nod your head."

291. Carr instructed the clerk to call the prosecuting attorney, who then came to the courtroom and sat at the prosecutor's table.

292. In Offutt v U.S. (1954) 349 U.S. 11 http://laws.findlaw.com/us/348/11.html the U.S. Supreme Court forbade the use of summary contempt power post-trial by a trial judge who had become "personally embroiled" with the lawyer whom he cited. 348 U.S. at 17, 75 S. Ct. 11. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, held under its "supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts" (348 U.S. at 13, 75 S. Ct. at 13) that a trial judge so embroiled could not proceed summarily after the completion of the trial but must recuse himself to allow another judge to adjudicate the contempt. This was reported in the appeal of William Kunstler who was sentenced by angry federal judge Julius Hoffman to 4 years and 13 days in jail for his conduct as lawyer for the Chicago 7. Kunstler was exonerated on appeal.

http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Chicago7/InReDellinger.htm

293. When Defendant Prosecutor Edwards, arrived, Carr said to him: "Mr. Andrus won't speak to me, perhaps he will talk to you," and then Carr left the courtroom.

294. I had no desire to speak to the prosecutor or to pretend that he was the defense counsel that I had previously requested.

295. Defendant Carr returned to the bench, found me in contempt of court, under case number 03-2642, and sentenced me to serve five days in jail.

296. Because the incident that gave rise to the contempt charge did not occur in the courtroom or the judge's chambers while court was in session, but instead took place at the public counter of the clerk's office, in the public hallway, and in the parking lot, while court was not in session, the contempt hearing should have been a formal hearing for contempt out of the presence of the court, as required by the Utah Code and explained by Robinson v. City Court of Ogden, 185 P.2d 256 Utah (1947).

297. Prior to the contempt hearing, Defendant Carr failed to issue an Order to Show Cause or a Warrant of Attachment and have it served on me by the Sheriff or his representative as required in a formal contempt hearing.

298. Defendant Judge Carr lacked jurisdiction to hold the contempt hearing because of his failure to issue and have served an Order to Show Cause or Warrant of Attachment prior to the hearing and those other violations of substantial and procedural due process.

299. Yet, lacking personal jurisdiction, Defendant Carr did issue an in personam judgment against me in direct violation of the Pennoyer rule.

300. At the contempt hearing, Defendant Carr failed to provide me with a sworn Affidavit, filed with the court, in place of an Information, informing him of the charge against him and detailing the allegations upon which the charge was based.

301. Defendant Carr lacked jurisdiction to hold the contempt hearing also because a sworn affidavit, stating the charge and detailing the basis for the charge, had not previously been filed with the court and presented to me.

302. At the contempt hearing, Defendant Judge Carr failed to inform me of me right to counsel, failed to determine whether or not I was indigent and thus entitled to the appointment of defense counsel, failed to allow me to obtain my own counsel, and failed to obtain a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel from me.

303. Defendant Judge Carr failed to hold a formal contempt hearing in which witnesses were called and evidence taken.

304. Defendant Carr's failure to hold a formal hearing with witnesses and evidence deprived me of my right to due process.

305. He deprived me of my right to confront and cross examine the witnesses against me

306. He deprived me of my right to call witnesses in my defense.

307. Defendant Carr provided no recording or stenographic transcript of the hearing.

308. Thus there is no record.

309. He permitted no appeal from the judgment.

310. Carr should have recused himself; he was the only prosecution witness except for Defendant Court Clerk Virginia Pectol.

311. Defendant Carr presided over a contempt hearing in which he (Defendant Carr) should have been the primary witness.

312. Defendant Carr's failure to recuse himself from the contempt hearing created conflict of interest and deprived me of my right to a fair trial with an impartial judge.

313. Defendant Carr was aware of, or should have been aware of, the proper and lawful procedures for conducting a formal contempt hearing, as those procedures are provided to justice court judges in the Utah Code and in Chapter 19 of the Utah Justice Courts Bench book.

314. Defendant's ignorance of these procedures is not a mitigating factor but an aggravating factor.

315. Defendants Pectol, Morris, Buell and a bailiff, whose name is not known, and others were also present at the unlawful contempt hearing and did not act to prevent the violations of my civil and constitutional rights.

316. The did not attempt to prevent my unlawful incarceration.

All about the Unconstitutional Jail, Sheriff Kirk, and Washington County.

317. Defendant Morris and another man took me in handcuffs to the county jail.

318. I served five days without bail.

319. Morris booked me.

320. Defendant Washington County is a political subdivision of the State of Utah at111 North 100 East, St. George, Utah 84780.

321. Defendant Kirk is employed as county sheriff by Washington County.

322. Many deputies processed me; I don’t know all their names.

323. I advised them at that processing that I suffered from a variety of physical ailments, including pancreatitis.

324. This ailment requires treatment.

325. Failure to treat it causes physical pain and injury.

326. They locked me in a cell block until approximately 2:00 PM the next day.

327. Then they placed me in the same cell as an alleged attempted murderer.

328. On that next day, they called me to the cellblock door.

Unconstitutional jail

329. The entity and people who run the jail owed me a duty to honor my constitutional rights of the imprisoned. Some of those rights are set forth at: Your rights as an imprisoned pro se litigant at: http://www.circuitlawyer.8m.com/5687.html

330. They beached this duty.

331. The jail provided no access to a law library.

332. The jail provided no writing material, no computer, no printer, and no access to the courts of appeal and general jurisdiction.

333. The jail provided no legal forms such as a petition for habeas corpus.

334. The jail provided no medical services.

335. The jail provided no chaplain.

336.

Judge visits me in jail; I refuse to speak to him.

337. They asked if I wanted to "speak to the judge," who was apparently at the jail seeking to speak with me.

338. I answered No.

339. I made numerous requests of the sheriff's deputies for medical assistance for my untreated and painful physical ailments.

My wife informs and pleads with City Manager Fawcett and Mayor Hirschi

340. Defendant Clark Fawcett whose address is 361 West 300 South, Hurricane, Utah 84737, is employed as a city manager and as a city recorder by Hurricane City.

341. My wife contacted Defendant City Manager Fawcett and Mayor Hirschi on repeated occasions.

342. She advised them of the my unlawful arrest and incarceration.

343. She told them of my serious and painful medical conditions.

344. Defendants Judge Carr, Prosecutor Edwards, City Manager Fawcett, Mayor Hirschi, Court Clerk Virginia Pectol and Police Chief Lynn Excell neglected to act to prevent the unlawful actions including unlawful incarceration and negligent care in jail.

345. My wife Ruth visited defendant Court Clerk Virginia Pectol.

346. She asked Virginia to show her a copy of my file regarding the contempt hearing.

347. Pectol and other clerks denied access to my records.

348. They told her to fill out a ten (10) day request for copies.

349. My son Jared had already filled out a 10 day request.

350. My wife sought the assistance of Defendant City Manager Clark Fawcett

351. Defendant Court Clerk Virginia Pectol told my wife and Defendant City Manager Clark Fawcett that they were to be given neither access to my file nor a copy of my file.

352. They were told that Defendant Judge Carr ordered the denial of access.

353. My son, Jared Andrus, made an in person request for access to the public record file and was refused.

354. The court clerks told Jared that "only Mike Andrus could have the papers."

355. Well, of course, I was incarcerated at that time.

356. Jared then made written request of the court for a copy of the case file.

357. Defendant Mayor Tom Hirschi told my wife that Jared Andrus had, "signed a waiver giving them ten (10) days to produce the papers."

358. Defendant Mayor Tom Hirschi made this comment the presence of my wife and Defendant City Manager Clark Fawcett.

359. Hirschi said that the comment was a message from Defendant Judge Carr.

360. I served five days in jail and was then released on 10 November, 2003.

361. I then a copy of the case file.

362. The file contained the following:

a. An unsworn statement by Defendant Carr, signed and dated November 7th, 2003 and deceptively entitled as "Affidavit," though without a filing stamp of the clerk of the court;

b. A warrant of attachment dated November 7th, 2003.

Upon release I appealed; the contempt charge was promptly dismissed by district court.

363. I appealed the contempt conviction to the District Court and the charge was dismissed in the District Court.

364. A copy of this order from the district court is appended hereto as Exhibit 3.

All about Defendant Prosecutor Christopher Edwards

365. Defendant City Prosecutor Christopher Edwards is at 257 South 370 West, Hurricane, Utah 84737.

366. At all pertinent times he was employed as a City Prosecutor by Hurricane City,

367. Until this point in the story, his fault was mere failure to act to prevent injustice.

368. On November 26, 2003, just 16 days after my release, I received by mail, an Information, signed by Defendant Prosecutor Christopher Edwards in case number 03-2726, charging me with Disorderly Conduct under the Utah Code, referencing the same date and place as the alleged contempt incident, and listing the complaining witness as "Judge Richard D. Carr."

369. In so bringing this false accusation Defendant Edwards ceased being merely a passive tort feasor; he was now an active tort feasor.

370. In the same envelope as the Information was a Summons, signed by Defendant Carr, directing me to appear four days later before Defendant Judge Richard D. Carr to answer the Disorderly Conduct charge.

371. I appeared in the Justice Court courtroom on the date required, whereupon Defendant Judge Carr took the bench and called my case.

372. He then recused himself from hearing the case, after which Jim Judd, of the Ivins City Justice Court, conducted the arraignment, with Defendant Prosecutor Christopher Edwards and other defendants present for all of the proceedings.

373. Defendant Judge Carr at all relevant times was exercising the office of Justice Court Judge without the required subscribed oath of office.

374. I objected to the court proceeding without meeting the requirements of URCrP 9.5.

375. I objected to being placed in double jeopardy.

376. I objected to the absence of specific elements in the allegations of Disorderly Conduct.

377. The court continued with the proceedings and scheduled a pretrial appearance.

378. They later dismissed the Disorderly Conduct charge.

379. Defendant Carr's action in summoning me to court on the Disorderly Conduct charge was a conflict of interest because Defendant Judge Carr was the primary witness.

380. It was done to further harass me.

381. Defendant Judge Carr’s act violated my right to due process and a fair trial before an impartial judge.

Judge Carr had not taken the oath of office; he was therefore not authorized.

382. Nine months later, On August 5, 2004, I requested, in writing, that Hurricane City, pursuant to Utah's Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), provide him me a copy of Defendant Carr's subscribed Oath of Office for the period of Defendant Carr's term of office which included the date of November 5, 2003.

383. Hurricane City provided me with a copy of Defendant Carr's subscribed Oath of Office for the year 2004, but did not provide a copy of any such subscribed Oath of Office for the term of office including November 5, 2003.

384. On August 19, 2004, I made a second request under GRAMA, specifically noting that the Oath of Office requested had not been provided and asking that it be provided or that the City certify that the requested Oath of Office was not on file with the City.

385. As of the date of this complaint I have received no response to my second GRAMA request.

386. Based on Hurricane City's failure to provide me a copy of Defendant Carr's subscribed Oath of Office for the term including November 5, 2003, I contend that Defendant Carr was acting as a judge without a subscribed Oath of Office being on file with Hurricane City.

387. Without a subscribed Oath of Office, as required by the Utah Constitution IV,10 and Utah Code, Defendant Carr was intruding upon the office of justice court judge without authority to do so when he began actions against me.

388. Also, Defendant Carr was not a judge when he conducted the contempt hearing against me on November 5, 2003, and later when he summoned me to answer a Disorderly Conduct charge.

389. Defendants Carr, Edwards, Pectol, Feltner, Buell, Morris, Excell, Fawcett and Hirschi are employees of Hurricane City and the Hurricane City Justice Court in various capacities and are under the supervision of, and function under the authorities of, Hurricane City.

390. Defendants, in bringing, maintaining and participating in an action charging Disorderly Conduct and placing me in double jeopardy, knew or should have known that their activities were expressly prohibited by statute and constitutional Amendment.

391. Hurricane City Justice Court operates as a municipal court under the supervision and authorities of Defendant Hurricane City.

392. Defendant LaVerkin City is party to an interlocal governmental agreement, and was so at the time of the events complained of, in which LaVerkin City contracted with Hurricane City for the use and services of the Hurricane City Justice Court.

393. Defendant Virgin City is party to an interlocal governmental agreement, and was so at the time of the events complained of, in which Virgin City contracted with Hurricane City for the use and services of the Hurricane City Justice Court.

394. Defendant Rockville is party to an interlocal governmental agreement, and was so at the time of the events complained of, in which Rockville contracted with Hurricane City for the use and services of the Hurricane City Justice Court.

395. Defendant Springdale City is party to an interlocal governmental agreement, and was so at the time of the events complained of, in which Springdale City contracted with Hurricane City for the use and services of the Hurricane City Justice Court.

396. Defendant Smith as county sheriff supervises sheriff's deputies and operates the Washington County Jail and supervises its employees.

397. Defendant Washington County supervises Defendant Smith, who operates under the supervision and the authorities of Defendant Washington County.

398. The actions depriving him of his protected constitutional rights were borne out of anger and a desire for retribution on the part of the defendants consequent to my of my right to free exercise of religion and my right to free exercise of protected speech.

399. I allege malice and negligence, as well as violations of Utah State Statutes, Federal Code and the RICO Act in the foregoing acts and omissions. "Acting without statutory power at all, or misapplying one's statutory power, will result in a finding that such action was ultra vires." Outboard Marine Corp v. Thomas, 610 F. Supp. 1234, 1242 (N.D. Ill. 1985). "When a citizen challenges the acts of a federal or state official as being illegal, that official cannot just simply avoid liability based upon the fact that he is a public official." United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 220, 221).

400. But for the failure of the Defendants to act to a reasonable standard of care I would not have suffered the wrongs complained of herein.

Causes of Action

Defendants all violated section 1983 and 1985 except as otherwise stated herein.

401. The defendants all violated my constitutional rights excepted as stated herein.

402. All defendants acted under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, and usage, of the state of Utah.

403. All defendants subjected me and other persons similarly situated to deprivation of our rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws as more specifically set forth herein.

404. The defendants are liable to me for damages under section 1983, 1985, and other statutes.

405. All defendants herein caused me to suffer deprivation of our rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws as more specifically set forth herein.

406. As a direct and foreseeable result of their denial of access to the law library, my meaningful access to the courts was denied.

407. As a direct and foreseeable result of their denial of my access, I suffered a loss in one or more cases in this local court.

408. The injury to me was the actual and foreseeable result of their wilful actions.

409. Defendants did this as participants in an out-of-control oppressive system of traffic court ticket enforcement - a problem throughout this country.

410. Defendants did this because they were “out to get me” as the term is defined in Olech v Willowbrook 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir.1998) http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5126.html

411. The municipal defendants and their city managers and mayors deceived the litigants in traffic court by failing to disclose the bias of their cop-turned-judge who has no legal education.

412. They did this to make money.

413. Defendants herein particularly attacked me because of the content of my protected free speech and my free exercise of religion.

414. Defendants did this out of animus of greed and hatred for classes of people: drivers, litigants.

415. All defendants conspired to deprive me of my constitutional rights thereby violating sections 1983, 1985 et seq.

Cause of Action: RICO: Obstruction of Justice and Interference with Commerce

416. The actions that constitute this cause of action are described in the chronology.

417. Defendant Judge Carr committed the requisite predicate crimes to make him liable under RICO.

418. I cannot allege that Defendant Clerk Virginia committed a second predicate crime and therefore I cannot accuse her of RICO.

419. A corporation acts only through the actions of humans.

420. The several municipal defendants profit from the predicate crimes of their Defendant Judge Carr and Defendant Clerk Virginia.

421. It is there official policy to hire uneducated people to perform the job of judge.

422. But for this policy I would not have suffered the violations that I suffered.

423. Therefore Defendants City Manager Clark Fawcett, Hurricane City, Laverkin City, Town of Virgin, Rockville, and Springdale Town must all be held liable under RICO.

424. They designed this system.

425. They ignored previous reports of improprieties amounting to RICO.

426. The practice of hiring the uneducated and appointing them to judgeships is a bad one and leads to just this sort of highhandedness.

427. They continue to profit from RICO actions performed under their authority according to their rules.

Cause of Action: Section 1983

428. All defendants committed acts that violated section 1983.

429. Title 43 USC section 1983 in its entirely:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

430. As to the exception set forth in section 1983 for official judicial acts, the act of forwarding my appeal paper was a mere ministerial act requiring no judicial discretion.

431. As to the contempt action this was not an official judicial act because it did not pertain to a court proceeding and because it was the instrumentality used by Defendant Carr to effect his criminal retaliation in violation of 18 USC 1513.

Cause of Action: Section 1983: False Arrest.

432. Following the incident at the clerk's office at the Justice Court on November 5, 2003, Defendant Carr directed Hurricane City police officers to arrest me without the issuance of a warrant of attachment for my arrest.

433. Defendant Carr's actions in directing the police to arrest me without the issuance of a warrant of attachment, for alleged contempt that was not committed in the presence of the court violated Utah Code section 78-32-4.

434. I was seized and arrested without a warrant, without probable cause or other legal privilege, without substantive or procedural due process, without legal authority, outside of the jurisdiction of the two men in police cars effecting the arrest, conspiring to do so among themselves and with others; all in objective bad faith and in direct violation of Law, including UC 77-9-3, Utah Constitution Article I, sections 1, 7 & 21 and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America.

Cause of Action: Section 1983: False Imprisonment.

435. The actions described herein constitute false arrest. There was no warrant. There was no crime alleged. There was no probable cause.

436. Defendant police officers Thad Feltner Brandon Buell swore to uphold the constitution.

437. When their big chance came they simply acted as serfs and demonstrated their fealty to Defendant Judge Carr.

438. All defendants are liable, some more than others.

439. They conspired to do so among themselves and with others; all in objective bad faith and in direct violation of Law, Utah Constitution Article I, sections 8 (2) & 21 and the 4^th, 5^th, 6^th, and 14^th amendments.

Cause of Action: Section 1983: Denial of Bail

440. As set forth in the chronology, there was no bail set in my case. I was entitled to bail and to appeal.

441. The denial of bail was in retaliation in violation of 18 USC 1513 and a predicate RICO crime.

442. The denial of bail constitutes a section 1983 violation and a section 1985 violation.

Cause of Action: Section 1983: Unreasonable Search and Seizure.

443. As explained in the chronology Defendants Beull and Feltner searched and seized me and my property including my signatures, fingerprints and photographs.

Cause of Action: Section 1983: Infliction of Cruel and Unusual Punishment.

444. I was incarcerated for five days, placed in lock-down, placed in a cell with a state inmate with known dangerous propensities, denied proper medical care, denied a medically necessary diet and there suffered pain and anguish for the length of incarceration and for a substantial period of time after release; all in violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Utah Constitution Article I, section 9 and in the Eighth Amendment and as explained in Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625.

445. Washington County is being sued for cruelly imprisoning me through maintained policy, practice, pattern or custom, and by their acts or omissions, failing to train jail personnel to recognize medical problems and failing to provide access to a physician, by which I was subjected to injuries.

446. This failure and negligence was a direct cause of the wrongs suffered.

Cause of Action: Section 1983: Denial of Right to Due Process and Equal Protection.

447. I was;

a. (a) Arrested without warrant, The police report of the events of the arrest list the arrest as a warrantless arrest for a violation not committed in the presence of the arresting officers. Such is a violation of UC 77-7-2 and Utah Constitution Article I, section 1

b. Tried without a jury, in violation of right to trial by jury secured by Utah Constitution Article I, sections 1 & 11 and the Seventh Amendment.

c. Denied the right to attendance of witnesses to testify on my behalf which right is secured by Utah Constitution Article I, section 12 and the Sixth Amendment.

d. Denied the right to confront witnesses testifying against me which right is secured by Utah Constitution Article I, section 12 and the Sixth Amendment.

e. Subjected to a criminal prosecution by a "justice court judge" acting without judicial authority, in that Defendant Carr unlawfully intruded into the duties of the office of a Justice Court Judge and illegally exercised the same, without the subscribed oath of office required by UC 10-3-827 and the Utah Constitution Article IV section 10 (made mandatory by Article I, section 26), thereby injuring me by the deprivation of my rights as secured by the Utah Constitution and Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.

f. Prosecuted without an information or affidavit, in that neither affidavit nor information existed at the time to my "trial" for contempt of court in violation of URCrP 4 (a) & (b), 5 (a) and 7 (b), (e) & (e) (1) and Utah Constitution Article, I section 12.

g. Tried and sentenced without personal jurisdiction in that a trial was held without affidavit, without information, without personal jurisdiction and a judgment against me was entered contrary to the Pennoyer rule.

Cause of Action: Commencement of Prosecution without Jurisdiction.

448. At the contempt hearing against me on November 5, 2003, Defendant Carr and others prosecuted me for contempt of court and sentenced me to five days in jail, all without jurisdiction to do so.

449. Defendant Carr lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the contempt hearing and to sentence me to jail because Defendant Carr failed to enter and have served an Order to Show Cause or a Warrant of Attachment, as required by Utah Code section 78-32-4.

450. Defendant Carr lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the contempt hearing and to sentence me to jail because Defendant Carr proceeded without a sworn Affidavit, stating the charge and the basis for the charge, being presented to the Justice Court, as required by Utah Code section 78-32-3.

Cause of Action: Denial of Right to a Fair Trial.

451. Defendant Carr's action in failing to hold a formal hearing with witnesses, evidence, confrontation and cross-examination, and defense witnesses, violated my' right to a fair trial, including my rights to hear the evidence against me, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against me, and to present evidence and call defense witnesses.

452. At the contempt hearing against me on November 5, 2004, Defendant Judge Carr acted as the judge at a hearing in which he should have been the primary witness against me which created a conflict of interest.

453. Defendant Carr's action in acting as the judge when he should have been the primary witness was a violation of my right to a fair trial.

454. These actions violated the my rights secured by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

Cause of Action: Denial of Right to Assistance of Counsel.

455. I was denied counsel despite my having twice requested counsel.

456. This violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

457. I was brought in handcuffs into the Hurricane City Justice Court, surrendered to an unfair tribunal and was there denied assistance of counsel where no inquiry was made to determine if I was indigent and therefore entitled to have counsel provided and no intelligent waiver of assistance of counsel was obtained.

458. I was sentenced to, and served, five days in jail without the benefit of assistance of counsel in direct violation of the Argersinger doctrine which prohibits imprisonment if the defendant was not provided with counsel.

Cause of Action: Denial of Right to Free Speech and Free Exercise of Religion.

459. Defendants under color of law acted against me for the purpose of suppressing my protected free speech and free exercise of religion.

460. They retaliated against me for my having exercised my Right to Free Speech.

461. They retaliated against me for my having exercised my Free Exercise of Religion in rebuking defendant Judge Carr, which rights are secured by the Utah Constitution Article I, section 1 and the First Amendment.

462. Express textual provisions of the Utah Constitution protecting the freedoms of speech and exercise of religion are self-executing, or enforceable without additional legislation. (see Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 Utah) "Freedom of speech is not only the hallmark of a free people, but is, indeed, an essential attribute of the sovereignty of citizenship . . . Freedom of speech is . . . essential for the psychological, moral, intellectual, and political, well-being of individuals." (Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 558 Utah). "The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise," Utah Constitution, Article I, section 26.

Cause of Action: Denial of Right against Self Incrimination.

463. Demand and threat of force was made by the arresting officers that I "talk" to them under threat of arrest.

464. Demand was made that I surrender his right to remain silent and that he speak to the "judge" or to the city prosecutor under threat of being jailed.

465. These demands made of me violated my rights secured by the Fifth Amendment.

Cause of Action: Conspiracy to Deprive Civil Rights.

466. Defendants conspired to go on the highway in disguise to deprive the me of my civil rights, which thing they did in violation of Title 42 section 1985 (3) and the RICO Act,

Cause of Action: Neglect to Prevent.

467. Defendants Carr, Edwards, Pectol, Feltner, Buell and others who knew of the conspiracy to deprive me of my civil rights neglected to or refused to prevent the wrong and neglected or refused to prevent the continuation of the wrong; which negligent failure is made unlawful by Title 42, section 1986.

Cause of Action: Section 1983: Being Placed Twice in Jeopardy.

468. With malice and in violation of Utah State Statute, I was placed twice in jeopardy by the Hurricane City Justice Court and court personnel without personal jurisdiction and without substantive or procedural due process of law in direct violation of my rights secured under URCrP 9.5 and the Fifth Amendment.

469. Defendant Carr placed me in double jeopardy by issuing a Summons and proceeding with a criminal prosecution for Disorderly Conduct, in case number 03-2726, after I had already been placed in jeopardy with a Contempt charge for the same incident, all without good cause and without a Court Order separating charges as required by URCrP 9.5.

470. Defendant Prosecutor Christopher Edwards placed me in double jeopardy by filing an information and proceeding with a criminal prosecution for Disorderly Conduct, in case number 03-2726, after I had already been placed in jeopardy with a Contempt charge for the same incident, all without good cause and without a Court Order separating charges as required by URCrP 9.5.

Cause of Action: Section 1983: Negligent Supervision and Negligent Training

471. Upon information and belief with respect to individual rights as protected by the Constitution of the United States of America, Hurricane City, LaVerkin City, Virgin City, Rockville and Springdale City are each being sued as a person for, by their acts or omissions, failing to and/or neglecting to take corrective action against police and court personnel whose lawless propensities were notorious. This failure and negligence was a direct cause of the wrongs suffered.

472. Upon information and belief with respect to individual rights as protected by the Constitution of the United States of America, Hurricane City, LaVerkin City, Virgin City, Rockville and Springdale City are each being sued as a person for, by their acts or omissions, failing to and/or neglecting to implement policies and procedures to discourage lawless conduct. This failure and negligence was a direct cause of the wrongs suffered.

473. Upon information and belief with respect to individual rights as protected by the Constitution of the United States of America, Hurricane City, LaVerkin City, Virgin City, Rockville and Springdale City are each being sued as a person for, by their acts or omissions, failing to and/or neglecting to properly supervise, train and manage its employees to assure competency of its personnel. This failure and negligence was a direct cause of the wrongs suffered.

Cause of Action: Section 1983: Malicious Prosecution.

474. Defendants Carr, Edwards, and other defendants did prosecute me, in hearing and at trial, with malice and without cause; without a crime having been committed, in direct violation of my rights secured by URCrP 4 (a) & (b), 5 (a), 7 (b), (e) and (e) (1) & 9.5 and Utah Constitution Article, I section 12, among others.

Cause of Action: Section 1983: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

475. Defendants have intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon me, my wife and children.

476. Their efforts to silence my exercise protected free speech and free exercise of religion were:

a. Unreasonable and outrageous, in that their efforts offends the generally accepted standards of decency and morality in Washington County and the State of Utah.

b. Done with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress or where any reasonable person would have known that such would result. And

c. The direct and legal cause of severe emotional distress as explained in Jackson v Brown, 904 P.2d 685,687 Utah.

Cause of action: Section 1985: Conspiracy to violate my civil rights.

477. Section 1985 in its entirety: Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights:

(1) Preventing officer from performing duties:

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof; or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave any State, district, or place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties;

(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror;

or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;

(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy;

in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.

478. All defendants herein conspired in the manner highlighted in the above quotation of section 1985 by their overt acts described in the chronology and plain statement above.

Prayer

479. I ask for a $8 million in compensatory damages as itemized in Appendix 1.

480. I ask for $9.6 million in punitive damages as itemized in Appendix 2.

Class Prayer

481. I ask that all traffic fines assessed by Carr by refunded in triplicate according to RICO.

482. I ask that defendant municipalities be ordered to notify the class.

Individual Prayer: Injunctive Relief.

483. I ask that the court order defendant Washington County to build a new jail with a law library and other modern accouterments.

484. I ask the court to appoint an expert to supervise the jail and to devise means to immediately assure that inmates are afforded constitutional rights.

485. I ask that the court order the immediate release of all traffic offenders pending the building of a new jail.

486. I ask for the return all my court records including all signatures, fingerprints, photographs, and other property taken, both originals and any copies, including but not limited to electronic files, as explained by Davis supra.

487. Reasonable costs, expenses and fees including legal counsel, paralegal or research fees incurred in bringing and maintaining this action under section1988 which exact amount is unknown at this time.

488. And, such other and further relief which this Court may deem just, proper and equitable.

Jury Demand

489. I demand a jury.

Signed___________________ Mike Andrus, pro se. Date: Tuesday, October 11, 2005

List of Exhibits

Exhibit 1: A copy of my petition that was intercepted and obstructed by Defendant Judge Carr in violation of 18 USC 1512 a predicate RICO crime. This document is depicted at the following link:

Exhibit 2: A copy of the police report of the chase and false arrest instigated by Defendant Judge Carr in retaliation, a violation of 18 USC 1513, a predicate RICO crime. The false police report constitutes wire fraud, a predicate RICO crime.

Exhibit 3: Copy from District court circa November 12 exonerating me from the contempt of court before Defendant Judge Carr.

Appendix 1: Itemization of Damages

490. $ ½ million in compensatory damages for ordering and executing my arrest without a Warrant of Attachment in violation of the 4^th and 5^th Amendments

491. $ ½ million in compensatory damages for the 5 days day that I was incarcerated in jail.

492. $2 million for my loss of standing in the community, obloquy, shame, disgrace, humiliation, ridicule, scorn and damage to my reputation.

493. $ ½ million for my feared and actual loss of equal protection by law enforcement personnel free from bias and prejudice as to my presumed innocence, veracity and reliability; and for my actual fear of the law enforcement personnel.

494. $2 million in compensatory damages for my feared and actual loss of the free exercise of my First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion and the exercise of protected free speech.

495. $1 million in compensatory damages for conspiring to deprive me of my 1^st, 4^th, 5^th, 6^th, and 14^th amendment rights.

496. $ ½ million in compensatory damages for the my unreasonable search and seizure without warrant, probable cause or other legal privilege and without due process in direct violation of the 4^th, and 14^th Amendments.

497. $ ½ million in compensatory damages for the demand by force and through the exercise of force that I was made witness against myself by in violation of the 5^th Amendment.

498. $ ½ million in compensatory damages per each occasion, first in the matter of the hearing for contempt and secondly for the action charging disorderly conduct, denying me my right to a fair trial in the amount of per each occasion.

499. $ ½ million in compensatory damages for placing me twice in jeopardy in direct violation of the Fifth Amendment

Punitive Damages

500. $1.25 million in punitive damages against Defendants Washington County and Smith for developing and continuing to develop policy, practice and customs of torture and abuse under color of law, against my constitutionally secured rights, and failing and neglecting to properly train, manage and supervise their employees to assure competence of the personnel and especially its deputy sheriffs; and/or for creating such policies, practices and customs by neglecting to implement meaningful procedures to discourage lawless official conduct; and/or for creating such policies, practices and customs by failing to take corrective action against deputies whose lawless and vicious propensities were and are notorious.

501. $1.25 million in punitive damages for the demand by force and through the exercise of force that I bear witness against myself in direct violation of the 5^th amendment.

502. $1.25 million in punitive damages for denying me the right to assistance of counsel despite my repeated and specific demands in direct violation of the 6^th amendment and the Argersinger doctrine.

503. $1 million in punitive damages for my feared and actual loss of the free exercise of my First Amendment rights, to free exercise of religion and the exercise of protected free speech which rights I may no longer freely express without fear of arrest and incarceration by an unfair tribunal.

504. $ ½ million in punitive damages for conspiring to deprive me of my protected First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment civil rights as such conspiracy is made unlawful by Title 42 U.S.C. section 1985 in the amount of $500,000.

505. $ 1/4 million in punitive damages for the my unreasonable search and seizure without warrant, probable cause or other legal privilege and without due process in direct violation of the 4^th and 14^th Amendments.

506. $ 1/4 million in punitive damages for each day that I was incarcerated in jail.

507. $ 1/4 million in punitive damages per occasion. first in the matter of the hearing for contempt and secondly for the action charging disorderly conduct, for denying me my right to a fair trial.

508. Punitive Damages per each occasion, first in the matter of the hearing for contempt and secondly for the action charging disorderly conduct, for malicious prosecution in the amount of $250,000. per occasion.

509. $ 1/4 million in punitive damages for placing me in a punishment cell and locking me down and placing me in a cell with a state inmate with known dangerous propensities, punishing me in a cruel and unusual manner in violation of the 8^th amendment.

510. $ 1/4 million in punitive damages for seizing my property including signatures, fingerprints and photographs without a warrant or court order and without due process in violation of the 4^th and 14^th amendments.

511. $ ½ million in punitive damages for punishing me and forcing me to suffer extreme physical pain and emotional pain and injury and to suffer unusual punishment by denying me proper medical care and a medically necessary diet, in violation of the 8^th amendment.

512. $1.25 million in punitive damages against Defendants Hurricane City, LaVerkin, Virgin, Rockville, Springdale, Excell, Hirschi and Fawcett for developing and continuing to develop policy, practice and customs of abuse under color of law, against the my constitutionally secured rights and failing and neglecting to properly train, manage and supervise its/their employees/subordinates to assure competence of the personnel and especially its/their Court personnel and its/their police officers; and/or for creating such policies, practices and customs by neglecting to implement meaningful procedures to discourage lawless official conduct; and/or for creating such policies, practices and customs by failing to take corrective action against court personnel and police personnel whose lawless propensities were and are notorious.

513. $ 1/4 million in punitive damages against Defendant Carr for unlawfully intruding into the duties of the office of a Justice Court Judge without the prerequisite subscribed oath of office required by UC 10-3-827 and the Utah Constitution Article IV section 10 and thereby injuring me by the deprivation of my right to due process as secured by the Utah Constitution Article I, section 7 and the 6^th and 14^th Amendments.

514. $ 1/4 million in punitive damages for proceeding with and participating in a criminal prosecution without jurisdiction and without substantive or procedural due process in direct violation of the 5^th and 6^th Amendments for the trial for contempt and for falsely accusing me of disorderly conduct.

515. $ 1/4 million in punitive damages for ordering and executing my arrest without a Warrant of Attachment in violation of the 4^th and 5^th amendments.

516. $ 1/4 million for placing me twice in jeopardy in direct violation of the 5^th amendment

Proof of Service

I certify that I emailed this document to:

Attorney David L. Church at belaw@xmission.com

Attorney Frank D. Mylar at mylar-law@comcast.net and fdmylar@msn.com

Index of Defendants

Buell 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Carr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

clerks 1 2 3

deputies 1 2 3 4 5

Edwards 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Excell 1 2 3 4 5

Fawcett 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Feltner 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Hirschi 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Laverkin 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Morris 1 2 3 4 5

municipal 1 2 3 4 5 6

municipalities 1 2 3 4

Pectol 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Rockville 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Smith 1 2 3 4 5

Springdale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Unknown Bailiff 1 2

Unknown jail deputies

Virgin 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Washington County 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8