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Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Critique of Non-responsive brief by Prosecutor entitled “2nd demurrer” by David Christensen. 27 Feb 2009.



 David Christensen Certified Mail #: 7008 3230 0002 1544 9169 D – 3049 Yukon Street Vancouver, B.C. V5Y 3R4 Canada Ph: 604.418.8680

California Mailing: Agent c/o 6217 Franklin Ave., # 290 Los Angeles, CA 90028 David Christensen, In Propria Persona

CITY OF HURRICANE

Plaintiff,

vs.


David Christensen,
Accused/Defendant.
_____________________________________
UNKNOWN REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.
Case No. 085306741 / Citation No
. Citation #: UTO270300

JUDICAL NOTICE OF RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S “REPLY AND OBJECTON TO MOTION TO DISMISS / DEMURRER FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MAGGER JURISIDCITON; LACK OF ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS; FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPN WHICH RELIFE CAN BE GRANTED; LACK OF STATE’S VERIFIED COMPLAINT; STATEMENT OF FACTS, POINTS AND AUTHORITES IN SUPPORT THEREOF;” AND JUDICAL NOTICE OF MOTION TO DEMURRER WITH MEMORDANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER.


It should be noted that no sworn to Opposition has ever been filed by Plaintiff or served on Defendant by Plaintiff as of the time the accused is drafting this supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of David Christensen’s Demurrer.

             The above-named Sovereign Citizen David Christensen (hereinafter referred to as “ the accused”) without admitting to subject-matter and /or personal jurisdiction, and without waving any of his fundamental Rights, hereby submits these supplemental Points and Authorities in addition to the Demurrer in support of this unopposed judicial notice and request that the Demurrer be sustained without leave to amend.

 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The accused hereby reiterates the following and previously sworn to facts, which have never been objected to by any sworn testimony entered into as evidence to the contrary – therefore the following facts must be accepted as prima facie evidence in this instant case.

A)  The accused has the fundamental Right to use the public highways to travel which is given to me by my Creator; and that,     

B)  It is a well-settled fact in law that an automobile and a ‘motor vehicle’ are different modes of conveyance; and that,           

C)  To the best of my knowledge, the original intent and wording of the Motor Vehicle codes in Utah listed ‘automobile’ and ‘motor vehicle’ as two separate entities; and that,         

D)  The word “person” in legal terminology is perceived as a general word which normally includes in its scope a variety of entities other than human beings; and that,       

E)  The United States Supreme Court recognizes that in common usage, the term “person” does not include the Sovereign, statutes employing the word person are ordinarily construed to exclude the Sovereign; and that,  

F)  The accused is a Sovereign; and that,    

G)  In the day in question, the accused was exercising his God given Right to Travel; and that,             

H)  The accused was simply ‘traveling’ in an ‘automobile’; and that, 

I)   The accused was not ‘driving’ a ‘motor vehicle’ subject to Utah state’s Motor Vehicle Codes; and that,               

J)   No one was injured on the date in question; and that,      

K)  The accused has never received a “Verified Misdemeanor Complaint’ from the District Attorney or from any other party; and that, 

L)  It is a well-settled fact in law that Americans or Sovereign Citizens visiting America have the fundamental Right to Travel; and that,            

M)   A highway is a way over which the public have a free right of passage. (Yale University v. City of New Haven, 104 Conn. 610; 134 Atl. 268, 271.); and that,             

N)  The essential features of a highway is that it is a way over which the public at large has he right to pass.(State v. Pierson, 2 Conn. Cir. 660; 204 A.2d 838.); and that,           

O)  This right pf the people is in the street and highways of the state, whether inside or outside the municipalities thereof, is a paramount right. (Light & Coke v. City of Chicago, N.E.2d 777, 781; 413 Ill. 457 (1952); and that,   

P)  It is well settled that the public are entitled to a free passage along the highway. ( Michelson v. Dwyer, 63 N.W.2d 513, 517; 158 Neb. 427 (1954); and that,         

Q)  Our society is built in part upon free passage of men and goods, and the public streets and highways may rightfully be used for travel by everyone. ( Hanson v. Hall, 202 Minn. 381, 383); and that,          

R)  Public ways, as applied to ways by land, are usually termed “highways” or “public roads,” are such ways as every citizen has a right to use. (Kripp v. Curtis, 11 P. 879; 71 Cal. 62); and that,                        

S)   Our courts has stressed he basic right of the transient public and abutting property owners to the free passage of vehicles on public highways and the paramount function of travel as overriding all other subordinate uses of our streets. (State v. Perry, 269 Minn. 204, 206); and that,       

T)   A highway is a public road, which every citizen of the state has a right to use for the purpose of travel. Shelby County Com’rs v. Castetter, 33 N.E. 986, 987, 7 Ind. App. 309; Spindler v. Toomey, 111 N.E/2d 715, 716 (Ind.-1963); and that,              

U)   A highway is a road or way upon which all persons have a right to travel at pleasure. It is the right of all persons to travel upon a road. (Gulf & S.I.R. Co. v Adkinson, 77 So. 954, 955; 117 Miss. 118); and that,       

V)  HIGHWAY.-A free and public road, way, or street; one which every person has the right to use. Black’s Law Dictionary, 2d Ed. (1910), p. 571; and that,        

W) The right to travel over a street or highway is a primary absolute right of everyone. (Foster’s Inc. v. Boise City, 118 P.2d 721, 728); and that,        

X)  Highways are public roads, which every citizen has a right to use. (Wild v. Deig, 43 Ind. 455, 458; 13 Am. Rep. 399); and that,      

Y)  It is settled that the streets of a city belong to the people of a state and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen of the state.( Whyte v. City of Sacramento, 65 Cal. App. 534, 547, 224 Pac. 1008, 1013 (1924); Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1950), 222 Pac. 2d 1, 5, 35 Cal.2d 870 (1950); and that,             

Z)  The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. (Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583 (Va.-1930); and that,        

AA)This right of the people to the use of the public streets of a city is so well established and so universally recognized in this country, that it has become a part of the alphabet of fundamental rights of the citizen. (Swift v. City of Topeka, 23 Pac. 1075,1076, 43 Kansas 671, 674); and that,           

BB)The right of a citizen to use the highways, include the streets of the city or town, for travel and to transport his goods, is an inherent right which cannot be taken from him. Florida Motor Lines v. Ward, 137 So. 163, 167. Also: State v. Quigg, 114 So. 859, 862 (Fla.-1927); Davis v. City of Houston, 264 S.W. 625, 629 (Tex. Civ. App., 1924); and that,              

CC)The right to travel, to go from place to place as the means of transportation permit, is a natural right subject to the rights of others and to reasonable regulation under law. Shactman v Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 941 (1955); and that,              

DD)The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but, a common right. Thompson v Smith, 154 SE 579; and that,            

EE) “All citizens of the United States of America have a right to pass and re-pass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in their own state.” See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 12 L Ed. 702; and that,  

FF) Every citizen has an inalienable right to make use of the public highways of the state; every citizen has full freedom to travel from place to place in the enjoyment of life and liberty. People v Nothaus, 363 P.2d 180, 182 (Colo.-1961); and that,              

GG)A highway according to the common law, is a place in which all the people have a right to pass. A common street and public highway are the same, and any way which is common to all the people may be called a highway. Skinner v. Town of Weathersfield, 63 A. 142, 143; 78 Vt. 410; and that,   

HH) “In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 27 L.Ed.2d 272, 92 S.Ct. 260, Brennan, joined by White and Marshall stated that for more than a century, the Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional right of all citizens to unhindered interstate travel and that both the existence of this right and its fundamental importance in America has been long been established beyond question.” Also see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 31 Lawyer’s Edition 2nd 272, 92 S.Ct. 995, 56 Columbia L. Rev. 47; and that,           

II)   The common law rule was that a public highway was a “way common and free to all the king’s subjects to pass and repass at liberty,” and this court recognized that the “right to travel a highway belongs to everybody in the state,. . .that a highway belongs to the public, and is free and common as a way to every citizen on the land.” House-Wives League v. City of Indianapolis, 204 Ind. 685, 688-89; and that,    

JJ)  Automobiles have the right to use the highways of the State on an equal footing with other vehicles. Cumberland Telephone. & Telegraph Co. v Yeiser, 141 Ky. 15; and that,         

KK) There can be no question of the right of automobile owners to occupy and use the public streets of cities, or highways in the rural districts. Liebrecht v. Crandall, 126 N.W. 69, 110 Minn. 454, 456; and that,           

LL) Automotive vehicles are lawful means of conveyance and have equal rights upon the streets with horses and carriages. Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 205; See also: Christy v. Elliot, 216 Ill. 31; Ward v. Meredith, 202 Ill. 66; Shinkle v. McCullough, 116 Ky. 960; Butler v. Cabe, 116 Ark. 26, 28-29; and that, 

MM)           A traveler has an equal right to employ an automobile as a means of transportation and to occupy the public highways with other vehicles in common use. Campbell v. Walker, 78 Atl. 601, 603, 2 Boyce (Del.) 41; and that,            

NN)Persons may lawfully ride in automobiles, as they may lawfully ride on bicycles. Doherty v. Ayer, 83 N.E. 677, 197 Mass. 241, 246; Molway v. City of Chicago, 88 N.E. 485, 486, 239 Ill. 486; Smiley v. East St. Louis Ry. Co., 100 N.E. 157, 158; and that,            

OO) The owner of an automobile has the same right as the owner of other vehicles to use the highway,* * * A traveler on foot has the same right to the use of the public highways as an automobile or any other vehicle. Simeone v. Lindsay, 65 Atl. 778, 779; Hannigan v. Wright, 63 Atl. 234, 236; and that,

PP) The use of the automobile as a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livelihood in modern life requires us in the interest of realism to conclude that the right to use an automobile on the public highways partakes of the nature of a liberty within the meaning of the constitutional guarantees of which the citizen not be deprived without due process of law. Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A.2d 869, 872; 87 R.I. 226, 231 (1958). See also: Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136, 140; 93 Ariz. 273 (1963); and that,            

QQ)The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways* * *includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; and under the existing modes of travel includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purposes of life and business.* * *The rights aforesaid, being fundamental, are constitutional rights. Teche Lines v. Danforth, 12 So.2d 784, 787 (Miss.-1943). See also Thompson v. Smith, supra.       

Furthermore, the accused submitted to the Plaintiff’s attorney a ‘request for admissions’, and said ‘request for admissions’ was received by the Plaintiff’s attorney on January 26th, 2009. According to the fundamental rule of law, the Admissions must be received by the accused within a good-faith 30 day time frame. The Plaintiff has failed to respond, thus all of the responses to the following Admissions must be in the affirmative. .

a)   You recognize I am a sovereign citizen. Yes or No. [the answer is ‘Yes’]

b)   I have the Right to Travel in America in an automobile but I do not have the right to ‘drive’ a ‘commercial vehicle’ for profit or gain. Yes or No. [the answer is ‘Yes’]

c)    An automobile and a motor vehicle are different modes conveyance. Yes or No. [the answer is ‘Yes’]              

d)   I was traveling and not driving a commercial vehicle used for profit or gain. Yes or No. [The answer is ‘Yes’]              

e)   The Utah Vehicle Code’s original intent was for ‘commercial vehicles’ and not ‘automobiles’. Yes or No. [ The answer is ‘Yes’]

f)    The Utah Vehicle Code has in its history, combined ‘driver’ and ‘operator’ to be synonymous, and both ‘terms’ are strictly for ‘commercial driving purposes. Yes or No. [The answer is ‘Yes’]       

g)   I asked the peace office if anyone was injured, and he responded “no”. Yes or No. [The answer is ‘Yes’]              

h)   No man or woman was injured on the date in question. Yes or No. [The answer is ‘Yes’]           

i)    No man or woman has a claim against me for the date in question. Yes or No. [The answer is ‘Yes’]              

j)    On the date of my trial I will be guaranteed my fundamental Right to face my accuser, and the accuser will be sworn in under penalty of perjury? Yes or No. [The answer is ‘Yes’]        

k)   On the date of my trail I will be guaranteed my fundamental Right to cross-examine the injured party who has been sworn in under penalty of perjury? Yes or No. [The answer is ‘Yes’]    

l)    The word `automobile' connotes a pleasure vehicle designed for the transportation of persons on highways. Yes or No. [The answer is ‘Yes’]   

m)  A motor vehicle or automobile for hire is a motor vehicle, other than an automobile stage, used for the transportation of persons for which remuneration is received. Yes or No. [The answer is ‘Yes’]

n)   The term `motor vehicle' is different and broader than the word `automobile.'" Yes or No. [The answer is ‘Yes’]              

o)   The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common fundamental right of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived. Yes or No. [The answer is ‘Yes’]              

p)   The use of the automobile as a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livlihood in modern life requires us in the interest of realism to conclude that the Right to use an automobile on the public highways partakes of the nature of a liberty within the meaning of the Constitutional guarantees. Yes or No. [The answer is “Yes”]

q)   The State cannot diminish rights of the People. Yes or No. [The answer is “Yes”]            

r)    If the citation is not paid, the Hurricane City justice court / State of Utah will diminish my Right to travel. Yes or No. [The answer is “Yes”]   

s)    The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horse-drawn carriage, wagon, or automobile is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but a common right which he has under his right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Yes or No. [The answer is “Yes”]              

t)    The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a common law right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Yes or No. [The answer is “Yes”]              

u)   Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment. Yes or No. [The answer is “Yes”]              

v)   The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Yes or No. [The answer is “Yes”]              

w)  A highway is a passage, road, and street which every person has a right to use. Yes or No. [ The answer is “Yes”]              

x)   The ‘promise to appear’ citation in question was signed ‘under duress’. Yes or No. [ The answer is “Yes”]              

 

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF SUSTAINING DEMURRER WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

I.       THE PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE (Paragraphs # 1-5) TO THE ACCUSED’S DEMURRER IS UNINTELLIGIBILE    

 

A)  Plaintiff’s unsworn reply is disjointed.        

 

B)  Plaintiff’s unsworn reply is incoherent.       

 

C)  Plaintiff’s unsworn reply is incomprehensible.       

 

D)  Plaintiff’s unsworn reply is unintelligible (Evasrts v. Jones (1951) 104 Cal. App 2d 109, 111, 231 Pg 2d 74).

 

E)  It is not possible to determine what the Plaintiff alleges.  

 

F)  It is impossible to read or make sense of the allegations, if there are any allegations.             

WHEREFORE, I MOVE Judge Myers and this honorable Court, to Demurrer Case No. 085306741 / Citation #: UTO270300 for Plaintiff’s unsworn to, incoherent, unintelligible, incomprehensible, and disjointed pleading.

VII.  THE COURT SHOULD DEMURRER TO THE ACCUSED.     

A)  Plaintiff has no “sworn to” statement of facts.             

B)  In order to be sufficient, a complaint must contain a sworn to ‘statement of facts’ which, with the aid of other conjecture facts not stated, shows a complete cause of action. See Going v. Dinwiddie (1890) 86 Cal. 633, 637; see Garcia v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal. 3d 728, 737           

C)  Plaintiff’s complaint is not sworn to.  

WHEREFORE, I MOVE Judge Myers and this honorable Court, to Demurrer this case for Plaintiff has not served the accused with any type of verified complaint.

IV.        THE COURT SHOULD SUSTAIN TO THE ACCUSED’S DEMURRER WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMED BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF HAS NO REASONABLE POSSIBLITY TO CURE THE DEFECTS IN THE UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT HAS NO FACTS UPON WHICH TO BASE ANY OF THE PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS.      

A)  A trial court does not abuse its discretion by sustaining a general demurrer without leave to amend if it appears from the Complaint that under applicable substantive law there is no reasonable possibility that an amendment could cure the Complaint's defect. See Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 481, 486; Dalton v. East Bay Mun. Utility Dist. (1993) 18 Cal. App. 4th 1566, 1570-1571. Moreover, when a Complaint is successfully challenged by a general demurrer, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate how the Complaint might be amended to cure it of the defect. See Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Department of Industrial Relations (1995) 41 Cal. App. 4th 298, 302.            

WHEREFORE, I MOVE Judge Myers and this honorable Court, to Demurrer this case for Plaintiff has not served the accused with any type of verified complaint.

II.         THE DEMURRER TO THE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF UNCERTAINTY SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE ALLEGATIONS OF MATERIAL FACTS ARE LEFT TO SURMISE.       

A)  Mere recitals, references to, or allegations of material facts that are left to surmise are subject to a special demurrer for uncertainty. (Bernstein v. Piller (1950) 98 Cal. App 2d 441, 443-444, 220 P. 2d 558.       

B)  In holding that the trail court was correct in sustaining the accused’s special demurrer to the complaint for uncertainty, the Court of Appeal said that, in pleading, the essential facts on which a determination of the controversy depends should be stated with clearness and precision so that nothing is left to surmise and, (cite omitted) said that those recitals, references to, or allegations of unsworn material facts that are left to surmise are subject to special demurrer for uncertainty. Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1979) 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 537, 151 Cal. Rptr. 828.  

C)  The accused is unable to ascertain what facts, if any, support the unsworn to Complaint’s allegations, therefore, the accused and the court are left to surmise the unsworn to facts upon which the Plaintiff alleges in its unsworn to Complaint.         

D)  The demurrer should be sustained.           

WHEREFORE, I MOVE Judge Myers and this honorable Court, to Demurrer this case yet again for Plaintiff’s uncertainty and has left the accused to surmise what the allegations truly are.

V.        THE PLAINTIFF’S STATUTES ARE CONFUSING AND AMBIGUOUS.         

A)  UTAH’S MULTISTATE HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT states at title 41, Chapter 23 of Utah state’s motor vehicle codes, gives “Jurisdiction” to both a state of the United States or the District of Columbia.       

B)  Title 41, Chapter 23 of Utah state’s motor vehicle code gives jurisdiction to many different entities including any ‘foreign country’.    

C)  The accused cannot find the definitions for motor vehicle for the foreign countries that Utah state has given authority to over its highways.   

D)  However, Utah state has also given the United States complete jurisdiction over its highways. 

E)  The United States defines ‘motor vehicle’ at title 18, section 31.         

F)   That title and section read: (6) Motor vehicle.— The term “motor vehicle” means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo.         

G)  Used for commercial purposes.— The term “used for commercial purposes” means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit. 

WHEREFORE, I MOVE Judge Myers and this honorable Court, to Demurrer this case yet again for Plaintiff’s uncertainty, and ambiguous definitions. The Plaintiff gives complete jurisdiction of its highways to ‘foreign countries’ yet the accused has been denied access to which foreign countries they are, and the accused is again left to only surmise what are the foreign countries definition(s) for ‘motor vehicle’ for which Utah state has surrendered its highway jurisdiction to.

Additionally, the Plaintiff also gives complete jurisdiction to the United States and/or the District of Columbia, which has different definitions from Utah state, and may have different definitions from the foreign countries with jurisdiction.

VIII.    CONCLUSION:   

            For all the above reasons, but not limited to, it is abundantly clear to any Sovereign Citizen with average intelligence that:

a)  The accused has proven without a shadow of a doubt, that he has the fundamental Right to use the public highways to travel which is given to the accused by his Creator; and that,      

b)  It is a well-settled fact in law that an automobile and a ‘motor vehicle’ are different modes of conveyance; and that,      

c)  On the day in question, the accused was exercising his God given Right to Travel; and that,       

d)  Even the Plaintiff’s Admissions (by silence) readily admits that the accused was not ‘driving’ a ‘motor vehicle’ in ‘traffic’ subject to the Utah Codes / United States codes / foreign country jurisdiction codes; and that,  

e)  The Plaintiff agrees that no one was injured on the date in question; and that,          

f)   The Plaintiff agrees that no one has a ‘claim’ against the accused on the day in question; and that       

g)  The accused has never received a “Verified Misdemeanor Complaint” and/or a ‘Verified Felony Complaint’, and /or “Verified Civil Complaint”; and that,          

h)  The Plaintiff has failed to inform the accused, ‘what foreign country (ies)’ has jurisdiction over Utah state’s Highways; and that,              

i)   The Plaintiff has failed to supply the accused with the foreign countries definition(s) for both an ‘automobile’ and a ‘motor vehicle’. 

 

 

VERIFICATION

I, David Christensen, sovereign common law Citizen (not 14th Amendment citizen) hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of Utah state, that the above Statement of Facts / Points and Authorities In Support, and laws are true and correct, according to the best of my current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746 (1).

Dated: February 27th, 2009

ALL RIGHTS REVERSED

 

Signed: ___________________________________________________________

Printed: David Christensen