9111     3/17/08. Motion to dismiss for Richard Wilson.

Douglas; I will be filing my brief tomorrow. Any

suggestions?

_

This document is http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/9111.html

(Lawyerdude says: I don’t recall writing this brief. Don’t know who wrote it.)

____________________________


IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF LINN COUNTY, KANSAS


STATE OF KANSAS,

                                         Plaintiff,

vs.

                       Case No. 06TR947


Richard D. Wilson

                                         Defendant.



                                           BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF

DISMISSAL


FACTS

           1. The court ordered the State, within 20

days, to brief the issue of whether or not there was

probable cause for the traffic stop.

           2. State does not comport with order but

submits brief of the lesser standard of reasonable

suspicion.

           3. State uses some of the pertinent facts

presented at trial.

           4. State offers (and is admitted)

defendant’s driving record. Record reflects Latest

issue 06/26/96. Expire date 07/04/00. Issue date

07/04/91. Accidents 0, convictions 0, withdrawals 0,

miscellaneous 0, administration 0 End of record.

           5. State’s witness Deputy Paul Filla

testified he acted alone and used information obtained

in a 25 September 2004 standard offense report (00011

animal call) to effectuate the 26 December 2006

traffic stop for a driver’s license check.

           6. Deputy Filla testified (and the State

argues further probable cause pursuant to K.S.A.

8-244) he arrested and took defendant to jail. Deputy

Filla then proceeded with an investigation into

whether defendant had a valid driver’s license.

           7. Deputy Filla testified that the unlawful

license check and arrest were at his sole discretion.

Under color of law, Deputy Filla violated defendant’s

civil rights and right to due process.

           8. Deputy Filla admits knowing it is easy

to obtain a drivers license and that defendant could

obtain one at any time. Deputy Filla admits it would

be his guess defendant did not have one at trial.

           9. State cites State v. Hamic, State v.

Campbell and K.S.A. 8-244 as principals of law upon

which this case can be viewed.

           10. The trial court notes that the

evidentiary record is clear. On 25 Sept. 2004, Deputy

Filla wrote a standard offense report on 00011 (animal

call) which defendant was a witness. No vehicles were

involved. No further investigation of defendants

driving record prior to arrest 26 December 2006.


LAW

             Kansas Statutes Annotated 8-244 is a

nullity, clearly applies only to a licensee.

              State v. Hamic And State v. Campbell are

limited use because the facts and circumstances can

not be compared to this case. Both cites are about

suspended licenses and have other articulable facts.

Defendant agrees it is established law that there must

be more than a hunch or unparticularized suspicion to

justify a investigatory stop. One must look at the

totality of the circumstances and probabilities when

weighing the standards.

  

United States v. Griffith,

No.04-40106-01/02-JAR(D.Kan.04/01/2005) is helpful in

that it shows a controlling courts reasoning with

regard to stale information.

                                                      

U.S. v. Griffith

On this basis, defendants argue, there was no evidence

in the affidavit

upon which the magistrate judge could find that

contraband or evidence of a crime would be found at

the residence at the time of the search. This Court

agrees. For, "[p]robable cause to search cannot be

based on stale information that no longer suggests

that the items sought will be found in the place to be

searched."*fn8 And a determination of timeliness

"depends not merely on the passage of time but on the

nature of the criminal activity, the length of the

activity, and the nature of the property to be

seized."*fn9 The staleness doctrine is based on the

notion that probable cause may dissipate over time.


Defendant has been unable to find cases involving

stale information with facts and circumstances on

point that have been adjudicated by the controlling

courts. Defendant offers Moody v. State, No.SC94435

(Fla.01/02/2003) Supreme Court of Florida. McReynolds

v. State, Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama

No.2Div.352 1983.AL.1774 441 So.2d1016 (1983 AL.)

Defendant knows these cases do not control this court

but may be used in an advisory capacity for case based

reasoning because they are directly on point.


FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Delaware v. Prouse

*fn7 In that regard, it is possible to reconcile

Prouse with the cases cited above. In Prouse, the

Supreme Court found that Delaware's decision to

conduct random vehicle stops to check for unlicensed

drivers and unsafe vehicles was not shown to be

substantial enough to warrant the resulting intrusion

of an individual's privacy. The Court found no

evidence that demonstrated that random stops were

necessary to promote the government's asserted

interests. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658-63.


While we recognize that the totality of the

circumstances may have, at an early point in time,

justified the investigatory stop, we also recognize

that under the staleness doctrine, justification for

an investigatory stop may dissipate with time. When,

as in this case, as many as three years passes without

any further information about a person's driving

status, and when, as in this case, that person's

license can be restored through a simple

administrative process, the staleness of the officer's

information is indeed an important factor in

considering the totality of the circumstances showing

an objective manifestation to justify the stop. See

Denton v. State, 524 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)

(staleness is an "important factor" in determining

probable cause, although not the only factor).


"Good faith is not a magic lamp for police officers to

rub whenever they find themselves in trouble." (United

States v. Reilly (2d Cir. 1996) 76 F.3d 1271, 1280.) A

reasonably well-trained officer would have recognized

that probable cause in this case had grown stale by

the time the warrant was sought and executed. To

prevent the exception from swallowing the rule,

application of the good faith exception must be

limited in this context to those cases in which the

staleness determination is a close one. This is not

such a case.


A police officer is not excused from complying with

the standards applicable to an investigative stop

merely because he may have wanted to verify or check

that a driver had obtained a license. The authority of

the police must be strictly circumscribed by the law

of arrest and search as it has developed to date in

the traditional jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment.



Because the State cites no facts aside from Deputy

Filla’s knowledge of Defendant's 27 month old driving

record, that could, under an objective standard, give

rise to the requisite reasonable suspicion, this stop

was not justified. To hold that a stop based solely on

the facts from the 2004 investigation is proper, would

eviscerate the well-settled standards pertaining to

reasonable suspicion, substantially undermining the

guarantee against unreasonable seizures under the

Kansas and United States Constitutions. Driving

without a license where no suspension or revocation is

involved, the deputy, upon reencountering the driver,

is not legally cognizant of any impediment to the

driver's operation of a vehicle.

                   


Applying an objective standard, it cannot be said that

a person of reasonable caution would be warranted in

believing defendant did not have a license. The

alleged “specific and articulable facts” in this case

amount to no more than Deputy Filla’s prior knowledge

that defendant’s license had been expired on 25

September 2004. At that time, Deputy Filla did not see

defendant commit any violation; Filla was

investigating an animal call in which no vehicles were

involved. Filla exercized a standardless and

unconstrained discretion, the type referred to in

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,661 (1979).


CONCLUSION

     This court should dismiss because the Supreme

Court of the United States, United States District

Court for Kansas, Supreme Court of Florida and the

Appellant Court of Alabama agree with Defendant in

reference to the staleness doctrine, when the facts

and legal circumstances are such as in this case.

      Defendant prays this honorable court will enter

an order to dismiss with prejudice, expunge arrest

record and return Defendants property (appearance

bond, finger print cards).


                                                                                          Respectfully submitted,


                                                                                          ____________________

                                                                                          Richard D. Wilson

                                                                                          2111 E. Santa Fe

                                                                                          Olathe, Kansas 66062





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


I, hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief

in Support of Dismissal was hand-delivered on this

17th day of March, 2008 to the John S. Sutherland,

Linn County Attorney office.


                                                                                          ____________________

                                                                                          Richard D. Wilson



_____________________


Richard David Wilson

2111 E. Santa Fe

Olathe, Kansas 66062

913-302-8693 cell