Ron Fox, Pro Se
In Jail at 503 3rd street, Bay City, Michigan 48708.
Jail Phone: 989 895 4066
Ron’s local lawyer is Paul Beggs: 989 893 3221
This motion is not net finished.
This motion is http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/8069.pdf http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/8069.html
http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/8069.wpd
18th Judicial Circuit of Michigan
1230 Washington Avenue, Bay City MI 48708.
Court of Judge William J. Caprathe
http://www.co.bay.mi.us/bay/home.nsf/Public/Circuit_Court.htm
898 895 4265. Fax: 989-895-4099
People
v
Ron Fox
Case number: 2003-2752
District Case number: 03-fy-10859 SN
Document #8069 Version 0.901
30th Motion for Ron Fox
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Vagueness and Overbreadth of the underlying statute.
Date: Tuesday 28 November 2006.
Time: 9 a.m.
Place: Court Room of Judge Caprathe
Help is coming one day late. - Song by Sam Philips. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sam_Phillips_%28singer%29
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Vagueness and Overbreadth of the underlying statute.
At the venue designated in the caption or at such other venue as the court shall designate I will ask the court to Dismiss the Complaint for Vagueness and Overbreadth of the underlying statute. I hereby waive my right to a speedy trial as needed. My lawyer Palaschak has not yet been informed of the statute number for the underlying accusation. Although my local lawyer Robert Dunne promised to send Palaschak the file if authorized by me, he failed to do so.
Signed _______________________ Ron Fox. Friday, October 27, 2006.
Demand for Renewed Trial Setting Conference. This time I demand to be there.
On Monday October 9th I expected to be in court. I am informed that the court held a trial setting conference without my presence. I strongly object. This violates my due process and other criminal rights under the Michigan Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. I am not ready for trial. I have a multitude of pre-trial motions to be heard.
Signed _____________________ Ron Fox. Friday, October 27, 2006.
Table of Contents
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Vagueness and Overbreadth of the underlying statute.
Notice of Concurrent and Planned Motions in this case.
Statement of the Case. I am the victim of Police Brutality.
I will prevail and be paid just like the woman in South Carolina!
The elements of the crime are not there.
Paul Beggs has a conflict of interest. I fired him over a year ago.
Paul Beggs is doing nothing. . . . again.
Declaration of Attorney Douglas Palaschak
Ron’s disease: Sexsomnia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleep_sex
Instrument of Oppression - Reduce to Attempt even if Illogical.
Points and Authorities Supporting Dismissal on Void-for-Vagueness and Overbreadth
Table of Authorities cited herein:
U.S. Supreme Court cases cited herein:
Michigan Statute Cited herein:
The Logic is Simple. Driving 1 mile home is not Fleeing and Eluding.
Comment of the Prosecuting Attorney Association Proves that Ron was not attempting to elude.
Appendix A - Text of article by Michigan Prosecutor re Fleeing and Eluding.
Appendix C - Link to Story about Ed Czuprynski, one of my other do-nothing local lawyers:
Notice of Concurrent and Planned Motions in this case.
1. I plan to seek review of the exorbitant bail in my case set by Magistrate Bleau.
2. I will move the strike the complaint.
3. I will challenge this statute.
4. I plan to obtain e-transcripts.
5. I plan to move to dismiss.
6. Well, there are a lot of motions that I plan to make.
Here is what I want: I want the court to Vacate the Trial Date and Order Lawyer Beggs to File Written Motions or Withdraw.
Statement of the Case. I am the victim of Police Brutality.
This case arises from a traffic stop. On Monday 27 February, 2006, at around 9:30 a.m. I was driving my van safely around 1.11 miles from my house. Officer Lochinski noticed that my license plates had expired 5 months previously. He signaled me to stop. I stopped. I did not flee and elude. I stopped. Lochinski interviewed me and began writing a ticket. He did not arrest me. There was no emergency. I was merely unable to afford the road tax due to extreme poverty. The remedy would be payment of the tax
Thereafter I saw the wrecker approaching. I have been down this road before. I was not under arrest. I had yielded. The officer could have arrested me. He chose not to. He had all the information to write a ticket and had written a ticket and was walking to my car. I chose to go 1.11 miles to a place of safety - my home. I drove slowly and safely westbound over the water from the intersection of McKinley and Jackson to my home at 503 South Dewitt St., Bay City. Douglas Palaschak plotted the map on MapQuest. This distance is 1.11 miles.
I pulled into my driveway. Having been accosted by police in the same place I assumed the position on the ground outside my van. I have previously filed a section 1983 case for a previous police abuse of this nature at my house. The case is published at the following link:
http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/7045.pdf
I will prevail and be paid just like the woman in South Carolina!
In a more egregious chase in South Carolina, a woman drove 8 miles being chased by a police officer. This happened on January 9, 1996. It was shown on Court TV. The incident is captured on a dashcam and shown on YouTube at
http://youtube.com/watch?v=I4FPlicf4Xg&search=cop%20woman%20stop
This 11 year veteran cop was fired! The woman driver who refused to stop was awarded a substantial judgment. I was treated worse that this woman was.
The elements of the crime are not there.
The elements of the crime are not there. This is the subject of a separate motion which will be at the following link: Http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/8066.html
Signed _______________________ Ron Fox Tuesday, October 10, 2006
We are not ready for trial; my lawyer has not even seen the file yet despite requesting it in March - over a half year ago!
I, Ron Fox, was put in jail March 28, 2006, by Attorney/Magistrate Thomas Bleau 989-895-4231 on the basis of a traffic stop on February 27 - a month earlier. Although I was deemed safe and reliable enough to be released immediately upon booking, Bleau set my bail at an unconstitutionally high amount thereby precluding me from my constitutional right to bail. Bleau said that my short drive to my home indicated a flight risk. This is ludicrous. Bleau was the same magistrate who sent police to my house on January 25th after I mistakenly failed to appear for a traffic ticket.
Nobody has successfully argued this issue of fair bail. When my lawyer, Douglas Palaschak called Bleau around January 25th , Bleau hung up on Palaschak. Palaschak’s contention was that there was no signed warrant and no probable cause.
From the beginning of his case and on previous cases Palaschak has attempted to obtain the records of my case.
Palaschak talked to Attorney Robert Dunne. Dunne demanded written authorization before sending a copy of the file to Palaschak. I signed an authorization and Gail delivered it to Dunne’s office. Dunne never did give a copy of the file to Palaschak or anybody. Now Dunne is off the case and Paul Beggs is on the case. Same modus operandi: 1. No motions; 2. Failure to cooperate with me and my lawyer Palaschak.
Paul Beggs has a conflict of interest. I fired him over a year ago.
Paul Beggs was my lawyer a year ago. I don’t have my records with me and therefore I cannot cite the exact date. I worked hard to fire him then. The law forbids that he be appointed again!
Paul Beggs is doing nothing. . . . again.
Paul Beggs came up to see me in jail on the evening of the day that he was appointed. He had no plan. He promised to return the next day. He never did return. He has no plan. He has written nothing.
Declaration of Attorney Douglas Palaschak
I, Douglas Palaschak, declare the following under penalty of perjury:
There is so much to say about Ron’s many cases.
I have suffered the same injustice as Ron Fox. I was arrested by the FBI on March 14, 1999 at my farm home on a false allegation of “fleeing” - same murky word as was used in Ron’s case. Immediately upon my being locked up in jail the federal charge was dropped. Actually it was a fake case from a fake stack of fake case numbers held by a magistrate in Santa Barbara.
Use of such illegal tricks is routine for the FBI as documented on page 291 in the book “Bad Boy” by Gary M. Laverge, St. Martin’s Paperbacks, 1999, currently on sale at WalMart.
I was held on $500,000 bail, extradited 2000 miles, and then released after serving the maximum time for the alleged crime. Thereafter a jury acquitted me. Who pays for my lost 4 months? I sued.
Ron Fox selected me from all the lawyers in the United States to be his lawyer in December 2003 - almost 3 years ago. I have published a brief autobiography in the appendix.
Since then I have done what no other lawyers could do for Ron Fox: I figured out his St. Ignace case and I filed a Section 1983 case for him. We will ultimately prevail. Here is a link to the federal civil rights case: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/7045.pdf
In February or March Ron Fox informed me that Robert Dunne has been appointed. I called Dunne and talked to him personally. I asked for a copy of the file including the police reports.
Dunne balked saying that he needed written authorization from Ron even though I have been Ron's lawyer for several years. Ron and Ron's wife Gail collaborated and delivered written authorization to Dunne's office. Still Dunne sent nothing to me.
Ron’s St. Ignace case started this same way: Lawyer ignorance and neglect and multiple incompetent lawyers, judges and prosecutors over the course of 3 years.
Ron Fox's legal problems began because his assigned lawyers in St. Ignace ignored the legal theory in his case. Here is link to the motion: http://ronfox.250free.com/ignace.html
Ron’s disease: Sexsomnia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleep_sex
Ron has a medically recognized variation of sleepwalking disease called “sexsomnia”. It is a variety of sleepwalking.
Ron’s grandmother died around 1997. Ron went to the funeral and stayed overnight at the home of his brother in St. Ignace. Unbeknownst to Ron, his 8 year old niece jumped in bed between Ron and Ron's nephew who was sharing the niece's bed with Ron. The niece had been temporarily assigned to the nephew's bed.
Ron woke up the next morning and went home.
Some weeks later he returned to St. Ignace to socialize with his brother's family including the 8 year old niece.
Four months later the niece allegedly reported to her Mom that Ron has touched her underpants while she was in bed with him. The niece testified that Ron appeared to be sleeping. Ron had no knowledge that she had even been in bed with him. The niece testified that she jumped in bed in the middle of the night after using the toilet. She testified that she left the bed around 20 minutes later. The testimony is undisputed: Ron slept through this event.
The trial was pending during the course of 3 years. There were 3 consecutive public defenders, 3 consecutive prosecutors, and 3 consecutive judges over the course of 3 years. None of them investigated Ron's disease although Ron told them about it. Ron had been informed of the disease by his wife and his ex wife.
Instrument of Oppression - Reduce to Attempt even if Illogical.
After 3 years of trips to St. Ignace they persuaded Ron to plead guilty to attempt, although that was factually impossible because one cannot attempt what one is unconscious of doing. Ron would serve no time in jail and would be on probation for two years. Ron did not understand that he would be required to register as a sex offender for life. Michigan's sex registry is unique in that alleged offenders are all lumped in the same class so that Ron could be a serial rapist for all that the public knows.
I long ago posted the story and police reports in the St. Ignace case. I wrote the motion. We are close to litigating that case and undoing the wrong.
The local police are prejudiced/ biased against Ron because of misunderstanding regarding the mysterious secret status imposed by the bad Michigan law which was temporarily overturned at one time by Judge Victoria.
I filed a federal case in this regard.
The fleeing and eluding accusation is not founded. Once again Michigan law is out of line with the law from the rest of the country. A legislature may not change the meaning of ordinary words and neither may the Michigan courts in their interpretation but that is precisely what has happened with Fleeing and Eluding.
There is a well known South Carolina case on YouTube where a cop pushed a woman to the ground for failing to stop - even worse action by the driver than what Ron did. In the woman's case the cop was fired and she received a hefty payment from the police. This is what should happen in Ron's case.
I would have acted sooner but Robert Dunne refused to forward the files and then he got off the case.
Ron's trial would be premature.
I sent the foregoing explanation by email to Attorney Beggs on Monday Oct 9, 2006 to his email address at BeggsandSchisler@sbcglobal.net
Points and Authorities Supporting Dismissal on Void-for-Vagueness and Overbreadth
Table of Authorities cited herein:
U.S. Supreme Court cases cited herein:
*Connally v General Construction (1926) 269 U.S. 385
*due process
American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468 , 35 L. ed. 821, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 55
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 14 of 16
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 , 508-509 (1964).. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 of 16
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14 of 16
Benziger v. U.S., 192 U.S. 38 (1904).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14 of 16
City of Mesquite v. Alladin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982).. . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 15 of 16
Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 47 S. Ct. 681 (1927). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14 of 16
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 ( 1971).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14 of 16
Collins v. Kentucky (1914) Tobacco case. http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/vague14.html 234 U.S. 634, 638 , 34 S. Ct. 924 [269 U.S. 385, 393]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13 of 16
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 15 of 16
Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania (1966) 382 U.S. 399; 86 S.Ct. 518.. . . . . . . . .Page 13 of 16
Gould v. Gould, 245 US., 151 (1917). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 13 of 16
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108-09 & n. 4 http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/grayned.html
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 15 of 16
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 , 34 S. Ct. 853. . . Page 13 of 16
Karlan v. City of Cincinatti, 416 U.S. 924 (1974).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 14 of 16
Marbury v. Madison (1803) http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/marbury.html 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 of 16
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 15 of 16
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). A vague statute may be overbroad if its uncertain boundaries leave open the possibility of punishment for protected conduct and thus lead citizens to avoid such protected activity in order to steer clear of the uncertain proscriptions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 15 of 16
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville (1971)
http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/papachri.html 405 U.S. 156. Vague laws defeat the
intrinsic promise of, and frustrate the essence of, a constitutional regime.. . . . . . Page 14 of 16,
Page 15 of 16
Rector, Etc., Of Holy Trinity Church v. United States (1892) http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/vague92.html 143 U.S. 457; 12 S.Ct. 511. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13 of 16
Sewell v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 14 of 16
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 15 of 16
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 , 90-91, 15 L. Ed.2d 176 (1965)
http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5089.html (Includes photograph of Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 14 of 16
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15 of 16
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 ( 1954).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14 of 16
United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, Fed. Cas. No. 16,690.. . . . . . . . . Page 14 of 16
Winters v. People of State of New York (1948) 333 U.S. 507; 68 S.Ct. 665.. . . Page 13 of 16
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967), quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). "Overbreadth, on the other hand, 'offends the constitutional principle that 'a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 15 of 16
Michigan Statute Cited herein:
257.602a Fleeing and Eluding.
750.479a Fleeing and Eluding.
The Logic is Simple. 1 Ron Stopped. 2 Therafter Driving 1 mile home is not Fleeing and Eluding.
The Appended Article by Michigan Prosecutors is Enlightening: The Fleeing and Eluding is not successful unless the driver successfully Eludes. And an attempt is not a mere attempt unless Ron fails to achieve all that Ron intended. Ron achieved all that he intended.
The better motion is the concurrent demurrer/ motion to strike the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Ron intended merely to drive 1.1 miles to the safe place at his house.
There are two possible statutes: 750.479a and 257.602a. Attorneys Dunn and Beggs have refused to tell my lawyer Palaschak which statute is used to accuse me.
750.479a states in its entirety:
1. A driver of a motor vehicle who is given by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren a visual or audible signal by a police or conservation officer, acting in the lawful performance of his or her duty, directing the driver to bring his or her motor vehicle to a stop shall not willfully fail to obey that direction by increasing the speed of the vehicle, extinguishing the lights of the vehicle, or otherwise attempting to flee or elude the police or conservation officer. This subsection does not apply unless the police or conservation officer giving the signal is in uniform and the officer's vehicle is identified as an official police or department of natural resources vehicle.
2. Except as provided in subsection 3, 4, or 5, an individual who violates subsection 1 is guilty of fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both.
3. Except as provided in subsection 4or 5, an individual who violates subsection 1 is guilty of third-degree fleeing and eluding, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both, if 1 or more of the following circumstances apply:
a. The violation results in a collision or accident.
b. A portion of the violation occurred in an area where the speed limit is 35 miles an hour or less, whether that speed limit is posted or imposed as a matter of law.
c. The individual has a prior conviction for fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, attempted fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, or fleeing and eluding under a current or former law of this state prohibiting substantially similar conduct.
4. Except as provided in subsection 5, an individual who violates subsection 1 is guilty of second-degree fleeing and eluding, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both, if 1 or more of the following circumstances apply:
a. The violation results in serious impairment of a body function of an individual.
b. The individual has 1 or more prior convictions for first-, second-, or third-degree fleeing and eluding, attempted first-, second-, or third-degree fleeing and eluding, or fleeing and eluding under a current or former law of this state prohibiting substantially similar conduct.
c. The individual has any combination of 2 or more prior convictions for fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, attempted fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, or fleeing and eluding under a current or former law of this state prohibiting substantially similar conduct.
5. If the violation results in the death of another individual, an individual who violates subsection 1 is guilty of first-degree fleeing and eluding, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not more than $15,000.00, or both.
6. Upon a conviction for a violation or attempted violation under subsection (2) or (3), the secretary of state shall suspend the individual's operator's or chauffeur's license as provided in section 319 of the Michigan vehicle code, 1949 PA 300, MCL 257.319.
7. Upon a conviction for a violation or attempted violation under subsection (4) or (5), the secretary of state shall revoke the individual's operator's or chauffeur's license as provided in section 303 of the Michigan vehicle code, 1949 PA 300, MCL 257.303.
8. Except as otherwise provided, a conviction under this section does not prohibit a conviction and sentence under any other applicable provision for conduct arising out of the same transaction. A conviction under subsection (2), (3), (4), or (5) prohibits a conviction under section 602a of the Michigan vehicle code, 1949 PA 300, MCL 257.602a, for conduct arising out of the same transaction.
9. As used in this section, “serious impairment of a body function” means that term as defined in section 58c of the Michigan vehicle code, 1949 PA 300, MCL 257.58c.
History: Add. 1966, Act 299, Eff. Mar. 10, 1967 ;-- Am. 1988, Act 407, Eff. Mar. 30, 1989 ;-- Am. 1996, Act 586, Eff. June 1, 1997 ;-- Am. 1998, Act 344, Eff. Oct. 1, 1999 ;-- Am. 2002, Act 270, Eff. July 15, 2002 © 2006 Legislative Council, State of Michigan
Michigan Vehicle Code Except: Act 300 of 1949: 257.602a Failure to stop at signal of police or conservation officer:
257.602a states in its entirety:
1. A driver of a motor vehicle who is given by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren a visual or audible signal by a police or conservation officer, acting in the lawful performance of his or her duty, directing the driver to bring his or her motor vehicle to a stop shall not willfully fail to obey that direction by increasing the speed of the motor vehicle, extinguishing the lights of the motor vehicle, or otherwise attempting to flee or elude the officer. This subsection does not apply unless the police or conservation officer giving the signal is in uniform and the officer's vehicle is identified as an official police or department of natural resources vehicle.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), (4), or (5), an individual who violates subsection (1) is guilty of fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both.
(3) Except as provided in subsection (4) or (5), an individual who violates subsection (1) is guilty of third-degree fleeing and eluding, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or both, if 1 or more of the following circumstances apply:
(a) The violation results in a collision or accident.
(b) A portion of the violation occurred in an area where the speed limit is 35 miles an hour or less, whether that speed limit is posted or imposed as a matter of law.
(c) The individual has a prior conviction for fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, attempted fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, or fleeing and eluding under a current or former law of this state prohibiting substantially similar conduct.
(4) Except as provided in subsection (5), an individual who violates subsection (1) is guilty of second-degree fleeing and eluding, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both, if 1 or more of the following circumstances apply:
(a) The violation results in serious injury to an individual.
(b) The individual has 1 or more prior convictions for first-, second-, or third-degree fleeing and eluding, attempted first-, second-, or third-degree fleeing and eluding, or fleeing and eluding under a current or former law of this state prohibiting substantially similar conduct.
(c) The individual has any combination of 2 or more prior convictions for fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, attempted fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, or fleeing and eluding under a current or former law of this state prohibiting substantially similar conduct.
(5) If the violation results in the death of another individual, an individual who violates subsection (1) is guilty of first-degree fleeing and eluding, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both.
(6) A conviction under this section does not prohibit a conviction and sentence under any other applicable provision, except section 479a(2), (3), (4), or (5) of the Michigan penal code, 1931 PA 328, MCL 750.479a, for conduct arising out of the same transaction.
(7) As used in this section, “serious injury” means a physical injury that is not necessarily permanent, but that constitutes serious bodily disfigurement or that seriously impairs the functioning of a body organ or limb. Serious injury includes, but is not limited to, 1 or more of the following:
(a) Loss of a limb or use of a limb.
(b) Loss of a hand, foot, finger, or thumb or use of a hand, foot, finger, or thumb.
(c) Loss of an eye or ear or use of an eye or ear.
(d) Loss or substantial impairment of a bodily function.
(e) Serious visible disfigurement.
(f) A comatose state that lasts for more than 3 days.
(g) Measurable brain damage or mental impairment.
(h) A skull fracture or other serious bone fracture.
(i) Subdural hemorrhage or hematoma.
History: Add. 1966, Act 203, Eff. Sept. 1, 1966 ;-- Am. 1968, Act 160, Eff. Nov. 15, 1968 ;-- Am. 1981, Act 159, Eff. Mar. 31, 1982 ;-- Am. 1988, Act 406, Eff. Mar. 30, 1989 ;-- Am. 1996, Act 587, Eff. June 1, 1997 ;-- Am. 1998, Act 347, Eff. Oct. 1, 1999 ;-- Am. 1999, Act 73, Eff. Oct. 1, 1999 © 2006 Legislative Council, State of Michigan
Comment of the Prosecuting Attorney Association Proves that Ron was not attempting to elude.
Ron Fox is innocent once again. First, he stopped immediately upon signal. He waiting. The cop wrote the ticket. Ron drove 1.1 miles to his home before accepting the ticket.
http://www.paamtrafficsafety.com/hot_topics/fleeing_and_eluding.htm
Also see a bad article in the quasi official Michigan book written by a bad lawyer.
Deja Vu. Just like in January 2004, Ron is being pressured to be tested a 4th time after 3 forensic psychology tests returned identical results.
Broadly speaking a defendant enjoys the right against self-incrimination and a right to speak for himself. Faretta v California (1975) 422 U.S. 806. Here is a link to the Faretta case: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/faretta.html It appears that the purpose of this test is to mitigate the case in order to plead it down. Defendant Ron Fox and I have determined that this is an inappropriate strategy.
Forensic Psychological Testing can be a form of self incrimination. Sometimes physical testing justified by the fleeting nature of evidence but not in this case. Ron’s case is not a situation of fleeing evidence like Schmerber v California (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 16 L ed 2nd 908. Ron’s situation is more like Rochin v California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 96 L Ed. 183 in that the testing violates due process of law and is not justifiable even considering competing societal interests. Ron isn’t the guy who acted with mental defect; the cops acted with mental defect and malice. Ron’s was involuntary testing imposed by a public defender to give it the air of voluntariness. I protested on Ron’s behalf. www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6201.html ,
www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6203.html , www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6202.html ,
www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6207.html , www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6204.html , www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6205.html , www.lawyerdude.8k.com/6317.html ,
www.lawyerdude.8k.com/6318.html , Motion 6464, Motion 6465, Motion 6466, and other motions.
Although I don’t have the transcript, because the court reporter refused to give me a prompt copy, I do know from my investigation and conversation that appointed counsel, Jennifer Barnes was attempting to impose her own agenda with directly contradicts Ron’s plan. A lawyer may not do that.
Appendix A - Text of article by Michigan Prosecutor re Fleeing and Eluding.
Fleeing and Eluding vs. Fleeing and Eluding
Have you ever wondered if there is a difference between the Fleeing and Eluding Statute in the Motor Vehicle Code (257.602a) and the one in the Penal Code (750.479a)? While they have the same words, they do not have the same consequences.
According to the statutes, Fleeing and Eluding in the Motor Vehicle Code can not be reduced to attempted. MCL 257.204b(2) states, with added emphasis, "the court shall impose a criminal penalty for a conviction of an attempted violation of this act . . .in the same manner as if the offense had been completed."
If a defendant pleas to Attempted Fleeing and Eluding under 257.602a, the court must treat it with the same penalty as the original offense. In other words, Attempted Fleeing and Eluding 4th degree is still a two-year felony. However, Fleeing and Eluding under the Penal Code does not have that provision. Attempted Fleeing and Eluding 4th degree under the Penal Code is a one-year misdemeanor. (The licensing sanctions on a driver's license are not affected by either provision. The impact on the defendant's license is the same as if the defendant was convicted of the original charge. MCL 257.204b(1).)
Jurisdictional Issues
This raises another issue. Many times a Fleeing and Eluding 4th Degree charge is reduced to an attempt in District Court. However, under the Motor Vehicle Code, the penalty is still two years and is outside the court's jurisdiction to sentence the defendant.
To "complicate" matters, when the District Court sends the abstract of conviction to the Secretary of State (SOS), on an Attempted 4th Degree Fleeing and Eluding, the SOS still considers it a felony and kicks it back. This happens with either provision because the District Court has no jurisdiction to handle a felony, or because of the computer program. MCL 257.204b(1) says that the license sanctions shall be the same as the original offense charge. The computer reads the original charge as a felony coming from District Court, sees it as an error, and kicks it back. This means the license action does not take place, either because of the law or a computer program glitch. According to the Secretary of State's office, to get around the computer, the District Courts must enter the abstract of conviction manually. If that is not done, it is very likely that the defendant is not receiving the proper license sanctions. (The computer issue does not happen with the Circuit Court taking the plea since it has jurisdiction on the original charge.)
Expungement
One area where these two statutes do not have a different impact is under the Expungement Statute (MCL 780.621). According to that statute, expungement is not allowed for "traffic
offenses." Traffic offense is specifically defined as offenses under the Motor Vehicle Code (MCL 780.621a), thus, the Fleeing and Eluding Statute in the Motor Vehicle Code can not be expunged. So it would appear that it is possible to expunge a conviction for Fleeing and Eluding under the Penal Code. However, this is wrong. MCL 257.732(20) provides that "A court shall not order expunction of any violation reportable to the secretary of state under this section." Pursuant to MCL 257.732(4)(a), a fleeing and eluding conviction under the penal code must be reported to the Secretary of State. Thus, neither charge can be expunged.
HYTA
Finally, another area of concern is under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (HYTA), MCL 762.11. According to that section, HYTA is not allowed for "a traffic offense." As used in that section, "traffic offense" means a violation of the Michigan vehicle code, Act No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1949, being sections 257.1 to 257.923 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, or a violation of a local ordinance substantially corresponding to that act, which involves the operation of a vehicle and, at the time of the violation, is a felony or a misdemeanor.
Thus, a person charged for Fleeing and Eluding under the Penal code could get HYTA status, and a person charged under the Motor Vehicle Code could not. However, this question has not been definitely answered.
The bottom line is when a person is being charged with Fleeing and Eluding, be aware of the difference between the two statutes. While they have the same wording, they have different consequences.
Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan
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Appendix 1: Detailed Brief regarding the Doctrine entitled “Void for Vagueness”
Void for Vagueness. Fourteenth Amendment Annotations
This article is at http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/vagueness.html
First annotation:
Connally vs. General Construction Co. (1926)
http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/vague26.html 269 U.S. 385
The question whether given legislative enactments have been thus wanting in certainty has frequently been before this court. In some of the cases the statutes involved were upheld; in others, declared invalid. The precise point of differentiation in some instances is not easy of statement; but it will be enough for present purposes to say generally that the decisions of the court, upholding statutes as sufficiently certain, rested upon the conclusion that they employed words or phrases having a technical or other special meaning, well enough known to enable those within their reach to correctly apply them - Supreme Court in 1926 in Connally v Gen. Construction.
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a well- recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 , 34 S. Ct. 853; Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 , 34 S. Ct. 924 [269 U.S. 385, 393] http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/vague14.html ...
The dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be left to conjecture. The citizen cannot be held to answer charges based upon penal statutes whose mandates are so uncertain that they will reasonably admit of different constructions. A criminal statute cannot rest upon an uncertain foundation. The crime, and the elements constituting it, must be so clearly expressed that the ordinary person can intelligently choose, in advance, what course it is lawful for him to pursue. Penal statutes prohibiting the doing of certain things, and providing a punishment for their violation, should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizen may act upon the one conception of its requirements and the courts upon another.'
Rector, Etc., Of Holy Trinity Church v. United States (1892)
http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/vague92.html 143 U.S. 457; 12 S.Ct. 511 :
"All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter." - Rector, Etc., Of Holy Trinity Church v. United States 143 U.S. 457; 12 S.Ct. 511 (1892)
Winters v. People of State of New York (1948) 333 U.S. 507; 68 S.Ct. 665:
"Men of common intelligence cannot be required to guess at the meaning of penal enactment. "In determining whether penal statute is invalid for uncertainty, courts must do their best to determine whether vagueness is of such a character that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning. "Where a statute is so vague as to make criminal an innocent act, a conviction under it cannot be sustained." - Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507; 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948)
Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania (1966) 382 U.S. 399; 86 S.Ct. 518:
"Law fails to meet requirements of due process clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves public uncertain as to conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case." - Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399; 86 S.Ct. 518 (1966)
Gould v. Gould, 245 US., 151 (1917):
"In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes, it is THE ESTABLISHED RULE NOT TO EXTEND their provisions, by implication, BEYOND THE CLEAR IMPORT OF THE LANGUAGE USED, OR TO ENLARGE their operations SO AS TO EMBRACE MATTERS NOT SPECIFICALLY POINTED OUT"
Benziger v. U.S., 192 U.S. 38 (1904):
"This provision of the statute should be liberally construed in favor of the importer, and if there were any fair doubt as to the true construction of the provision in question, the courts should resolve the doubt in his favor. American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468 , 35 L. ed. 821, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 55; United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, Fed. Cas. No. 16,690; Rice v. United States, 4 C. C. A. 104, 10 U. S. App. 670, 53 Fed. 910."
U.S. v. De Cadena, 105 F.Supp. 202, 204 (1952):
"The essential purpose of the "void for vagueness doctrine" with respect to interpretation of a criminal statute, is to warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their conduct. ... Criminal statutes which fail to give due notice that an act has been made criminal before it is done areunconstitutional deprivations of due process of law."
Hassett v. Welch (1938) 303 US 303, pp. 314 - 315, 82 L Ed 858:
" . . . .if doubt exists as to the construction of a taxing statute, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer..."
Sewell v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 982 (1978):
As we said in Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972): "It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment [435 U.S. 982 , 986] is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." See also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 47 S. Ct. 681 (1927); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
Karlan v. City of Cincinatti, 416 U.S. 924 (1974):
"These cases all involve convictions under ordinances and statutes which punish the mere utterance of words variously described as 'abusive,' 'vulgar,' 'insulting,' 'profane,' 'indecent,' 'boisterous,' and the like. The provisions are challenged as being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The 'void for vagueness' doctrine is, of course, a due process concept implementing principles of fair warning and non-discriminatory enforcement. Vague laws may trap those who desire to be law-abiding by not providing fair notice of what is prohibited. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 ( 1954). They also provide opportunity for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement since those [416 U.S. 924 , 925] who apply the laws have no clear and explicit standards to guide them. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 ( 1971); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 , 90-91, 15 L. Ed.2d 176 (1965) - http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5089.html (Includes photograph of Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth). Further, when a vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of First Amendment freedoms,' it 'operates to inhibitthe exercise of [those] freedoms.' Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." - Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972), quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 [1964 loyalty oath case], and Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)."
"Overbreadth, on the other hand, 'offends the constitutional principle that 'a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." - Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967), quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
A vague statute may be overbroad if its uncertain boundaries leave open the possibility of punishment for protected conduct and thus lead citizens to avoid such protected activity in order to steer clear of the uncertain proscriptions. Grayned v. City of Rockford supra, 408 U.S. at 109; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). A statute is also overbroad, however, if, even though it is clear and precise, it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 , 508-509 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)."
City of Mesquite v. Alladin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982):
" Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (emphasis [455 U.S. 283, 290] added) *fn12... [ Footnote 12 ] The Court of Appeals summarized the relevant authorities as follows: "A law is void for vagueness if persons `of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application . . . .' Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 n. 8, quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 . See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960). The offense to due process lies in both the nature and consequences of vagueness. First, vague laws do not give individuals fair notice of the conduct proscribed. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 . Accord Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 & n. 3. Second, vague laws do not limit the exercise of discretion by law enforcement officials; thus they engender the possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108-09 & n. 4 http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/grayned.html ; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville (1971) http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/papachri.html , 405 U.S. at 168-70. Third, vague laws defeat the intrinsic promise of, and frustrate the essence of, a constitutional regime. We remain `a government of laws, and not of men,' Marbury v. Madison (1803)
http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/marbury.html 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 163, only so long as our laws remain clear." - 630 F.2d, at 1037."
Appendix C - Link to Story about Ed Czuprynski, one of my other do-nothing local lawyers:
http://www.injusticeline.com/Czu.html
Proof of Service
I, Douglas Palaschak, declare the following under penalty of perjury: I attempted to obtain the fax number for the court at 8:10 a.m. on Tuesday, October 10, 2006. Michelle at 989-895-4265 said that they don’t accept any faxes. Thereafter I found a fax number for the court in my files. I faxed version 1.000 of this motion at 8:30 a.m. to Judge Caprathe’s court at 989-895-4099. I emailed a link to this to Attorney Paul Beggs at beggsandschisler@sbcglobal.net at 8:24 a.m. having pre-advised them yesterday October 9th that I would do so. At 8:25 a.m. I called the Beggs office at 989 893 3221 and talked to Bruce Manico (phonetic). He said that the secretaries would be there in 5 minutes maybe. I left my number. I explained that I faxed a link to them that would link to Ron Fox’s motion for today. Bruce said he would leave a message but he did not have access to the email. Thereafter at 8:35 I called back and talked to Donna at the office of Paul Beggs. She remembered me talking to her yesterday. She said she would check the email and download the motion and “see what [she] could do”. She is only 5 minutes from the court house. I suggested that she find a way to get that motion to court.
Thereafter at 8:57 a.m. I called the court at 895 4265 They transferred me to Judge Caprathe’s court. I asked the clerk to ask Attorney Paul Beggs to call his office. She said he was just there. I told her that I faxed a motion to the court and that the Ron Fox trial would be premature and that I emailed a motion to the office of Attorney Beggs and that cell phones are usually off in court. She said that she would relay the message to Attorney Beggs if she saw him.
Thereafter at 9:07 a.m. I called the office of Attorney Paul Beggs at 893 3221. I was put on hold. I talked to Donna. Yes, she has indeed printed out the motion that I sent her. However, she refused to even write down the number for the court. Although the court is only 5 minutes away there is nobody to drive there. She says that Paul Beggs may call her and then she will tell him about the motion.
Thereafter at 9:15 I talked to Deputy Walzac at the jail at 989 895 4066. I explained the situation to her. She said that Ron was still there and had not gone to court. Of course she is not permitted to give any message to Ron. She said that the best thing to do would be to call the court - which is what I had previously done.
Thereafter I called Art Schupback and he said that he lives on the other side of town and it is too far to drive.
Thereafter at 9:40 a.m. (6:40 a.m. Pacific time) I dropped 4 copies into the postal drop box and sending them to Ron in jail by priority mail.
Signed ________________ Douglas Palaschak. Tuesday, October 10, 2006