Ron Fox, Pro Se Received by Detroit Fed Judge Rosen 23 Dec 05.
503 South Dewitt St., Bay City, Michigan 48706
989 980 4089
This document is http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/7045.html
The pdf version is http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/7045.pdf
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In the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division.
231 West Lafayette Blvd Fifth Floor Detroit, Michigan 48226. Phone Number 313-234-5005
Transferred from Northern Division: 1000 Washington Avenue, Room 304, P.O. Box 913 Bay City, Michigan 48707, (989) 894-8800. http://www.mied.uscourts.gov/index.htm
Ron Fox,
and all other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs
v
Bay City, Bay County, Bay County Jail,
State of Michigan, Robert Loggenslaughter,
Elizabeth Loggenslaughter, Richard Roberts,
Publishers of the sex offender page,
Sherri A. Waterman a/k/a Recorder #6116,
Bay County Circuit Court Probation Office
Person who wrote false probation report,
Defendants
Case Number: 05-73519 (was 10223)
Judge: Gerald E. Rosen (was Davis M. Lawson)
Magistrate Judge: Mona K. Majzoub (was Charles E. Binder)
Document #7045. Version 2.02
First Amended Complaint for money damages, declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 USC 1983, et. seq. and RICO for obstruction of justice and being “out to get me”
Class Action.
Jury Demanded.
Equity delights in justice - and not in halves.
For every wrong there is a remedy.
“We will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs, or bailiffs only such as know the law of the realm and mean to observe it well.” - Magna Charta
The complaint begins on page 5.
Table of Contents:
This complaint was written by a Civil Rights Lawyer with 21 years experience. It is not frivolous.
Plain Statement of Facts as Required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Section 1983: Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws
Denial of Meaningful Access to the Courts by Clerk Linton’s having concealed official documents.
Section 1983: All defendants denied my rights
Section 1985. All defendant conspired to violate my civil rights and those of the class.
Defendants have conspired and injured me; I am entitled to redress under section 1985
I am an American with a Disability
Chronology of Operative Events
1995 - Falsely accused of committing crime while sleeping.
We have a dismissal motion ready for St. Ignace court.
Michigan Law invites terrorism by telling nothing about the crime.
The beginning: Neighbors began shouting at me in my yard around 1999.
Office Aldrich visited my home around 20 times to harass me.
False police reports. Went to court. Newcombe gave me relief.
Dec 2003. Pretextual Housing Inspection without Warrant in Violation of Camara rule.
October 11, 2003. Retaliation for federal complaint escalates to Violent Pretextual Traffic Chase
There was no legal right to tow my van off my own property and steal my camera.
Jan 27, 2004. Judge without jurisdiction changed my bail to $100,000.
Blind Judge raised my bail to exorbitant level - he had no jurisdiction. It was malicious.
Double Jeopardy; They arrested me again after I bailed out.
Refused discovery request with impunity.
Falsely Accused by anonymous official of having been convicted of a felony; I am felony free!
Most recently: Feb 14, 2005: Imprisonment until I pleaded guilty for not having $35 to register.
Private Attorney General Status
Attorney Fees pursuant to RICO, 42 USC 1988, and Private Attorney General theory.
Appendix #1 - Text of 42 USC 1983 et seq.
Section 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights.
Section 1985. Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights
(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror
(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges
Section 1986. Action for neglect to prevent
1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights
Appendix #2. Text of Selected Predicate RICO crimes.
18 USC Section 1512. Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant:
18 USC Section 1513. Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant
18 USC section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion)
1. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to:
a. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988; and 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1343(1), (2), (3), and (4);
b. Bivens v Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1971) www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/bivens.html 29 L Ed 2nd d 403 US 388, 91 S Ct 1999; and
c. Pendant Jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
2. Venue is proper here because all the parties work here and because the location of the civil rights injury/ deprivation/ denial is here.
This complaint was written by a Civil Rights Lawyer with 21 years experience. It is not frivolous.
3. This complaint was written by a lawyer with 21 years experience in Civil Rights Litigation.
4. This complaint is not frivolous.
Venue based on Location of Parties and Events
5. All parties are residents of this judicial district.
6. The defendants in St. Ignace are in the Western District. We will file in that district for those defendants.
Plain Statement of Facts as Required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Section 1983: Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws
Denial of Meaningful Access to the Courts by Clerk Linton’s having concealed official documents.
Section 1983: All defendants denied my rights
7. All defendants were “out to get me” as the term is defined in Olech v Willowbrook 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir.1998) http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5126.html .
8. I suffered obloquy as a direct and foreseeable result of the acts of defendant.
9. “Obloquy” is defined as: Abusively detractive language or utterance; calumny: “I have had enough obloquy for one lifetime” (Anthony Eden). The condition of disgrace suffered as a result of abuse or vilification; ill repute.
10. All defendants acted with malice, oppression, and hatred.
11. Most of this hateful and illegal obloquy was triggered by my having been falsely accused of attempted criminal sexual conduct which, in turn, was a false conviction triggered by the ignorance and neglect of the attorneys and judges in the St. Ignace case.
12. Even registered sex offenders are entitled to equal protection of the laws.
13. The defendants should not have been “out to get me”.
14. All defendants acted under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, and usage, of the state of Michigan and its political subdivisions.
15. All defendants subjected me and other persons similarly situated to deprivation of our rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws as more specifically set forth herein.
16. The defendants are liable to me for damages under section 1983.
17. All defendants herein caused me to suffer deprivation of our rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws as more specifically set forth herein.
18. The injury to me was the actual and foreseeable result of their wilful actions.
19. Filing of a claim is not a prerequisite to relief under section 1983.
Section 1985. All defendant conspired to violate my civil rights and those of the class.
20. All of the defendants conspired and continue to conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, and defeating the due course of justice with the intent to deny me and the class the equal protection of the laws and equal, meaningful access to the courts,
21. and to injure me and my property in retaliation for my having lawfully enforced, or attempted to enforce, my rights and the rights of other persons, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws.
22. Among other reasons, the defendants are retaliating for my having engaged in my First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances as a Pro Se litigant.
Defendants have conspired and injured me; I am entitled to redress under section 1985
23. To paraphrase section 1985: In this instant case defendants have conspired to deprive me of my rights and privileges.
24. Defendants here have done (or caused to be done by their employees) acts in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy.
25. Defendants thereby by injured mc in my person and property and/or deprived me of having and exercising me 1st amendment rights or privileges of a citizen of the United States.
26. In this instant case section 1985 grants to me an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
27. I was so injured and now seek redress.
28. Members of the class were so injured and seek redress.
29. Defendants are liable to me pursuant to section 1985.
Ongoing tort: They are out to get me. Injury is continuous since around 1999; it has escalated to police retaliatory violence, false imprisonment for a total of over a half year in the past two years, obstruction of justice by interception of court documents.
30. Defendants have intentionally committed unauthorized acts under the color of law.
31. They have intentionally refrained from performing duties imposed upon them to afford me equal protection and equal access to the courts.
32. Defendants are aware that they are committing a crime.
33. They violate 18 USC 241 and/ or 242 - the penal equivalent to section 1983.
I am an American with a Disability
34. My head was run over by a car twice when I was a child.
35. The first time required 7 months hospitalization.
36. In my twenties I fell on my head when a staircase collapsed.
37. I suffer limited impaired cognitive ability which diminishes my IQ to around 70 for some mental tasks.
Chronology of Operative Events
1995 - Falsely accused of committing crime while sleeping.
38. Redress against defendants in the Western District will be addressed in that federal court.
39. On or about 8 Feb 1995 I drove 4 hours to St. Ignace to attend Gramma’s funeral.
40. I elected to stay overnight there at the house of my brother.
41. While I was sleeping, my niece jumped in bed with me and my nephew.
42. Around 4 months later, the niece’s mom complained to the police that I had touched the outside of the underpants that the niece wore to bed.
43. My wife informed me that I sometimes do that in my sleep.
44. On that basis I voluntarily informed police that indeed such a thing may have happened in my sleep.
45. I did not know the elements of the alleged crime.
46. Therefore I could not possibly have known that I was innocent.
47. I know now that I am innocent; I was sleeping when the event happened.
48. The police tape recorded my statement but then erased it.
49. They substituted a written document for which nobody claims authorship.
50. They illegally and dishonestly called this document a confession.
51. I could not have possibly confessed because I did not know the elements of that crime.
52. Specifically, I did not know that I could not commit this crime while I was sleeping.
53. I now know that I committed no crime; I was sleeping !
54. My 3 lawyers, the 3 prosecutors, and the 3 judges all failed to consider the specific intent that is a statutory element of the statutory crime of which I was accused.
55. I only discovered their negligence in the year 2005 when Attorney Douglas Palaschak took the time to read the statute and analyze my case.
56. My plea agreement promised that my obligations would end in 2 years; it was on that basis that I pleaded - after this misdemeanor dragged on for 2.5 years.
We have a dismissal motion ready for St. Ignace court.
57. We have a motion nearly ready for St. Ignace court asking for dismissal.
58. That motion is published at http://ronfox.250free.com/ignace.html
59. There is no factual basis for the plea.
60. 2004 Around January. They imprisoned me to make sure that I had my 2nd forensic psych evaluation requested by public defender against my will. They imprisoned me only after I filed a motion to avoid the examination.
61. 2004 12 09 Sentence date for violation of probation.
62. 2005 2 11 Pat McIver arrested me in court when I appeared to see about the continuance that I filed on Feb 9. They set my bail at $25,000 and kept me there for 97 days - until May 25. As in 2004 they kept me in jail until I pleaded guilty.
63. 2005 2 14 Feb 14. In court for violation what happened July 29 of 2004.
64. 2005 $25,000 bond for my inability to pay $35 sex offender fee.
65. The ludicrous part is that the St. Ignace court realized that intent was missing because I was sleeping.
66. Therefore they substituted “attempted csc” for “csc”.
67. Well you can’t have an attempt if the perp is sleeping !
68. I would have argued this point earlier but none of the lawyers and judges in the case understood it.
69. Therefore nobody explained it to me until Thanksgiving 2004 when Attorney Douglas Palaschak received the transcripts and court files from St. Ignace.
70. Palaschak immediately spent 12 hours reading the record.
71. Then Palaschak explained that serious error had been committed in my case.
72. He said that I am innocent and that there is no factual basis for my plea.
Michigan Law invites terrorism by telling nothing about the crime.
73. Michigan put my photograph on the internet without telling people that I only pleaded to end the case.
74. I am lumped in with the rapists.
75. I am innocent. I was sleeping. I was only accused of a misdemeanor. I was granted probation with no jail time.
The beginning: Neighbors began shouting at me in my yard around 1999.
76. My neighbors saw my photograph on the sex offender site. They are defendants Bob and Elizabeth Loggenslaughter.
77. They began shouting vulgarities at me.
Office Aldrich visited my home around 20 times to harass me.
78. The last of his visits was well within the statute of limitation.
79. My wife and child moved to a different house to avoid the animosity and obloquy.
False police reports. Went to court. Newcombe gave me relief.
80. Defendants Loggenslaughter filed against me in state court.
81. They tried to make me move.
82. Judge Newcombe told them to leave me alone.
83. Several times defendant officer Aldrich came to my house without a warrant and peeped in my windows.
84. Officers in Michigan are sworn to uphold all state statutes and prosecute violations
85. In my case Aldrich violated MCL 750.539d It is a felony to observe, photograph or eavesdrop on a person in a private place without the person's consent according to the that statute.
86. This violation of my rights is actionable under 1983, 1985, and RICO in that he did it out of retaliation and in so retaliating he obstructed justice in violation of 18 USC 1512, and 1513 thereby triggering RICO damages.
Dec 2003. Pretextual Housing Inspection without Warrant in Violation of Camara rule.
87. Around December 2003, well within the 3 year statute of limitations for personal injuries in Michigan, Defendant Elizabeth Loggenslaughter again maliciously acted against me.
88. Her name is listed on the paperwork.
89. This time she persuaded the housing department to raid my house at 207 N. Farragut St Bay City MI 48708, under the pretext of a code violation.
90. This conducted the raid without a warrant.
91. A warrant is required. Authority: Camara v Municipal Court (San Franciso1967)18 L. Ed. 2d. 930, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727 http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/camara.html
92. The warrant requirement is black letter law.
93. Therefore the defendants have no legal excuse.
94. The defendant officers are Richard Roberts, Robert Reiling, Eric Berg, Jeffery Doud and the Bay City Building Code Enforcement official Gerald Morin
95. The case numbers are CTN: 09-4002620-01 SID NO: 1824136M.
96. Being out to get me is a violation and actionable under section 1983 which I hereby invoke against these defendants.
97. A leading case in this area of “out to get me” is Grace Olech v Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir.1998) http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/5126.html .
Escalation to police violent retaliation for my having filed a federal complaint. Oct 11, 2003: Defendant Aldrich and his co-conspirators broke the windows in my van in pretextual stop in retaliation for my having attempted to file a federal complaint against him. He now lied about a broken finger.
98. Around August of 2003 I attempted to file a civil rights case regarding the many pretextual raids at my house.
99. These raids by Defendant Aldrich at the request of Defendant Loggenslaughter were a manifestation of their being “out-to-get-me” based on the false conviction resulting in my falsely being listed in the sex offender web site.
100. As retaliation for my having attempted to file the 2003 federal case, Aldrich stepped up his level of harassment.
101. In doing do he committed at least two counts of obstruction of justice and interference with commerce in violation of 18 USC 1512, 1513, and 1951 which are set forth in the appendix.
102. His commission of these two predicate RICO crimes qualifies him for RICO prosecution as well as section 1983 and 1985 prosecution.
October 11, 2003. Retaliation for federal complaint escalates to Violent Pretextual Traffic Chase
103. My wife witnessed the beginning of the following incident.
104. This happened on October 11, 2003.
105. She saw me in traffic with Aldrich behind me.
106. Like a growing number of Americans, I have researched the law and I know that originally only commercial vehicles were subject to state regulation.
107. See In re Stork (1914), for example: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/stork.html 167 Cal 294.
108. I discovered that U.S.C.A. Title 18 section 31(a) definitions defines “motor vehicle” as being a commercial vehicle,
109. Defendant Police Officer Aldrich as part of his campaign to “get me” did the following.
110. On Oct 11, 2003 he saw me waiting for the draw bridge to come back down.
111. I had previously filed a federal civil rights complaint against him.
112. We I began moving, he turned his car around and signaled me to stop.
113. I was 1 mile from the safety of my house.
114. I drove safely to my house.
115. This is the prudent thing to do when one is worried that a police stop is actually an attack masquerading as a traffic stop.
116. Aldrich and Jason Richnak broke the windows out of my van and stole my camera.
117. Bradley Peter assisted and conspired with them.
118. Aldrich pushed my face down into the broken glass.
119. Aldrich lied in his police report; he said that he suffered a broken finger.
120. The hospital report shows that he suffered no broken finger.
121. There was an article in the Bay City Times paper.
122. As I recall, a bondsman posted the $10,000 bail.
There was no legal right to tow my van off my own property and steal my camera.
123. There was no warrant to take my car off private property.
124. Defendant Bob Panzner towed my car.
125. Panzner is at 906 S. Euclid Bay City, Michigan 48706. Phone 989-686-5288
126. In so doing he acted under color of law. He is liable under section 1983 and 1985.
127. The law is clear in this regard.
128. In the case of Miranda v. City of Cornelius, No. 04-35940 (9th Cir. November 17, 2005) summary judgment for defendants on a Fourth Amendment challenge was reversed where the impoundment of plaintiffs' vehicle following a traffic violation while it was parked on their property was an unreasonable seizure not justified by the community caretaking doctrine. http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0435940p.pdf
129. Aldrich and his co-conspirators violated 18 USC 1951 which states:
130. (a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section—
(1) The term “robbery” means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining.
(2) The term “extortion” means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.
131. Aldrich and his co-conspirators also violation 18 USC 1513 by retaliating against me, a federal witness for having filed a federal document attempting to sue him in federal court for his previous harassment.
132. This predicate RICO crime states:
18 USC 1513 (b) Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby causes bodily injury to another person or damages the tangible property of another person, or threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate against any person for -
(1) the attendance of a witness or party at an official proceeding, or any testimony given or any record, document, or other object produced by a witness in an official proceeding; or
(2) any information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation supervised release,, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings given by a person to a law enforcement officer; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both
133. These RICO predicate crime definitions are printed in the appendix to this complaint.
134. Aldrich’s previous harassment was a federal crime, 18 USC 241 and 241 and a federal tort, 42 USC 1983 et seq.
135. He was now retaliating by using violence in a pretextual police stop and lying about his imaginary broken finger.
136. Aldrich and his conspirators are liable to me for RICO damages in addition to conspiracy to violate my civil rights and retaliation in that regard pursuant to section 1985.
Jan 27 2004. Arrested me for making a written motion to demand to refuse my lawyer’s unconstitutional request for forensic testing. This constitute denial of access to the courts and retaliation for having merely filed written motions.
137. On January 27, 2004, I appeared with a written motion to demand that I not be tested.
138. My malfeasant public defender had requested this testing in a malicious move against me.
139. She had no right to ask for the testing against my will!
140. This motion is posted at www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6201.html .
141. I also had with me a motion to suppress evidence. This motion is posted at www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6203.html .
142. I also had with me a motion to fire Jennifer Barnes. This motion is posted at www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6202.html
143. I had already undergone testing.
144. It was my prerogative to refuse.
145. Lawyer Jennifer Barnes requested that testing against my will.
146. The court should have set the motion before Judge Newcombe but instead they said that Newcombe was unavailable; they set it before blind Judge Alston without telling my lawyer that Judge Alston was blind.
147. When I appeared for the motion they went off the record.
Jan 27, 2004. Judge without jurisdiction changed my bail to $100,000.
148. Then Judge Alston ordered me imprisoned and set the bail at $100,000, an exorbitant amount in violation of the 8th amendment.
149. He was without jurisdiction to change my bail.
150. Judge Newcombe set the bail. I am a life long member of this community.
151. I am well known as a peaceful person and have never fled and have nowhere to flee to.
152. I brought a written motion explaining my right to refuse testing.
153. The judge refused to hear the motion and he did so off the record.
154. In doing so he and the court reporter conspired to deny my right to appellate review.
155. This reporter further conspired with co-defendant Linton days later by conspiring to keep my next set of papers from reaching the judges at the higher court.
156. This constituted false imprisonment and retaliation for my having filed a motion.
157. This constituted retaliation for my having filed a case against Aldrich for his having broken the windows out of my van and taken my camera.
158. Even after I underwent testing, they kept me in jail until I pleaded guilty.
159. They did this to help their civil case so that it would appear that the traffic stop and window breaking was justified.
160. The window breaking was excessive violence on the part of Aldrich.
161. The various incidents were part of a their plan to “get me”. They were “out to get me” as the phrase is used in the case of Olech v Willowbrook, cited elsewhere in this complaint.
Blind Judge raised my bail to exorbitant level - he had no jurisdiction. It was malicious.
162. On January 27, 2004 I appeared before blind judge Craig D. Alston in order to object to forensic testing.
163. He was not the judge on the case but Judge Newcombe was unavailable.
164. Nobody had told my lawyer that Judge Alston was blind.
165. This would have made a difference because my lawyer wrote papers and is out of state and could not possibly appear.
166. Had he known that the judge was blind he could have made arrangements to argue by phone.
167. He deserved to know!
168. The testing had been ordered by Jennifer Cass Barnes (P62808) who was then my malfeasant public defender.
169. I had a right to refuse the testing.
170. The person running the tape recorder that day was Sherri A. Waterman CER 6116
171. My case number was 03-FY-10859-N.
172. Here is part of what Judge Alston said:
The Court: - - seeing emotional instability on the part of the defendant. This is set for a forensics (sic) examination tomorrow. I'm very concerned that the exam be done, and th- - and of the general safety of the defendant, and- - and the public; therefore, I'm gonna change the bond to 100,000 cash/surety, and we'll put on here, "To be transported tomorrow for a forensic exam."
173. This judge had no jurisdiction to protect the public from me; this was a mere pretext.
174. He had no jurisdiction to force me to take a forensic examination.
175. My public defender Jennifer Barnes turned against me.
176. She had no jurisdiction to order me to take a forensic exam.
177. I had written papers with me.
178. The judge ignored them; he is blind.
179. The court was off the record for much of what happened.
180. She ignored my case.
181. I obtained outside help to prevent Jennifer Barnes from sending me off for forensic testing.
182. Barnes had a duty to let me decide if I wanted to be tested again.
183. I did not want to be tested again.
184. She conspired to have me put in jail to await testing.
185. She abandoned me.
186. The blind judge went off the record.
187. Rather than simply deny my motion to refuse testing, he put me in jail to make sure that I went for the testing.
188. He increased my bail to an exorbitant unconstitutional amount.
189. So then I was in jail sitting there waiting for them to send me out for testing. I would not voluntarily go.
190. Sergeant Pat put me in lock down because I would not voluntarily go get testing.
191. When the time came Pat called me out. He told me I have one chance to choose.
192. “You come willingly or I'm going to have to call more guys in this jail and we will use force, and pick you up and carry you out. You choose.”
193. I said: Okay. I surrender. I'll come.
Jan 27, 2004 until April 2004. After the test, they kept me in jail in order to force me to plead guilty.
194. I cooperated with the forensic testing.
195. They kept me in jail after the testing.
196. Barnes should have got me out of jail; instead she conspired to put me in jail.
197. Barnes is the one who filed the motion to have the testing done.
198. This motion was against my will.
Jan-April 2004 and Feb-May 2005: Cause of Action: Illegal Conditions of Confinement. Denial of Access to Internet, my lawyer, and the courts.
199. While I was in jail the jail officials cut off the previous connection to the internet.
200. My lawyer was in California.
201. I had no way to effectively receive and sign his legal papers except by mail.
202. I had no access to a word processor.
203. The jail had the equipment to permit me meaningful contact with my lawyer in my usual way - by email.
204. The blocking of previously existing internet access was a violation of my right to effective assistance of counsel.
205. The denial of access to a printer and word processor program on the computer to which I had access constitutes denial of effective access to the courts.
January 28, 2004: Attorney Sylvia Linton and the clerk for the blind judge conspired and intercepted my court papers so that they did not reach the judge.
206. Immediately upon hearing of my imprisonment on January 27th , my lawyer, Douglas Palaschak, filed several applications for writs.
207. These motions are posted at www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6207.html ,
208. at www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6204.html , and
209. at www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6205.html .
210. The court simply ignored most of my motions.
211. They ignored the motions posted at www.lawyerdude.8k.com/6317.html ,
212. and at www.lawyerdude.8k.com/6318.html
213. and at www.lawyerdude.8k.com./6464.html ,
214. and at www.lawyerdude.8k.com/6465.html ,
215. and at www.lawyerdude.8k.com/6466.html .
216. These motions are listed on Ron’s page: http://www.lawyerdude.8k.com/ronfox.html
217. They ignored my motion posted at www.lawyerdude.8k.com/6467.html .
218. They ignored my motion posted at www.lawyerdude.8k.com/6470.html .
219. They ignored my motion posted at www.lawyerdude.8k.com/6471.html .
220. They ignored my written motion in order to teach me a lesson; they were out to get me.
221. They ignored my motion posted at www.lawyerdude.8k.com/6472.html .
222. They ignored other motions that are not posted.
223. They ignored my motion posted at http://www.lawyerdude.s5.com/6474.html .
224. They ignored my motion #6473 which is not posted.
225. I don’t know what they did with my motion posted at http://www.lawyerdude.s5.com/6617.html .
226. They granted my motion to fire my incompetent lawyer Biggs http://www.lawyerdude.s5.com/6672.html but then they rehired him again for me against my wishes!
227. The defendants in an effort to get me (and my lawyer) complained to the Michigan Bar who attempted to silence my lawyer Palaschak.
228. Sylvia L. Linton and the clerk for the blind judge conspired to deny me access to the courts.
229. There were at least two motions.
230. My lawyer Palaschak faxed these to the Circuit Court.
231. There after he called to see if they were received.
232. Defendant Linton admitted receiving them and ordering that they not be filed.
233. Her pretext was that Palaschak was not a member of the Michigan Bar.
234. Palaschak explained that under common well known legal theories an application for an extraordinary writ on behalf of a person falsely imprisoned may be made by any next friend and that Palaschak is a lawyer with 20 years experience and that he could qualify under the pro hac vice rules pertinent case law and that any obstructing was a serious violation and that it was not Linton’s call and that Linton was obligated to pass the documents on to the judges.
235. Linton scorned Palaschak and hung up on him at least twice.
236. Linton obstructed these papers and interfered with the operation of my redress of grievances in that court.
237. In doing so she committed two predicate RICO crimes as set forth in more detail in the appendix.
238. In particular her obstruction violated 18 USC 1512 et seq which states in pertinent part:
239. Title 18 USC section 1512 Tampering with a witness victim, or an informant:
240. . . . (c) Whoever corruptly -
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record [regarding Linton], document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
(d) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades any person from -
(1) attending or testifying in an official proceeding;
(2) reporting to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation supervised release parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;
(3) arresting or seeking the arrest of another person in connection with a Federal offense; or
(4) causing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation revocation proceeding, to be sought or instituted, or assisting in such prosecution or proceeding; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
241. Linton obstructed at least two document.
242. These two crimes qualify her for RICO treatment.
243. They obstructed justice within the meaning of section 1985 and Title 18 section 1512 et seq as set forth in the appendix.
244. Attorney Sylvia Linton’s bar number is P42125. She works at the 18th Circuit Court. 1230 Washington Ave. Bay City, MI 48708-5731. Phone: (989) 895-4224, Fax: (989) 895-2002. E-mail: rileylinton@yahoo.com
245. Sylvia admitted that the received a call from the clerk at the lower court and that on the basis of that telephone call she intercepted my applications for a writ written by Palaschak.
246. I believe that Sherri A. Waterman, Recorder #6116, is the name of the defendant clerk for the blind judge.
Judge and Prosecutor conspired to hold me in jail in order to extort a plea from me in order to preclude their officer Aldrich from being liable for civil rights damages. They did this to me in 2004 and 2005.
247. I did not flee. Neither did I elude.
248. I have a tape recording of the radio traffic stating that I was not speeding.
249. Fleeing and eluding requires either speeding, hiding, or some other method of eluding or evading arrest.
250. I simply went to a close safe place to stop, to wit: my driveway at my house.
251. The city officials ended that case by keeping me in jail until they succeeded in illegally extorting a plea from me in order to change the outcome of the federal lawsuit that I now file in redress for having been attacked in my van which attack was in itself retaliation for the previous lawsuit that I filed.
252. I pleaded guilty to fleeing and eluding under duress and extortion.
253. In doing so they violated federal law, 18 USC 1512 et seq and 18 USC 1951 which are printed in the appendix and quoted in brief in the body of this complaint.
254. On May 3, 2004 officer Elizabeth Ducolon arrested me for not registering.
255. That case number 04-30954-SM-1
Double Jeopardy; They arrested me again after I bailed out.
256. In the summer of 2004 they arrested me for failing to register.
257. I had been advised that the registration law was ruled unconstitutional by Judge Victoria in this federal court.
258. When I bailed out they arrested me again for the same charge and made me pay bail again.
Refused discovery request with impunity.
259. I filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) demand before I got charged or set to jail for the false charge of fleeing and eluding. The FOIA was denied in writing.
260. That amounts to a denial of discovery.
261. My appointed lawyer should have run with that.
262. I was denied effective assistance of counsel.
Falsely Accused by anonymous official of having been convicted of a felony; I am felony free!
263. On 25 May 2004 somebody filed a presentence report with the local court.
264. I have preserved this exhibit in an email of 10 December 2005.
265. This person did not sign the report.
266. This report falsely accuses me of having been convicted of a felony.
267. Attached to the report is an unsigned sheet instructing the lawyer to shred the report.
268. On 14 June 2004 I was sentenced regarding the plea that they forced on my by falsely imprisoning me for 97 days until I pleaded guilty.
269. Conviction date was 29 April 2004.
270. This was after blind judge Alston put me in jail so that I would do the test. Then after the test they simply kept me in jail for 90 days in order to force me to plead guilty.
271. This was after Aldrich broke out the windows in my van in a pretextual stop at my house in retaliation for my having attempted to file a civil rights complaint against him.
272. This retaliation constitutes obstruction of justice as set forth in 18 USC 1512 et seq and 1951 as set forth in the appendix.
273. On the presentence report there is the false report that I have been convicted of a felony.
274. My lawyer, Ed Czuprynski, did nothing about this lie.
275. My wife paid good money to Czuprynski.
276. He failed to get me out of jail even though I was only there being held for my test which had already happened on the 3rd day of my 97 day false imprisonment.
277. Czuprynski should have brought to the court’s attention that this report was grievously false; he should have demanded its retraction and correction.
278. Judge Kenneth W. Schmidt did nothing about this lying defamatory report.
279. Regarding this extorted plea, I demand that this conviction be revoked and that I be paid $1000 for each of the 97 days that I was held in jail.
280. This plea was indeed extortion as the term is defined in 18 USC 1951 reprinted in the appendix.
July 29, 2004. Another inspection without warrant in violation of rule of Camara case and in retaliation in violation of 18 USC 1512 et seq.
281. Once again Defendant Elizabeth Loggenslaughter called the police in her 6 year effort of harassment and being out to get me.
282. Defendant Doud responded.
283. Doud called the housing officials.
284. They raided my house without a warrant at 207 N. Farragut St Bay City MI 48708, under the pretext of a code violation.
285. A warrant is required. This is established law. Authority: Camara v Municipal Court (San Franciso1967)18 L. Ed. 2d. 930, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727 http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/camara.html
286. On July 29, 2004 Jerry Doud arrested me for not registering. The case number is 04-10622-FY-1
287. They arrested me again on 13 August, 2004.
288. I posted bond on 15 August 2004.
289. There was a “Cobbs Hearing” November 30, 2004 It was ordered “no jail” by Judge Scott Newcombe.
290. The Probation Interview was November 30, 2004. Case 04-10622-FY-1, 04-30954-SM-1
Most recently: Feb 14, 2005: Imprisonment until I pleaded guilty for not having $35 to register.
291. Around a year after they kept me in jail to extract a plea, they did it again.
292. Around January of 2005 I attempted to register.
293. Here are my notes from that day:
294. Date Friday Jan 7, 2005. I was there on time (on the 6th). 1:30PM The players were all the same. This was judge Scott Newcombe. Same judge and report from before when I was in jail. They were doing the people in jail first on the screen. I walked out and waited until the room was empty. There was a girl that was crying she told me all of her thing was stolen by the cops and could not get them back. I thought I would give your name to her, so I did. She walked out with her mom. The mom didn't say much. She was not up set and a little confused on what was going on. I told her if she didn't have control of the case they would. Judge Newcombe same recorder as I was in jail. I think her name is Chris. I will call tomorrow and let you know. The names were loaded up on the paper work I fax you this day. Listing of names for court. I saw Jennifer Barns. I asked her where does due process go.
295. She said that was a good question.
296. Eric Proschek, I shook his hand and ask if he was on my side yet.
297. He said “ I don't know about you Ron.”
298. I told him I was firing Kim Higgs because “he, like you. didn't write me any motions.”
299. He just walked off. I finally sat down in front of Judge Scott Newcombe with one ahead of me. Judge said to me “I not going to have your hearing.”
300. I said, “I have the supreme court that says I'm in control of my case.”
301. He threw his hands in the air and said were going to have at the 12th.
302. I said, “can that be on the record?”
303. Judge newcombe said yes. I said, thank you your Honor and left the room and waited until 4:45pm before I left.
304. I would be waiting in the hall instead of jail, it was worth the wait. I didn't see too much of intimidation until I got to the police station. I went across the water to the police station and wanted to sign up. They said we have changes. You have to sign at the other police post across the water. When I arrived there about 8:30 p.m. Officer Hungry was speaking. He told me that in order for me to sign up I would have to pay $35.00. I couldn't sign up until I had the money in cash.
305. I first went to the State Michigan Police to register. Officer Hungry told me if I don't pay $35.00 I can't register, so I went home and called my attorney the Lawyerdude. He told me to go back and get a name.
306. So, I did. I came home and called him to get the supervisor's name and I was taping. The story had change from the police Station to the taping recording that I took.
307. Half way though.
308. This is how it went down with officer Hungry. I don't think he's telling the truth. Phone number: 989-684-2234 Police post number.
309. Hungry--"I'm just telling you what everybody supposed to be notified of.
310. Ron--Okay. hum I didn't get all that. Can you just read that one more time..because I just didn't get all of it.
311. Hungry (reading from the form to be signed by the registrant): “I understand that I should pay a one time registration fee of $35.00. I understand that if I am determined to be indigent by the collect agency this fee will be waived temporarily. I understand that failing to pay the registration fee is a misdemeanor and shall result in criminal prosecution.”
312. Ron-- and that is...
313. Hungry... that is on one of the from that you need to fill out, when you come in here with your thirty five dollars.
314. Ron--Right..Okay then if I'm indigent and if I don't have $35.00 then what happens.
315. Hungry---Will you will need to be able to show indigent and you don't have the $35.00.
316. Ron– okay.
317. Hungry--its not waived according to this form here, it not waived, its simply indicate. It's leaves you to believe that it is waived temporary. It will be waived until you will be able to pay that.
318. Ron--Okay
319. Hungry--You need to prove that you are indigent and you can not pay the thrifty five dollars.
320. Ron--okay alright so..now..ha..okay then and then who is Mr. Woolmen’s supervisor.
321. Hungry--Lieutenant John Card
322. Ron--Lieutenant John Card. Okay. no.. and then who is his supervisor?
323. Hungry: Captain Dan Miller
324. Ron Fox: Captain Dan Miller and then who is his supervisor.
325. Hungry--That’s the colonel.
326. Ron--That’s the colonel there? and that the highest you can go?
327. Hungry--Right
328. Ron--until you get to the governor
329. Hungry--Right
330. Ron: Okay. Okay. Good. well that’s all I need to know. Oh ha can I have there phone number?
331. Hungry--Well they’re not going to talk with you until you go through the chain of command. You need to talk to the Sergeant first.
332. Ron: Okay
333. Hungry--If the Sargent feels it necessary he will put you in contact with the lieutenant, who if he feels you need to contact the captain he will do that and if the captain feel you need to talk to the colonel he will notify the colonel.
334. Ron: Okay. And I can't have any e-mails
335. Hungry-- I don't have their e-mails
336. Ron--Ok.
337. Hungry--I'm just a trooper. They don't talk to me.
338. Ron: Okay. And then you don't have phone numbers do you.
339. Hungry--Well you need to contact Sergeant Woolman in the morning first. You need to go up the chain of command. That’s how a paramilitary organization like this one department.
340. Ron: Okay.
341. Hungry: They’re not just going to respond to you by going up to the top. You need to start with Sergeant, and then lieutenant and then you will go up from there.
342. Ron: Okay Thank you very much.
343. Hungry: All right
344. Ron: Bye bye.
I taped the conversation of officer Hungry. Date Friday 7, 2005
ADDED:
Mr. Hungry said that the legislature has passed a new law saying that I had to pay a one time fee of thirty five dollars. I asked Mr. Hungry where in law it says that I have to pay the thirty five dollars. Mr. Hungry said he didn't know. Then I asked when did that pass? Again he said he didn't know. I will be looking into this. I don't think he was telling me is name right. Ron Fox
345. They had taken my photo identification card/ driver license.
346. Officer Brian Schroer is the one who took my driver license.
347. There was a lot that happened in 2005 but I don’t have it all written down here.
Feb 11, 2005. Dirty Tricks. Taking my card for asserting my rights; then imprisoning me for not having a card; they had my card in the files of the very court that imprisoned me!
348. Then they refused to register me because I did not have a photo identification card.
349. I got a new identification card.
350. But my old card was in the court file. I saw it there.
351. They simply took it to retaliate against me for writing “All rights reserved. UCC 1-207" or words to the effect.
352. Then they arrested me for not having the statutory $35 fee.
353. Once again they set the bail beyond constitutional limits for the purpose of forcing me to plead guilty.
354. On Feb 9, 2005 I filed a continuance motion.
355. On Feb 11, 2005 I appeared in court to inquire as to whether the motion was granted.
356. Pat McIver arrested me because I did not have the $35.00 sex offender fee.
357. The case numbers were: 04-10622-FY-1, 04-30954-SM-1
358. On February 14, 2005 they set the bond at $25,000 in order to extract a plea by extortion like they did a year prior.
359. This constitutes obstruction of justice as set forth in 18 usc 1951 in the appendix.
360. I was unable to post bail and spent 97 days in jail - very nearly the same as had happened to me a year earlier.
361. Officer Brian Schroer is the one who took my driver license.
362. They were out to get me and teach me a lesson.
363. This lesson constitutes retaliation for my having attempted to file a civil rights case against Aldrich and the others who conspired to harass me for being on the sex offender list.
364. On 25 May of 2005 I was released from jail after serving 97 days. They hoped that they would teach me a lesson by convicting me falsely and using false reports.
365. All persons who were given illegible handwritten “action in court” papers.
366. All persons whose bail was set at exorbitant levels and who thereafter pleaded guilty or no contest as a way to get out of jail.
367. All prisoners in the Bay County jail who were denied internet access to their lawyers or who were denied word processor and printer use.
Private Attorney General Status
368. Whether or not this case is approved as a class action I nonetheless vindicate the rights of other similarly situated persons.
369. What I do for myself in this case I do for all similarly situated person.
370. The Supreme Court and Congress have expressed public policy in this regard and have provided incentives for people who advocate for the enhancement of civil rights.
371. They call this person a Private Attorney General as explained at http://www.fu.gq.nu/6790.html and in the case of Newman v Piggie Park (1968) 390 U.S. 400 at http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/piggie.html
372. I ask that the $25,000 bail be declared unconstitutional.
373. I ask that the process of extorting pleas be declared unconstitutional.
374. I ask for a declaration that a public defender who refuses to file any written papers is ineffective counsel.
375. I ask for Declaratory Relief that a “Next Friend” is entitled to file a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and that this right was denied to me.
376. I ask for Declaratory Relief that the I had a right to refuse forensic testing requested only by my public defender.
377. I ask for Declaratory Relief that the ruling of blind judge Alston in refusing to consider my written papers in that regard and in imprisoning me at the request of my own lawyer was illegal, without jurisdiction, unconstitutional, and outrageous.
378. I ask for declaratory relief stating that a jail has previously provided internet access to it inmates may not arbitrarily terminate this internet access for those inmates whose lawyers are over 2000 miles away and routinely communicate by email.
379. I ask this court to enjoin the defendant courts from handing out handwritten “action in court” papers. I ask the court to enjoin the defendant courts to hand out legible printed forms consisting mostly of sentences.
380. I ask the court to enjoin the defendant courts from extorting pleas by use of exorbitant bail.
381. I ask the court to set up a special master to supervise the public defender office and force it to comply with the Lawyerdude standard as set forth at http://www.circuitlawyer.8m.com/5635.html or some variation of that standard.
382. I ask the court to set up a lawyer to review the procedures of the clerks at the offending courts to ensure that similarly situated persons are not treated as I was.
383. I ask this court to enjoin the defendants from discriminating against me, against the named would- otherwise- be- plaintiffs, and against the classes that I represent.
Attorney Fees pursuant to RICO, 42 USC 1988, and Private Attorney General theory.
384. I ask for payment of attorney, expert, and witness fees pursuant to the aforementioned theories.
385. I ask for nominal damages for each class member. When nominal damages are awarded in a civil rights class action, every member of the class whose constitutional rights were violated is entitled to nominal damages. Cumming v Connell (03/29/05 9th circuit).
386. Regarding this extorted pleas of 29 April 2004 and May 2005, I demand that these convictions be revoked and that I be paid $1000 for each of the 97 days that I was held in jail in 2004 and for each of the 97 days that I was held in jail in 2005 and for every other day of false imprisonment.
387. I demand that the court and the officer who took my driver license be reprimanded for these dirty tricks as set forth herein; they took it for my having reserved my rights pursuant to UCC 1-207 as set forth herein.
388. I ask for actual damages of $1 million.
389. I ask for exemplary damages of $3 million.
390. I ask for the return of my camera and the images therein.
391. I ask for award of fees for private attorney general under Equal Access to Justice Act and any other pertinent act.
392. I ask for such other relief as the court may deem appropriate.
393. I demand a jury trial
Signed _____________________________ Ron Fox. Wednesday, August 24, 2005
I, Ron Fox, certify that the information contained in this complaint is true and correct except as to those items stated as being on information and belief. As to those items I state them on information and belief.
Signed ___________________ Ron Fox Thursday, December 22, 2005
Appendix #1 - Text of 42 USC 1983 et seq.
Section 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights.
1. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Source: Sec. 1980 derived from acts July 31, 1861, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 284; Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, Sec. 2, 17 Stat. 13. Section was formerly classified to section 47 of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality. This section is referred to in sections 1986, 1988 of this title; title 28 section 1343.
Section 1985. Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights
1. (1) Preventing officer from performing duties If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof; or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave any State, district, or place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties;
(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;
(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
Section 1986. Action for neglect to prevent Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action; and if the death of any party be caused by any such wrongful act and neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such action therefor, and may recover not exceeding $5,000 damages therein, for the benefit of the widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if there be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of kin of the deceased. But no action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued.
Section 1987. Prosecution of violation of certain laws
1. The United States attorneys, marshals, and deputy marshals, the United States magistrate judges appointed by the district and territorial courts, with power to arrest, imprison, or bail offenders, and every other officer who is especially empowered by the President, are authorized and required, at the expense of the United States, to institute prosecutions against all persons violating any of the provisions of section 1990 of this title or of sections 5506 to 5516 and 5518 to 5532 of the Revised Statutes, and to cause such persons to be arrested, and imprisoned or bailed, for trial before the court of the United States or the territorial court having cognizance of the offense. Section
1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights
(a) Applicability of statutory and common law The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
(b) Attorney's fees. In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.), title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), or section 13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including attorney's fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such officer's jurisdiction.
(c) Expert fees In awarding an attorney's fee under subsection (b) of this section in any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section 1981 or 1981a of this title, the court, in its discretion, may include expert fees as part of the attorney's fee. Previous [Notes] Next Related Resources Health Law Guide Health Articles and Documents Health Discussion
Section 1989. United States magistrate judges; appointment of persons to execute warrants
1. The district courts of the United States and the district courts of the Territories, from time to time, shall increase the number of United States magistrate judges, so as to afford a speedy and convenient means for the arrest and examination of persons charged with the crimes referred to in section 1987 of this title; and such magistrate judges are authorized and required to exercise all the powers and duties conferred on them herein with regard to such offenses in like manner as they are authorized by law to exercise with regard to other offenses against the laws of the United States. Said magistrate judges are empowered, within their respective counties, to appoint, in writing, under their hands, one or more suitable persons, from time to time, who shall execute all such warrants or other process as the magistrate judges may issue in the lawful performance of their duties, and the persons so appointed shall have authority to summon and call to their aid the bystanders or posse comitatus of the proper county, or such portion of the land or naval forces of the United States, or of the militia, as may be necessary to the performance of the duty with which they are charged; and such warrants shall run and be executed anywhere in the State or Territory within which they are issued.
Section 1443. Civil rights cases
1. Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law.
Appendix #2. Text of Selected Predicate RICO crimes.
Title 18 United States Code section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant),
18 USC Section 1512. Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant:
(a)(1) Whoever kills or attempts to kill another person, with intent to -
(A) prevent the attendance or testimony of any person in an official proceeding;
(B) prevent the production of a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or
(C) prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings; shall be punished as provided in paragraph (3).
(a)(2) Whoever uses physical force or the threat of physical force [regarding Aldrich] against any person, or attempts to do so, with intent to -
(A) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding;
(B) cause or induce any person to -
(I) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding;
(ii) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use in an official proceeding;
(iii) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness, or to produce a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or
(iv) be absent from an official proceeding to which that person has been summoned by legal process; or
(C) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation, supervised release, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;
shall be punished as provided in paragraph (3).
(a)(3) The punishment for an offense under this subsection is -
(A) in the case of murder (as defined in section 1111), the death penalty or imprisonment for life, and in the case of any other killing, the punishment provided in section 1112;
(B) in the case of -
(I) an attempt to murder; or
(ii) the use or attempted use of physical force against any person; imprisonment for not more than 20 years; and
(C) in the case of the threat of use of physical force against any person, imprisonment for not more than 10 years.
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in
misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to -
(1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding;
(2) cause or induce any person to -
(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding;
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding;
(C) evade legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness, or to produce a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or
(D) be absent from an official proceeding to which such person has been summoned by legal process; or
(3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation supervised release,, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
(c) Whoever corruptly -
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record [regarding Linton], document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
(d) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades any person from -
(1) attending or testifying in an official proceeding;
(2) reporting to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation supervised release parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;
(3) arresting or seeking the arrest of another person in connection with a Federal offense; or
(4) causing a criminal prosecution, or a parole or probation revocation proceeding, to be sought or instituted, or assisting in such prosecution or proceeding; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
(e) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, it is an affirmative defense, as to which the defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant's sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully.
(f) For the purposes of this section -
(1) an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense; and
(2) the testimony, or the record, document, or other object need not be admissible in evidence or free of a claim of privilege. (g) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind need be proved with respect to the circumstance -
(1) that the official proceeding before a judge, court, magistrate judge, grand jury, or government agency is before a judge or court of the United States, a United States magistrate judge, a bankruptcy judge, a Federal grand jury, or a Federal Government agency; or
(2) that the judge is a judge of the United States or that the law enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the Federal Government or a person authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal Government or serving the Federal Government as an adviser or consultant.
(h) There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section.
(I) A prosecution under this section or section 1503 may be brought in the district in which the official proceeding (whether or not pending or about to be instituted) was intended to be affected or in the district in which the conduct constituting the alleged offense occurred.
(j) If the offense under this section occurs in connection with a trial of a criminal case, the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any offense charged in such case.
(k) Whoever conspires to commit any offense under this section shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.
section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant),
18 USC Section 1513. Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant
(a)(1) Whoever kills or attempts to kill another person with intent to retaliate against any person for -
(A) the attendance of a witness or party at an official proceeding, or any testimony given or any record, document, or other object produced by a witness in an official proceeding; or
(B) providing to a law enforcement officer any information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation supervised release,, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings, So in original. shall be punished as provided in paragraph (2).
(a)(2) The punishment for an offense under this subsection is -
(A) in the case of a killing, the punishment provided in sections 1111 and 1112; and
(B) in the case of an attempt, imprisonment for not more than 20 years.
(b) Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby causes bodily injury to another person or damages the tangible property of another person, or threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate against any person for -
(1) the attendance of a witness or party at an official proceeding, or any testimony given or any record, document, or other object produced by a witness in an official proceeding; or
(2) any information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation supervised release,, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings given by a person to a law enforcement officer; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
(c) If the retaliation occurred because of attendance at or testimony in a criminal case, the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense under this section shall be the higher of that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any offense charged in such case.
(d) There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section.
(e) Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful to any person, including interference with the lawful employment or livelihood of any person, for providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission or possible commission of any Federal offense, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. So in original.
Two subsections. (e) have been enacted.
(e) Whoever conspires to commit any offense under this section shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.
18 USC section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion)
§ 1951. Interference with commerce by threats or violence
Release date: 2005-08-03
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section—
(1) The term “robbery” means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining.
(2) The term “extortion” means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.
(3) The term “commerce” means commerce within the District of Columbia, or any Territory or Possession of the United States; all commerce between any point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State through any place outside such State; and all other commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.
(c) This section shall not be construed to repeal, modify or affect section 17 of Title 15, sections 52, 101–115, 151–166 of Title 29 or sections 151–188 of Title 45.