5613old Version 1.01. Charlie Sprinkler 805 640 0439 Chas@ojai.net. Good guy to talk to and learn from !

Lawyerdude: 541 476 8954. Lawyerdude1989@yahoo.com Upgraded January 5, 2006.

This page is www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/5613old.html

The complete Anthology of Charlie’s case including transcripts ! : http://www.fu.gq.nu/charlie.html

Charlie’s Section 1983 Complaint from 1976: http://www.lawyerdude.8k.com/5718.html

Charlie’s big fat 995 motion that I wrote for him: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/5686.html

Complete list of winning pro se litigants and their papers: http://www.circuitlawyer.8m.com/traffic.html

Click here to go to my list of links at the bottom of this page.

Complete list of right2drive briefs! : http://www.lawyerdude.8k.com/right2drive.html

When I wrote a similar traffic brief for Melvin Looser they had me extradited !: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/5918.html

Skateboard, Cadillac, and Humvee and other motions: http://www.fu.gq.nu/6756.html

Here is Charlie’s Winning Demurrer. We have more almost like this one.

The prosecution did not even bother to answer this brief. They gave up after a year and dismissed the case.

Paste your own personal facts into this demurrer and Voila! you have a memorandum of law and your own demurrer!

Charlie cannot be charged with driving on a suspended license - because he rejected his license. He drives without license! He uses the public roads.

At first the Mexican affirmative action judge blew off Charlie’s demurrer with a scornful wave of his hand saying “this is just constitutional stuff. Denied.” This mexican affirmative action welfare recipient did not even read this brief. Is that the end? Heck no! We appealed and demanded a transcript. Many months elapsed before we received a transcript.

The transcript was the beginning of th end for the prosecution. The written transcript failed to even say who the judge was! A judge may not summarily deny a demurrer with no response from the other side and without a hearing. Eventually the prosecution dismissed the entire case. They always try to make it look like your papers were not the reason for dismissal.

Charles Sprinkler

805 640 0439

Chas@ojai.net

In Pro Per

Combined Superior and Municipal Court of California

800 S. Victoria, Ventura CA 93003

People

Charles Sprinkler

Case # 2002: 013, 441

Document #5613 preliminary version #1

Notice of Demurrer.

Memorandum of Authorities.

Notice of concurrent motions:

Motion #5614 to continue Arraignment until I receive police report

#2-36250.

Motion #5615 to continue Arraignment I receive the confidential

papers in my court file.

Proof of service.

Venue for Hearing on this motion:

Date: Thursday January 9th, 2003

Place: Court 10

Time: 1:30 pm

Notice of Demurrer

To the district attorney: Please take note: At the venue shown in the caption of at such venue as the

court may order, Defendant will demur to the accusation. Signed: Charlie Sprinkler Sui Juris. 3 Nov 2002.

Sign on side of Grampa’s truck : “Not for Hire”

"Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that

we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an

act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized,

if, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most

sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid

encroachment." -Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133,147

"Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion -- to go where and when one pleases -- only so

far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right

of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage,

wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common

Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional

guarantee one m ay, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or

in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor

disturbing another's Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct." American Jurisprudence 1st. Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p 1135.

Table of Contents:

Tables of Authorities cited herein: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Table #1 U.S. Supreme Court cases cited herein: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Lower Federal Court Cases cited herein: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Cases from other states cited herein: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Pennsylvania statutes and rules cited herein: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Constitutional clauses cited herein: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Learned Treatises and Encyclopedias cited herein: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Memorandum of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

History of the driver license . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

In the Beginning we built roads. We shared common tenancy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Declaration of Douglas Palaschak re: The law of licensure of farm trucks. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Defendant did not suddenly lose his right to drive. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

We use the road as common tenants - not as renters from the state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Comparison of Tenant in Common to Licensee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The Nature of a License: permission to do something that one otherwise may not do. . . . 7

Supreme Court’s Views on the right to Locomotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The Department of Motor Vehicles has by stealthy encroachment overstepped its bounds . . . . . 8

Supreme Court’s older Traditional View of Right to Travel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

States m ay not compact with each other without permission of Congress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Some cases that flesh out the difference between “rights” and “privileges” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Liberties may not be licensed - although by stealthy encroachment that was the trend . . . . . . . . 12

The Constitutional Right to Travel. Locomotion. Association. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

General Ancient Libertarian Premise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Right to Use Roads and Highways. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

The Common Law Right to Travel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Automobiles and the Right to Travel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Defendant is not required to have a driver license. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

There is no compelling state interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Some would say that the right to travel is limited to travel without a car. They are wrong. . . . . . 24

Licensing distinguished from mere Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

The California Constitution contains no grant of power to take away our right to use the road - and such a

grant would violate the privileges and immunities clause. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Abrogation of the Right of Property by stealthy encroachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Conclusions applicable to Defendant’s use of the roads in common tenancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Tables of Authorities cited herein:

Table #1 U.S. Supreme Court cases cited herein:

Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Boyd v. United States (1886) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Edwards v California (1941) 314 U.S. 160. The court held that a state may not condition interstate travel

upon wealth. I contend that driver license fee is a wealth based restriction on travel - especially when the

license requires proof of insurance and the cost of a smog check. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Gibbons v. Ogden (Feb 1824) 22 US 1, 6 L Ed 23, 9 W heat 1. Steamboat licensing dispute. . . . . . 7

Graham v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

U.S. v Mersky (1960) 361 U.S. 431: An adm inistrative regulation, of course, is not a "statute." . . . . . . . 8

United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Lower Federal Court Cases cited herein:

Douglas v City of Jeannette 130 F 2nd 652, 655. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Knoll Golf Club v U.S., 179 F Supp 377 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Cases from other states cited herein:

Beard v City of Atlanta (__) 86 SE 2nd 672, 676; 91 Ga. App. 584. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 NE 221. “The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and

transportation is not a mere privilege, but a comm on fundamental right of which the public and individuals

cannot rightfully be deprived." . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

City of Louisville v Sebree (19__) 214 SW 2nd 248, 308 Ky 420 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Littleton v Burgess 82 P 864, 866, 14 W yo 173. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Payne v. Massey (19__) 196 SW 2nd 493, 145 Tex 273. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133,147 "Complete freedom of the highways is so

old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and

yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through

lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from

them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment.".

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Taylor v Smith, 140 Va. 217, 235 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Wool v Larner, 26 A 2nd 89, 92, 112 Vt. 431. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Pennsylvania statutes and rules cited herein:

Constitutional clauses cited herein:

California Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Edwards v California. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

equal protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Equal Protection Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

U.S. Constitution : Art. 1 Section 10, Clause 3: “ No state shall, without Consent of Congress, . . . enter into

any Agreement or Compact with another State. . .” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

U.S. v Guest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Learned Treatises and Encyclopedias cited herein:

Am.Jur. (1st) Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p.1135 The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public

highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere

privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to

life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under

normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting

him self in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be

protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct."

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Demurrer

Defendant demurs pursuant to the common law. Penal code section 1004 is a bit stingy. The purview

of demurrer is broader than this penal code admits. See Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law of England.

“1004. The defendant may demur to the accusatory pleading at any time

prior to the entry of a plea, when it appears upon the face thereof . . .4. That

the facts stated do not constitute a public offense”

VC 12500 is void. It violates the constitution.

Signed ________________, Defendant pro se

Memorandum of Authorities

History of the driver license

In the Beginning we built roads. We shared common tenancy.

The townships generally required citizen s to contribute approxim ately 10 days in the spring to fix the

roads. Those citizens with wagons hauled macadam rock and other materials.

Evolution of Driver License - as related by Charles Sprinkle of Ojai, California

Charles was born in 1939 in West Virginia. He says that volunteers patrolled the roads carrying

gasoline for people with car problems. Eventually every driver paid 25 cents toward the gasoline fund. The

receipt for this 25 cents was your license to use the road and partake of the services should you become

stranded.

Declaration of Douglas Palaschak re: The law of licensure of farm trucks.

I, Douglas Palaschak, declare the following under penalty of perjury: I remember. I was raised on a

grand corn and soybean farm in Illinois. W hen I was age 9, each of my Grandfathers owned a grain truck.

Both trucks said the same thing on the side: “Not for hire”. I pondered this strange message for many years.

Why would you not hire your truck out? Why make an issue of it before anybody even asks? The answer

seemed to be that if you hired out your truck then you became subject to a higher tax on the truck . In fact to

this day there is a rule, perhaps unwritten, that a farmer may drive his truck to the nearest grain elevator just

as he may drive his tractor and wagon, to wit: without regard for licenses on the driver or the truck - because

none are needed for the tractor and wagon hauling corn in from the field.

I drove a grain truck again on the farm in the harvests of 1996, 1997, and 1998. I drove it without a

driver license for a truck, and, as I recall, the trucks, or at least one of them was not currently registered. That

is how the issue arose.

________________

Douglas Palaschak

Defendant did not suddenly lose his right to drive.

By stealthy encroachment the state takes away our liberty and sells is back to us as a license. The

stealth encroachment process of the corporation/ state against the human depends on time for its success.

The hum an lives perhaps 85 years. The corporation/ state has eternal life. As each succeeding generation

dies off, the next generation fails to remember the lessons and history of the previous generation. The

corporation state counts on that. Defendant remembers the way it was.

We use the road as common tenants - not as renters from the state

Stealthy encroachment at work: The state counts on this generation to forget that we use the roads

as tenants in common - not as licensees! Teodor Marian and his Mentor Richard McDonald have researched

this vein. By looking back at old disputes regarding roads, rivers, and other ways of passage, we see clearly

that the view was that public property is nothing more than property held in common tenancy for use by the

1 Edwards v California (1941)The fac ts of this case are sim ple and are not disputed. Appellant is

a citizen of the United States and a resident of California. In December, 1939, he left his home in

Marysville, California, for Spur, Texas, with the intention of bringing back to Marysville, his wife's brother,

Frank Duncan, a citizen of the United States and a resident of Texas. [314 U.S. 160, 171] When he

arrived in Texas, appellant learned that Duncan had last been employed by the Works Progress

Administration. Appellant thus became aware of the fact that Duncan was an indigent person and he

continued to be aware of it throughout the period involved in this case. The two men agreed that appellant

should transport Duncan from Texas to Marysville in appellant's automobile. Accordingly, they left Spur on

January 1, 1940, entered California by way of Arizona on January 3, and reached Marysville on January 5.

When he left Texas, Duncan had about $20. It had all been spent by the time he reached Marysville. He

lived with appellant for about ten days until he obtained financial assistance from the Farm Security

Administration. During the ten day interval, he had no employment.

1. In Justice Court a complaint was filed against appellant under Section 2615 of the Welfare and

Institutions Code of California, St.1937, p. 1406, which provides: 'Every person, firm or corporation, or

officer or agent thereof that brings or assists in bringing into the State any indigent person who is not a

resident of the State, knowing him to be an indigent person, is guilty of a m isdemeanor.' On demurrer to

the complaint, appellant urged that the Section violated several provisions of the Federal Constitution. The

demurrer was overruled, the cause was tried, appellant was convicted and sentenced to six months

imprisonment in the county jail, and sentence was suspended. On appeal to U.S. Supreme Court,

Edwards won.

public.

Comparison of Tenant in Common to Licensee

The licensee must request the license from the licensor, he cannot demand it from him. The licensor

cannot require the licensee to take his license under the licensee has encroached upon the thing or act that

the licensor has competent authority over. You cannot demand a liquor license. By comparison you can use

the road without even demanding anything. It is there to be used by all.

The Nature of a License: permission to do something that one otherwise may not do.

You may not hunt pheasant in my corn field without my permission. However, we each have the right,

barring abuse, to use the road. W e are tenants on common on the road.

To license means to confer on a person the right to do something which

otherwise he would not have the right to do. City of Louisville v Sebree

(19__) 214 SW 2nd 248, 308 Ky 420

The state cannot sell a right to drive; it was already ours.

The object of a license is to confer a right or power, which does not exist

without it. Payne v. Massey (19__) 196 SW 2nd 493, 145 Tex 273.

The word “license” means permission, or authority; and a license to do any particular thing, is a permission

or authority to do that thing; and if granted by a person having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the

right to do whatever it purports to authorize. Gibbons v. Ogden (Feb 1824) 22 US 1, 6 L Ed 23, 9 W heat

Supreme Court’s Views on the right to Locomotion

A good place to start is Edwards v California (1941) 314 U.S. 160. The court held that a state may not

condition interstate travel upon wealth1. I contend that the driver license scheme is merely a regressive tax

2Here is the Loyola Law School's page on "Right to T ravel"

http://faculty.lls.edu/~manheimk/cl2/travelx.htm

and therefore an impermissible barrier to interstate commerce. People are commerce. Interestate comm erce

includes, ironically, instate commerce, for purpose of this an alysis.

The Department of Motor Vehicles has by stealthy encroachment overstepped its bounds

There is a case that says that all administrative law is unconstitutional. We need not be that drastic.

Certainly there are some things that the Department of Motor Vehicles can do lawfully. They can assist in

transferring title of a car. They can administer a driver test. Even if the state legislature cooperates and

passes a “statute” for the motor vehicle code, that “statute” is really more like a “regulation” in that even the

legislature has no power to impede commerce absent com pelling state interest.

The Supreme Court said in U.S. v Mersky (1960) 361 U.S. 431: An administrative regulation, of

course, is not a "statute." W hile in practical effect regulations may be called "little laws," 1. 7 they are at most

but offspring of statutes.” I cite this case only to point out that indeed there is a difference between regulations

and statutes. Furthermore, not all laws are created equal. Furthermore, a statute that regulates without

constitutional authority is a nullity even though it be published in the books, recognized by the police and

lowers courts, and even though it be unchallenged for decades. Such is current state of driver license laws

in these United States. W e are in the age of government excess. Over half the working people work for some

form of government. By manipulating the money, by imprisoning dissenters, by owning the bulk of the stock

of public corporations, by deceptive bookkeeping, and by other oppression, fraud, and malice, the

governm ents have lulled the populace into a belief in the presumed regularity of whatever the government

says. W ell, I am here to tell you it aint so!

Supreme Court’s older Traditional View of Right to Travel2

"The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by

carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a common law

right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE

579.

"The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common

fundamental right of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived." Chicago Motor Coach

v. Chicago, 169 NE 221.

"Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days

of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may

be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interes t, the people submit, then they may look to see the most

sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment." Robertson vs.

Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133,147.

"Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion -- to go where and when one pleases -- only so

far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right

of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage,

wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common

Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional

guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or

in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor

disturbing another's Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct." [em phasis

added] II Am.Jur. (1st) Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p.1135.

The leading cases regarding travel in general are:

Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)

Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)

Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965)

United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)

Graham v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)

States m ay not compact with each other without permission of Congress.

Consider the compact by which all states seem to want you to have a driver license from one state only.

U.S. Constitution: Art. 1 Section 10, Clause 3: “ No state shall, without

Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with

another State. . .”

Some cases that flesh out the difference between “rights” and “privileges”

The permission or license is a special right or privilege. Once a license exists only the licensee has

he right to do the thing the licensor allows. The licensee is privileged over others who do not have a license.

It thus is a privilege to have the right to do the thing that is licensed. In other words, the right or permission

granted by the licensor is a privilege since he controls who can and who cannot exercise the right. If the

licensor grants the licensee a right or benefit, it is called a privilege:

The word privilege is defined as a peculiar benefit, favor, or advantage, a right or immunity not

enjoyed by all, or it may be enjoyed only under special conditions. Knoll Golf Club v U.S., 179 F Supp 377

Since the right or permission to do a thing is called a license, and since the right is “peculiar” to the licensee

alone, the license is called a privilege. Anything that requires a license is a privilege.

A license fo r the sale of intoxicating liquor is a privilege. Chiordi v Jernigan

129 P 2nd 640, 642; 46 NM 396.

Even privileges m ust be administered even-handedly. Authority: Equal Protection Clause.

Also, grandfather clauses, and im plied clauses, forbid the state to take away a vested right.

Those have the right to do something cannot be licensed for what they

already have right to do as such license would be m eaningless. City of

Chicago v Collins (19__) 51 NE 907, 910.

Also, those things which are considered as inalienable rights, which all Americans possess, cannot

be licensed since those are not held to be a privilege.

The right to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religious

worship are not privileges. Douglas v City of Jeannette 130 F 2nd 652, 655.

A license bypasses a legal barrier or makes an otherwise unlawful act lawful. The nature of a license

allows the licensee to do something he could not otherwise legally do. Thus, a license gives the licensee the

right to do something that would otherwise be illegal or unlawful for him to do.

A license is a mere permit to do something that without it would be unlawful. Littleton v Burgess,

82 P 864, 866, 14 W yo 173.

A license is a right granted by some competent authority to do an act which, without such license,

would be illegal. Beard v City of Atlanta (__) 86 SE 2nd 672, 676; 91 Ga. App. 584.

A licensee is one privileged to enter or remain on land by virtue of the possessor’s consent, whether

given by invitation or permission. Wool v Larner, 26 A 2nd 89, 92, 112 Vt. 431.

The licensor has the power to prohibit. Since the licensor is in the position to grant a right or

permission it logically follows that he has the power to prohibit the act also. Likewise, having the power to

prohibit something from being done, it follows as a corollary that power also exists to permit its use. Taylor

v Smith, 140 Va. 217, 235. Thus, where the power to license exists so does he power to prohibit.

The authority to license implies the power to prohibit, such being the meaning of the term. The City of

Burllington v. Bum gardner, 42 Iowa 673, 674.

The power to license necessarily includes the power to inhibit unlicensed persons from doing the acts

authorized by license. The power to refuse license necessarily gives the power to limit the issuance of

licenses. Ex parte M.T. Dickey, 76 W . Va.576, 585; 85 SE 781.

A license m eans leave to do a thing which the licensor could prevent. Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins,

160 P.2d 37, 39; 69 Cal. A. 2d 639.

Since the Motor Vehicles Departments, i.e., licensors, the Motor Vehicles Department(s) can issue

or refuse to issue a license and thereby permit or prohibit anyone from exercising the right or privilege they

has authority over.

A license carries limitations, restrictions and requirements. W henever a license is issued the licensee

is under certain limitations and requirements established by the Motor Vehicles Department (licensor), which

may be implied or expressed when the license was issued. These limitations and requirements are often in

the form of rules and regulations and may be referred to as the “terms” of the license, which the licensee is

subject to. The following decision reveals these characteristics:

“Licensee,” as used in Pub. St. c. 100, in reference to certain licensees, and providing that no such

licensee shall place or maintain any screen, curtain, or other obstruction on the licensed premises, refers to

every licensee, and not merely such as have been required by the licensing board to remove a screen, curtain,

or other obstruction. Commonwealth v. Rourke, 6 N.E. 383, 384; 141Mass. 321.

Those that are licensed under the statute cited above are restricted in their ability to erect curtains,

screens, or other obstructions on their premises due to the terms of the license. It matters not where these

terms were directly stated to the licensee or stated in the rules and regulations that cover such licensed

businesses, the licensee still becomes subject to the terms of the license. There can be no argument that

such terms are unreasonable as the licensor is in authority to make any such rules.

If a city chooses to grant permission [a license] to individuals to conduct a taxicab business in its