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Part #1 of 2:

My Federal Complaint for Arrest on May 14, 1999 by FBI

and subsequent Illegal Extradition from Illinois to California

At Jury Trial week of Sept 14, 1999 I was found innocent.

Douglas Palaschak

Jerry Palaschak

P.O. Box 23465 Ventura CA 93002

Dedicated virtual fax: 775-383-7885

http://lawyerdude.8m.com

805-643-3205

Pro Se

United States District Court for the Central District of California

312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles CA 90012. 213-894-3535. Judge Ronald Lew.

Attorney Douglas Palaschak and his brother Jerry Palaschak,

plaintiffs

versus the following 52 defendants:

1 FBI Special Agent Timothy Eley,

2 U.S. District Court,

3 La Salle County

4 Sheriff Tom Templeton,

5 Deputy Mike Crain,

6 Deputy Bob Scutt,

7 Deputy Gary Simpko,

8 Deputy Mike Rinner,

9 FBI,

10 United States,

11 County of Ventura,

12 State of California,

13 John Thomas Connors,

14 Willard McEwen,

15 Anne Hanson,

16 Sherri R. Carter,

17 Kevin D. Kelly,

18 David Nesbitt,

19 Grey Davis,

20 Governor of California in 1999,

21 all persons who procured my extradition and prosecution,

22 Investigator Glen Kitzman,

23 Prosecutor Eric Bond,

24 District Attorney Michael Bradbury,

25 Part time U.S. Magistrate in Santa Barbara,

26 Deputy Al Weigen,

27 Deputy __ in Illinois who took my law library,

28 La Salle county,

29 State of Illinois,

30 2nd extradition deputy,

31 Ventura Bailiff Vido aka Vito,

32 Ventura Judge Barry Klopfer,

33 Illinois Supreme Court,

34 Each justice of the Illinois Supreme Court sitting in May-September 1999,

35 Governor of Illinois in 1999

36 Attorney General of Illinois in 1999,

37 sheriff of LaSalle county,

38 Court of Appeal of Illinois at Ottawa,

39 Each Member of that court of appeal,

40 Public Defender Dan Bute,

41 the other public defender in Ottawa,

42 Judge Becky Riley,

43 Attorney Joel Steinfeldt,

44 Conflict Defense Associates,

45 Unremembered Ventura judges who participated,

46 Two judges before whom I appeared in Illinois,

47 Judge Steele,

48 Judge Clark of Ventura,                                                                                                               

49 every member of the California Supreme Court who was a defendant in Acuna's 1994/95 litigation against them,

50 State Bar of California,

51 every employee of the state bar and court who litigated against Palaschak to deprive him of his license,

52 occupants of plaintiff's former Illinois farm home,

defendants.

Case #CV 00 10510 RSWL. 3rd Amended Complaint #4055v4

for Money damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief.

Table of Contents of this complaint #4055 version 4:

 

Jurisdiction

 

Administrative Claim was filed and denied.

 

Procedural Background - Previous attempt to file 2nd amended complaint. Ratification

 

Need for 3^rd Amended Complaint

 

Need for assistance of U.S. Marshall

 

Original complaint was filed within 1 year; pro se office affixed wrong filing date

 

Computation of Time is from the date of release - not the date of arrest. It is tolled during disability of jail for 4 months.

 

Kitzmann's failure to include transcript of court session with his request for warrant

 

Facts pertinent to Plaintiff Douglas Palaschak. Ventura unconstitutionally punishes him for advocacy

 

Four warrants for the same crime.

 

Cause of Action: Timothy Eley, Tom Templeton, Mike Crain, Bob Scutt, Gary Simpko, Mike Rinner: Violation of my right to speak and petition; conspiracy to violate my constitutional rights

 

Patent Lie by FBI's Kelly regarding fact and date of "flight"; There was no flight.

Jurisdiction

1.         This case is about an arrest in Illinois and extradition to California for the crime of writing a petition.

2.          This court has jurisdiction under 42 USC 1983, its enabling statute, directly under the constitution (as enunciated in Bivens v Six unnamed agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics), and under concepts of pendant jurisdiction. I have spent the past year re-keying briefs and handwritten complaints in this case.

3.         Although this complaint may seem slow in the making, it is only one of several complaints and petitions begun or written while I was in jail in 1999.

4.         In order to be sure of the facts, I have gathered information from my diaries and pleadings which were handwritten in jail in 1999.

5.         Also, some diary segments are missing, presumably taken by the people who moved into my house while I was in jail.

6.         Being in jail requires writing things by hand which introduces a time consuming task years later when the litigation happens. That time consuming task is re-keying the information into the computer. As I write this I am searching my files on computer for key words.

7.         Facts are provable with key information. The information must be retrievable. That is why it must be keyed into the computer - a process that I do in my daily life. When I lost months and parts of years of keying, that time to re-key must be taken prior to writing a good complaint.

8.         Example: To find out when I talked to Attorney Hughes, I searched for his name in my 3rd quarter diary. The federal license issue

9.         On July 30, 2001, Judge Lew said that I could not represent my brother.

10.       I have never had any process regarding my federal license.

11.       In Re Ming http://www.lawyerdude.8m.com/ming.html supports my contention that process is due.

12.       . . . where a federal defendant (state bar of California and California Supreme court) conspire to take my bar license, the federal court may not defer to them and take the federal license.

            a.         This is complex litigation. I am without funds or a decent home. I request merely adequate time.

            b.         I can only shower when my friend permits me to use his shower.

            c.          Fortunately this same friend paid half a month's rent for a commercial office where I can sleep - but that place has no shower, bath, cooking facilities, or other amenities -

            d.         and I may be forced to leave for inability to pay rent. Working. Remember that I request my bar license back immediately.

            e.         I worked at Labor Ready for some weeks in May and June -

            f.          and during that time some defendants were dismissed

            g.         without notice to me.

            h.         I accumulated $400

            i.           which left very quickly.

            j.           Today my clothes are dirty and I feel yucky from not bathing.

            k.          I received some food stamps but I used them.

            l.           I plan to borrow $30 to pay for gasoline to drive to the heart of Los Angeles and pay parking to file this amended complaint.

            m.        My phone installation bill and electric deposit will be due soon.

            n.         My web site is free.

            o.         I can do some work and some litigation

            p.         but my life goes out of balance if I ignore work or this case.

Administrative Claim was filed and denied.

13.       I filed the administrative claim timely. Although it was after the 2nd anniversary of my arrest, it filed within the 2nd anniversary of my release.

14.       Common law requires that time be tolled during periods of disability including my incarceration in Ottawa without access to a law library.

Procedural Background - Previous attempt to file 2nd amended complaint. Ratification.

15.       Jerry Palaschak affirmed the 1st amended complaint in writing. It has not yet been filed with the court.

16.       Douglas Palaschak lodged a 2nd amended complaint with the court clerk in early July or June 2001.The clerk rejected it for lack of a court order permitting it. In court July 30th 2001, at Palaschak's first appearance in this case, Judge Lew seemed to be saying that he already asked me to file a 2^nd amended complaint - which would imply that he issued such an order but that the clerks did not know about it.

Need for 3^rd Amended Complaint

17.       This 2nd amended complaint is not yet perfected but plaintiff has been requested to serve the summonses - and some complaint, perfect or not, must accompany the summonses, and also,

18.       . .. this complaint answers some questions of fact that have been presented by counsel for the FBI.

19.       Plaintiff intends to further perfect this complaint.

20.       I expected the federal defendants to acknowledge receipt of the summons and complaint pursuant to rule 18A.

Need for assistance of U.S. Marshall

21.       If they will not do so, then I must ask for the assistance of the federal marshal.

22.       I contacted the U.S. Marshall. They will not assist me without a court order.

Original complaint was filed within 1 year; pro se office affixed wrong filing date

23.       The Complaint was filed within 1 year; court clerks applied the wrong date stamp.

24.       The Complaint is not time barred.

25.       The complaint reached this court on Thursday 21 September 2000 - on the 1st anniversary of the first

day of my 4 day trial for having petitioned for redress of grievances.

26.       September 1999 I was still in constructive custody of the police. I was subject to immediate

imprisonment should I fail to appear at trial that day and the following days.

27.       I wrote the following statement and sent it with cover letter #4084 and the complaint #4055:"Wednesday, September 20, 2000. 2:58 PM I am writing an amended complaint and by the time you receive this, an amended complaint will likely be on its way. I am late filing this due to being falsely incarcerated and then having lost my home and job due to the false arrest, but I am within that 1 year which expires 24 Sept, Sunday, which rolls over to Monday."

28.       I dispatched the complaint by UPS overnight service on 20 September.

29.       The UPS website contains (or did contain at one time) a detailed log of each step of the journey.

30.       My complaint arrived at the court in Los Angeles on21 September 1999.

31.       The date on the file stamp of the original first complaint is wrong due to mistake of the court clerks.

32.       The filing stamp on the complaint is wrong because the clerk sent it to the pro se department where it sat.

33.       It should be re-stamped nunc pro tunc.

34.       I filed the complaint in this case using UPS service so that it would arrive prior to the 1 year anniversary of my trial in Ventura at which time I remained subject to the pain of imprisonment should I fail to appear for trial.

35.       Having reviewed my contemporaneous diary notes I now affirm the following: I dispatched the complaint in this case by UPS air on 20 September, 2000. It was guaranteed to arrive the next day, 21 September, 2000 - on the one year anniversary of the first day of my trial in Ventura.

36.       My trial in Ventura began on Tuesday 21 September, 1999 and ended on 24 September, 1999.

Computation of Time is from the date of release - not the date of arrest. It is tolled during disability of jail for 4 months.

37.       Had the prosecution done the right thing and dismissed even as late as the 24th while the jury was out, I would have suffered less pain of threat of imprisonment.

38.       I was released on my own recognizance on approximately 14 September 1999 as I recall, after serving 4 months in jail because I could not afford the high bail.

39.       In Illinois my bail was $250,000 according to some court papers (although I thought I remember $500,000.) In California it was $5000 until reduced to $0.

Kitzmann's failure to include transcript of court session with his request for warrant

40.       In obtaining the arrest warrant, the prosecution failed to disclose that they possessed (or should have possessed), to wit: an exculpatory audio recording of the court session upon which the arrest warrant was predicated.

            a.         Don't reject this complaint for being disjointed while permitting the FBI to proceed with a complaint (Exhibit C attached herewith) that is perjured and pretextual.

41.       This complaint may seem disjointed because there are so many issues. The section that immediately follows was handwritten in Illinois before I was extradited to California. The next section discusses events in California.

42.       My goal has been to put my thoughts on paper contemporaneously each day before I forget with the thought that further refinement could be achieved once the facts are on paper. That is consistent with the goal of a concise statement of facts.

43.       The short concise statement of facts is a goal that takes time and effort - and may not even be possible in some cases.

44.       However, my efforts to preserve a record have been stymied by the people who moved into my Illinois house while I was in jail in California.

45.       They did not return my letters to me.

46.       I wrote myself letters from jail containing details of each days events including violations of my rights. I learned the virtue of mailing out my diaries when I was in the Ventura county jail in 1979. I kept a record in my cell. Deputies raided my cell and tore up my diaries to prevent me from accurately relating the events that transpired there.

47.       At every step Plaintiff Palaschak protested to deaf ears that the 1st amendment gave him immunity.

Facts pertinent to Plaintiff Douglas Palaschak. Ventura unconstitutionally punishes him for advocacy.

48.       Plaintiff is a zealous courageous advocate of the oppressed. As a result of his zealous prosecution of bureaucratic instruments of oppression he has incurred the wrath of powerful bureaucracies, namely The state bar of California, Ventura traffic court, and the Ventura district attorney.

Four warrants for the same crime.

49.       Exhibit H attached relates that a warrant was issued by Judge Campbell of Ventura. If this warrant is the basis for arrest, then extradition proceedings should have been used; the procedure of issuing a pretextual warrant is dishonest and denies defendant his constitutional fight to be free.

50.       At various times the excuse for arrest has been:

            a.         Warrant for 18 USC 1073 - See exhibit B attached.

            b. Warrant by Judge Klopfer of Ventura - a former defendant in my civil case.

            c. Warrant by Judge Campbell - See Exhibit H attached.

            d. Warrant by Judge Clark - appears in the extradition papers to replace Klopfer warrant.

51.       In 1993, prior to the arrest warrant by Ventura Judge Klopfer, Palaschak sued Judge Klopfer for a civil rights violation.

52.       Palaschak has battled with the state bar. He represented his fellow California sole practitioners in this new (1990) unconstitutional pseudo-court. Palaschak sued the state bar court in federal court for violation of the civil rights of is client lawyers.

53.       Just as the late William Kunstler suffered the imposition of a 4 year prison sentence by Judge Julius Hoffman for his zealous advocacy in the case of the Chicago 7, so Palaschak also suffers baseless attacks. (Kunstler's sentence was overturned on appeal.)

54.       In 1993 the Ventura district attorney's investigators raided Palaschak's office using a very general warrant that is best described as a writ of assistance.

55.       Then, as now, they accused Palaschak of practicing law without a license.

56.       Ventura district attorney delivered a press release to the Los Angeles time which then reported in a large headline that I was in jail accuse of 7 felonies. In fact the district attorney was mistaken. Palaschak was indeed licensed. No criminal complaint was ever filed. Palaschak was released after6 days in jail. The district attorney kept Palaschak's computer, money client files, files, and other property for one year. They read 3 years of Palaschak's diaries.

57.       In 1996 Palaschak became overwhelmed by attacks by the aforementioned bureaucracies.

58.       In 1996 Palaschak returned to his first love, farming.

59.       In 1997 Palaschak moved into a farm house in Illinois.

60.       He lived there from August 1997 until the date of his arrest by the FBI, May 14, 1999, leaving the state only twice to attended family functions in Wisconsin.

61.       Prior to his July 1999 extradition Palaschak had been in California since August 1997.

62.       Palaschak's parents cannot understand why Palaschak's bail was so high - and lost faith in Palaschak.

63.       The violation of Palaschak's diaries was similar to the violation of the McSurelys as told by Caroline Kennedy in "in our Defense" Avon books, 1991. See also McSurely v McClellan 753 F 2d 88 (D.C.Cir 1985).

64.       The McSurelys required 14 years to resolve their violation.

65.       Palaschak has not listed all of the outrageous abuses by the bar and the Ventura prosecutor and bench. Details of the 14 May 1999 arrest.

66.       On 14 May 1999 Brothers Jerry and Douglas Palaschak returned to their farm to find 3 Crown Victoria Sedans in their driveway.

67.       Having been alerted by telephone of FBI inquiries, and having received discovery in the Ventura case in 1998, Douglas Palaschak was not surprised.

Cause of Action: Timothy Eley, Tom Templeton, Mike Crain, Bob Scutt, Gary Simpko, Mike Rinner: Violation of my right to speak and petition; conspiracy to violate my constitutional rights

68.       On 14 may 1999 Defendants Eley, Templeton, Crain, Scutt, Simpko and Rinner went out onto the highways to intimidate Palaschak for having been a witness in California cases and to conspire with others to so intimate him by arresting him.68. All defendants knew that the arrest was a pretext, that Palaschak had indeed not been lawfully6accused in any court of violating 18 USC 1073.

69.       All defendants acted under color of state law at the request of Ventura district attorney and former prosecutors now judges.

70.       Douglas Palaschak walked into his house and found 5 or 6 men wearing suits and guns.

71.       The report of FBI Special Agent Timothy Eley was an exhibit in the FBI' motion to dismiss.

72.       Until reading this report, Palaschak did not know the names of the deputies who assisted the FBI.

73.       In his report, Eley names the persons who assisted in the arrest.

74.       Assisting in the arrest on 14 May 1999 were:

            a.         LaSalle county elected Sheriff Tom Templeton,

            b.         his Captain Mike Crane,

            c.          his Captain Bob Scutt,

            d.         his Sgt. Gary Simpko,

            e.         and his Corporal Mike Renner.

75.       FBI Agent Timothy Eley amicably arrested Palaschak for "interstate flight to avoid prosecution for practicing law without a license." (Added 18 May 2001 in retrospect: FBI agent Eley was wrong. The Ventura prosecutor charged Palaschak with Business and Professions code 626 which is “advertising without a license. Advertising is protected by the first amendment.

76.       Eley did not follow federal law.

77.       The warrant said to take me to a magistrate.

            a.         Years later I discovered that the federal rules (which are not law - because they are not written by the executive branch) approves of this particular pretextual arrest.

            b.         In particular the unconstitutional federal rules portend to permit the police to imprison a person without taking him before a magistrate even though the very warrant requires that the defendant be taken before a magistrate.

78.       Eley operated under false pretense, under color of state law - because he had no authority to arrest in the state of Illinois.

79.       Eley had the actual sheriff himself with him.

80.       Eley knew that the federal charge was bogus.

81.       Eley knows very well that the First Amendment is pre-eminent among our laws.

82.       I told Eley that I was innocent.

83.       I heard Eley tell my brother that I was unique to him because he had never arrested anybody for unauthorized practice of law.

84.       Unauthorized practice of law is abbreviated "UPL" or “UAL” by bar officials.

85.       Had Eley checked his own documents for their veracity he would have discovered that 6126 is not UAL. California B&P code 6125 is UAL.

86.       By comparison B&P 6126 is advertising.

87.       Inserted to rationalize numbering.

88.       Either way, speech is the element of the crime

            a.         Abridgment of speech is generally unconstitutional.

            b.         Speech “shall not be abridged” says the first amendment.

89.       Eley was duped by police in Ventura.

90.       FBI agent Eley told Jerry Palaschak: "Your brother is unique. I've never arrested anybody for practicing law without a license before."91. At the jail, Eley told me that the FBI only gets involved if the underlying crime is a felony.92. California Business and Professions code 6126 was modified circa 1996 to make it violative of the equal protection clause and thereby unconstitutional.793. 6126 prescribes a misdemeanor punishment for 1st time offenders except for former bar members; their penalty is felony punishment.94. FBI agent Eley refused to permit me to read his I.D. card.95. FBI agent Eley said "These federal cases usually go away". He said that the FBI provides a locator service for local police.96. The federal warrant directed that I be taken before a federal magistrate forthwith. It has been 35days and I have not been taken before a federal magistrate. (Added 18 May 2001: My research reading Am Jur regarding extradition shows that extradition law is much like criminal law was 100 years ago. In other words, extradition law is 100 years behind the times.)97. Reserved98. Reserved99. Reserved review of Illinois statutes proves that Eley was not authorized to arrest for Ventura warrant100. On the basis of all that transpired I conclude that FBI agent Eley had no intention of executing the federal arrest warrant. At first I thought that I would wait at La Salle county jail to be arraigned inChicago.101. On 28 August 2001 Palaschak conducted more investigation into this case. He talked with FBI supervisor Mack in Ventura. He talked with Laura at McEwen's office.102. FBI agent Eley is not authorized under Illinois statute (725 ILCS 225/14) to arrest. 725 ILCS5/107-4 defines "peace officer." FBI agent Eley is not a peace officer. FBI agent Eley is not a "law enforcement agency" as defined in 725 ILCS 5/107-4. Therefore the FBI could not lawfully arrest Palaschak under the Illinois uniform extradition act which is 725 ILCS 224/14 which limits arrest to peace officers and private persons. FBI agent Eley is not a private person for this purpose and the FBI had no probable cause regarding the underlying crime which probable cause is a prerequisite to arrest and continued detention.103. When I attempted to explain that the 1st amendment protects speech and press and may not be abridged, FBI agent Eley raised his hand and said "I don't want to hear about the underlying crime."104. FBI agent Eley and Palaschak chatted amicably at the LaSalle county jail immediately after arrest. FBI agent Eley wanted to collect information about the underlying crime. Palaschak declined. Palaschak wanted to discuss what would happen. FBI agent Eley seemed reluctant to discuss his role - as though the arrest completed his task. He assured Palaschak that "the federal case is usually dismissed."105. Inescapable conclusion: FBI agent Eley made a pretextual arrest! He knew that there was no federal case and he knew that nobody could arrest for extradition without probable cause which8requires evidentiary facts and circumstances to sustain arraignment. See 725 ILCS 225/13 and31A Am Jur 20.106. Conclusion: 1st cause of action: false pretextual arrest by FBI agent Eley in violation of U.S. constitution. See Bivens v Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1971) 29 L Ed2d, 403 US 388, 91 S Ct 1999.Cause of Action: Illinois Statutory Monetary Award for Denial of Paper Copy of Warrant107. Weeks later Palaschak obtained a copy of the warrant.108. Although Illinois statute provides a monetary penalty for violation of a statutory demand for a copy of the prisoner's warrant of arrest, this jail has 4 times denied my request. To their credit they eventually complied once on each of two warrants.

109. Illinois statute 735 ILCS 10-105 provides a monetary award to be paid to a prisoner who suffers a denial of a request for a copy of a warrant of process for more than 6 hours. 110. Palaschak hereby demands that monetary reward. The fraud and deceit by Ventura FBI and District Attorney employees 111. On 29 August, Attorney Charles Claiborne Hughes said that he indeed chatted by telephone with somebody in the district attorney office about my case in July 1998. Hughes told me on 29 August 2001 that he will review his notes. Deceit by Eric Bond is in doing a police function - not a prosecutorial function 112. See Exhibit G. Eric Bond was the point man on this project. 113. Eric Bond overcharged me to turn this into a felony thus triggering 18 USC 1073 action - although this section was originally designed for crimes where the death penalty is the punishment. 114. Judge Clark released me from jail after 4 months saying that the punishment would be no more than 6 months if there were a conviction. That indicates that the correct charge would be misdemeanor. 115. Ventura over charged me in my 1991 LSD case. 116. Ventura raided my law office in 1993 and then pressed no charges but kept my stuff. We have a pattern here. 117. Eric Bond conspired with the FBI to deny my due process and speech rights by using the standard ruse of arresting me for a non-existent charge of 180 USC 1073 and then neglecting to take me before a magistrate while instead holding me our of state in conspiracy with LaSalle county deputies while they wait for the Attorney General to obtain extradition papers. 118. Eric Bond cannot enjoy prosecutorial immunity (if there were such a thing) because the law holds that he loses that when he is doing a police function - which is what he was doing in conspiring to use the ruse of a pretextual arrest under 10 USC 1073 in order to put me in custody while the Attorney General took his time filling out the extradition papers. 9 119. Furthermore, I am a prosecutor also - a civil rights prosecutor. I should have some immunity - but instead my advocacy is the trigger that causes my opposition to attempt these dirty tricks - like putting me in jail while they do the paperwork. Fraud and Deceit by Attorney Magistrate McEwen and his secretary Anne Hansen 120. In August 2001 I obtained a local Ventura telephone. Immediately I called McEwen's office. 121. The receptionist promised to send me a copy of the warrant. She never did send it. 122. On 28 and 29 August 2001 I called again. I talked to Laura there and at her suggestion I left a voice mail for Anne Hanson because she takes all McEwen's calls. 123. On 29 August I telephoned first thing in the morning. I was told that Ann was not available and neither was McEwen. They relented and sent the warrant - which I already obtained from another source. 124. I called at 12:15 and finally Anne Hanson came on the phone and lied to me saying that the case number came from "down south". 125. I confronted her and told her that I thought that she had a bank of numbers assigned to her Santa Barbara office. She admitted that indeed she had a bank of numbers. 126. I asked her if a federal prosecutor had ever passed on the case. She said "You' ll have to talk to the FBI about that". I told her that I talked to the FBI yesterday and they said that they number on the warrant is not a federal case number. 127. Anne then became angry. 128. She said that I will have to ask them "down south" about my case. 129. I told he that I suspect that there is and never was any case and that the case number is just used to obtain a warrant. 130. Anne told me that she does not have to talk on the phone with me and hung up. 131. As shown in Exhibit B attached, Willard McEwen signed a fraudulent rigged warrant for the arrest of Palaschak. 132. Willard is not a judge; he is a member of the bar and practices law. 133. The warrant bears the name of Sherri R. Carter. 134. On information and belief I state that she is or was an employee of the clerk's office in Los Angeles. 135. From Exhibit 136. He can have no immunity for fraud and deceit in signing a rigged warrant. 137. He can enjoy no immunity for abusing his office. 138. Section 1983 does not give immunity; the immunities are inventions of the establishment to oppress the citizens; Section 1983 et seq continues to come into its own. 139. Note that there is a case number m99-4115-sb affixed to exhibits B and C, both in the same 10 handwriting. 140. I talked with Mr. Mack, an FBI supervisor on 28 August 2001. He told me that case 99-4115 is not a valid federal case number. 141. I contend that was no federal case. 142. The case number is one made up by McEwen. 143. I telephoned him approximately 5 times in the past 2 months including once on 29 August 2001. He has never returned my calls nor answered my specific questions in this regard. 144. The signature of Sherri Carter was affixed to the warrant before the details were filled in. 145. The warrant says to take me to answer a complaint; there was no complaint filed! This was pretextual from the beginning. Fraud by David Kelly of Ventura FBI 146. David Kelly committed perjury as shown on Exhibit C and D attached herewith. 147. On exhibit D, paragraph 3 Kelly says that July 13th is the day that Jennings of the fugitive department called me. That is not true. 148. In fact, I telephoned Jennings! That would change the tenor of the affidavit were that fact included. Pattern of Not Telling the Whole Truth and Not Giving me a Hearing. 149. On July 10th 1998 my parents celebrated their 50th wedding anniversary - and that is why my Mom did not tell me about the call from Jennings until Monday 12 July 1998. She did not want to ruin the party. 150. On the very next day I telephoned Jennings; he knew hardly anything about the case. 151. We were harvesting sweet corn - and therefore I had some cash. 152. On the very next day, Tuesday 14 July 1998, I wired $300 to Attorney Charles Claiborne Hughes of Santa Barbara so that he would investigate the charges. He did. 153. Hughes talked with somebody from the district attorney office. 154. On August 29 2001 Hughes recalled that conversation for me. His statement was essentially this: Hughes gathered from their tone that they had it in for me and although they had a weak case they were making it into something big. 155. Thereafter Hughes sent me some papers from the case -but they withheld the tape recording or a transcript thereof. This would seem to be a violation of discovery. 156. On Exhibit D, at paragraph 4, FBI's Kelly says "Jennings told me that since July 13, 1998 Palaschak has not appeared in . . . court. . to answer the warrant" - meaning the Ventura warrant. 157. I was never given the chance to appear in court. The court set a date, did not notify me, and then issued a warrant when I could not read their minds and appear. Patent Lie by FBI's Kelly regarding fact and date of "flight"; There was no flight. 158. On Exhibit C, Kelly swears that I fled California on or about 13 July 1998. In fact his very own statement in Exhibit D contradicts him. He says that on July 8th Palaschak was confirmed present in Illinois. 159. Obviously Kelly did not know when I left California - and therefore he simply filled in the blank on the arrest warrant. 160. An FBI agent does not have immunity to desecrate the system by lying under oath. Is there Cooperation in the Ruse by the U.S. Attorney's office? 161. It would be difficult to imagine that the U.S. Attorney is not familiar with this practice. The FBI should have asked the U.S. Attorney to file a case before disbursing a warrant telling the world that a case had been filed when in fact no case had been filed. 162. Because of this lie, I now suffer humiliation and obloquy because my parents simply cannot believe that the FBI would say that I had been accused of a federal crime (to wit: 18 USC 1073) if I had not indeed been accused. 163. Had any lawyer looked at this case he would have rejected it - and there could have been no federal warrant - and the state would have had to risk arresting Palaschak and waiting for extradition - which introduces another unconstitutional practice - that of imprisonment prior to issuance of a requisition for extradition. This fraud is standard FBI practice in Ventura 164. On 28 August 2001 Mr. Mack of the Ventura FBI told me that the unlawful flight cases go away once the fugitive is caught. 165. This practice is unconstitutional. Unlawful flight was originally written regarding crimes for which the death penalty applied - and now these petty officers have desecrated it by using it to violate the 1st amendment. 166. On Exhibit A, Eley reports that Palaschak was lodged in jail "on a warrant issued in Ventura" obviously referring to the state court warrant for practicing without a license. 167. One goal of the pretext is to avoid going through the process of extradition. 168. A California warrant has no effect in Illinois. 169. Only by the federal process of extradition does an out of state charge gain credence in another state. 170. The proper way to achieve the goal of bringing Palaschak back to California would have been to prepare the extradition papers and arrest Palaschak upon completion of the papers. 171. The FBI shortcuts this process and thereby violates the civil rights of innocent people. Palaschak hired a lawyer who talked with Ventura prosecutors in July 1998 172. Ironically while conspiring to arrest Palaschak under the pretext of harming the public by malfeasance, McEwen and his co-conspirators committed malfeasance by filling out forms 12 incorrectly and otherwise demonstrating malicious abuse of process. 173. On 29 August 2001 Douglas Palaschak chatted by telephone with Attorney Charles Claiborne

Hughes of Santa Barbara who was Palaschak's early counsel in the Ventura case.

174. Palaschak wired money to Hughes on 14 July 1998 - the day after talking to Ventura's Jennings in

the fugitive department.

175. Hughes investigated the case.

176. On the basis of Hughes's investigation and the papers that Hughes sent to Palaschak, Palaschak concluded rightfully that Palaschak enjoyed an immunity from prosecution for having spoken, written, and petitioned. 177. Palaschak remembered that the 14th amendment said "no state shall make or enforce any law which would abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens" and that speech, petition, and press are guaranteed by the 1st amendment and are presumably privileges of citizens. 178. Observe that on Exhibit B, in the bail line there is not amount listed - just the word "detention". 179. From the exhibits attached to the Extradition papers that I received months after my arrest, I conclude that the underlying crime is one single act of writing "attorney at law" on my letterhead on a cover letter delivering a pro per notice of appeal to Ventura court . . while not licensed in state court. 180. The warrant shown to me for the first 34 days in jail merely states that the crime is 18 USC 1073. 181. Despite 34 days of request to public defender Dan Bute and chief jailer Sgt. Preci, I was denied a copy of 1073. (Continuing update: 9:30 pm 16 June. Written request #3436 to Deputy Kneppert. Denied. This is my 5th denial of a request for my federal warrant. 10:30 a.m. 17 June. Written request #3436 to Deputy Kneppert. This is my 6th request for a copy of my federal warrant.) 2nd cause of action - false imprisonment 182. Sheriff Tom Templeton of LaSalle county held Palaschak for 35 days (as of 17 June 1999) under false pretenses. 183. Illinois state's attorney David Day presented a perjured complaint at a pseudo-arraignment on May 17. It was pathetically transparent. 184. Judge Lanuti declined to issue a warrant based on Day's perjury. 185. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all paragraphs of all cause of action in every other cause of action. 186. Having filed approximately 8 (as of 17 June 10 a.m.) requests to examine a copy of my arrest warrant pursuant to 75 ILCS 5/10-1-5 Palaschak has received only 2 warrants, namely: the aforementioned federal warrant alleging violation of 18 USC 1073; and the Ventura county warrant copied in Exhibit A. An out of state warrant only gains validity if supported by facts from credible (i.e. personally knowledgeable) sources. 13 187. Conclusion: Defendant Sheriff Tom Templeton and LaSalle imprison Palaschak without due process in violation of the constitution. 188. Palaschak is entitle to monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief authorized by 42 USC 1983 and the constitution which is, after all, self-enabling as we learned in See Bivens v Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1971) 29 L Ed 2d, 403 US 388, 91 S Ct 1999. 3rd Cause of Action: Defamation 189. John Thomas Connors signed the letter depicted in exhibit G attached herewith. 190. Connors told my public defender that I was once city attorney of Ventura and thrown out of office for sexual harassment. 191. LaSalle county deputies repeated the same falsehood to my wonderful neighbor Jean Swanson whose land is farmed by me and my brothers. 192. I have suffered obloquy and loss of credibility as a result of this defamation. 193. In face I have never been city attorney of Ventura or any city. 194. I have always practiced law as a sole practitioner. 195. I am entitled to monetary relief. 196. I have never been thrown out of office. 4th Cause of Action: 2nd False Arrest 197. On June 8, 1999 at 8:15 pm Deputy Schroeder called me out of my cell and told me that "Ventura recalled the warrant." He freed me. I telephone home and waited for a ride. 198. At approximately 9m on June 8 Deputy Karen asked me to come back to jail. She then locked me up. "We are waiting for a governor's warrant from California" said Karen. 199. Reserved 200. Reserved 42 USC 1983. 4th Cause of Action 201. In fact an Illinois governor's warrant has not yet been issued to my knowledge. I have asked in writing as provided by Illinois law. 202. In fact Deputy Karen was not authorized to arrest under the federal warrant. 203. In fact had defendant Deputy Karen arrested Palaschak without a warrant she would be obligated to so some paperwork to send Palaschak on the way to arraignment. 204. In fact in all the time Palaschak has been here (written 17 June at 1:25 pm) Palaschak has never been arraigned with counsel and has not waived counsel. 205. Chief jailer Preci told Palaschak on June 9 that "We have spent all day trying to figure this thing out." Preci said that the sheriff department had the state's attorney on the telephone during my June 89 half hour of freedom. 14 206. Reserved 207. Reserved 208. The action of Deputy Karen constituted a warrantless, baseless arrest in violation of the U.S. constitution. 209. The arrest was under color of law. 210. Palaschak is entitled of redress under 42 USC 1983 et seq. 211. Reserved. 5th cause of action: violation of Privileges and Immunities Clause. 212. The right to travel in interstate commerce is a privilege and immunity of U.S. citizenship. See Edwards v California __U.S.___ 213. Plaintiff is a U.S. citizen. 214. The extradition clause of the U.S. constitution ways: "A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up. To be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime." - Extradition Clause (Next to the Fugitive slave clause) 215. Palaschak is not within the group described in the extradition clause. The Fugitive Lawyer Clause 216. Ironically practicing law without a license is only a felony if you are a lawyer. Because extradition generally only happens for felonies, the combination of the state bar act and the extradition clause combine to create a fugitive lawyer clause. The due process clause and bill of rights supersede the extradition clause - and they supersede the fugitive lawyer clause. Plain Meaning of the Extradition Clause 217. Despite a plethora of hard cases (regarding hard crimes) to the contrary, when Palaschak left California in August 1997 not yet having been charged with a crime he could not possibly have been fleeing because fleeing implies something from which one is fleeing and there was nothing from which to flee because writing a petition is not a crime. 218. The history of constitutional law reveals that many gravely wrong interpretations were pronounced by the U.S. Supreme Court (and other courts) primarily to protect the moneyed interests who put them in power and to permit police to control the citizenry who, in the case of the Dred Scot decision were deemed property of the moneyed class. 219. Anybody with a grasp of English can understand the elements prescribed by the extradition clause: Element #1: Flight. (You can't flee if there is nothing from which to flee.) 15 Element #2: Pending charge at the time of flight. Element #3: "Crime" as defined in 1789 - which does not include practicing law without a license. 220. Palaschak situation fails to meet any element. 221. Palaschak has read Am Jur on extradition (including the latest update) and the annotations to 18 USC 3182 (the federal extradition statute). Not one case therein pertains to practice of law without a license. 222. Issues of law requiring resolution by this court: 223. Issue: Does the plain meaning rule (subject to 1789 meaning) apply to the extradition clause? Answer: Yes. 224. Issue: May Illinois use the extradition clause to enforce a statute that discriminates against a class of people (lawyers) thereby invidiously violating the equal protection clause? Answer: no. 225. California Business and Professions code 6126 is newly amended (1996?). It prescribes felony punishment for 1st offense for ex bar members but misdemeanor punishment for non lawyer 1st offenders. 226. This issue seems to be one of first impression. 227. Issue: Must a court (and/or governor) use a balancing test to evaluate competing societal goals and competing constitutional rights of the state viz a viz the individual? Answer: Yes, but it is more complicated than a simple yes. 228. Issue: Does "practice of law" include the act allegedly committed by Palaschak, namely : writing "attorney-at-law" on his letterhead while performing a non-monopolized function, a secretarial function (namely: filing a petition for a pro per litigant)? Answer: no. (May 2001 note in retrospect: In fact, Palaschak was accused not of practicing law without a license (as announced by the arresting officer) but "advertising or holding oneself out to be entitled to practice law when one is not so entitled.") 229. Plaintiff is an expert in the history and constitutionality of bar licensing - and driver licensing - and predatory bureaucracies. 230. The purported withdrawal of Palaschak's California state bar license is invalid suffering a multitude of infirmities including but not limited to: A. Traffic tickets are the primary basis for the deprivation of the bar license thereby presenting the issue of the absence of the requisite nexus. B. Palaschak is innocent of the underlying traffic tickets - or at least most of them. They are for driving on a licence invalidly suspended without the due process enunciated in Bell v Burson (1971) 402 U.S. 535. (Note added May 2001 in retrospect: There is a growing Patriot movement whose dominant theme is that the government may not license our 16 fundamental rights. Regular folks are not blind to stealthy encroachment of government and are righteously angry about government intrusion. As an example they proffer Stork 167 Cal 294, the 1914 case wherein the court draws the distinction between a chauffeur and a mere operator saying that a chauffeur needs a license but a mere operator does not.) C. The action by the California bar is retaliation for Palaschak's having been counsel for another lawyer who sued the bar in federal court. D. Palaschak was ordered excluded from his own bar hearing by an angry imitation judge as Palaschak attempted to plug in his notebook computer upon late arrival at court. E. Only he supreme court of California can revoke a bar license. 231. Reserved 232. Reserved 233. Issue: Does the phrase "treason, felony, or other crimes: include "practicing law without a license"? (May 2001 Comment in retrospect: The actual accusal was for "advertising" which is certainly not of the magnitude of treason or felony and in fact is protected speech which may not be abridged even by the state bar act. In Bates v Arizona (1977) 53 L Ed 2d 810, the U.S. Supreme court finally recognized that lawyer advertising is protected by the first amendment but they nonetheless in another case permitted my hero Attorney Melvin Belli to be suspended for his having endorsed his favorite liquor on television. This is established law and therefore various defendants may not argue qualified immunity.) 234. A reading of History of American Law by Stanford Professor Lawrence Friedman shows that there was no such crime in 1789. 235. Indeed the monopoly of the organized bar is a product of the age of monopolies and robber barons. Proper and police were favored over labor and individual freedom. 236. Lawyers were on the forefront of monopolistic abuse long before J. Pierpont Morgan created the railroad trusts before Morgan packed the Interstate Commerce Commission establishing the paradigm corrupt regulatory agency. 237. Lawyer are the lightning rods that draw rage during storms of polity. 238. In 1731 the New York City Charter gave a monopoly to 7 named attorney to handle all the practice in New York. Source: History of American Law, 1984, Professor Lawrence Friedman. 239. "Technical difficulty is the sole social excuse for the lawyers' monopoly" - Stanford Professor Lawrence Friedman in History of American Law, 2nd edition, 1984, page 24. 240. Between 1855 and 1870 several state gave the "diploma privilege" to graduates of law schools. Source: History of American Law, 2nd edition, 1984, page 620. (May 2001Retrospective note: At my trial I learned from my expert witness that Virginia and perhaps some other states continue to grant 17 the right to practice law without further examination to graduates of their own state schools. 241. The ABA and American Association of law schools were formed for monopolistic purposes. 242. Residency requirements were held unconstitutional in New Hampshire v Piper (1985) 84 L Ed 2d 205. 243. The bar exam evolved. 244. The multistate bar exam now constitutes 2 half days of the bar exam in most of not all states. It is identical in every state. 245. The trend is clear: A. The laws of the 50 states are becoming more uniform. B. Test are more uniform. C. Monopolistic barriers to multistate practice continue to fall. Example: The residency requirement fell. D. Non-comity in the form of failure of some states to mutually remove barriers to bar licensing remain. They are fueled by the organized state bar protecting its turf. E. The federal bar does no testing. Only states test. F. ABA and AALS (American Association of Law Schools) continue to dominate some state bars. With California in the lead by virtue of having established its own school licensing outside the ABA, these monopolies are losing power. G. "The practice of law" consists of a number of tasks. An increasing percentage of these tasks are being performed by paralegals, title companies, and other specialists. 246. The California bar, the proponent of 6126, the unconstitutional amendment of 6126, and a plethora of bad (unconstitutional) law was well aware that the spectrum of activities in the grey area overlaps what might arguably constitute holding oneself out as an attorney - but the California bar chose not to deal with this overlap which could lead to just the sort of confusion that resulted in Palaschak's having been arrested. (May 2001 retrospective note: It was not until I got to California that I had access to the new rule 1-311 which lists a multitude of tasks that can be performed by any ninny at the direction of a lawyer. This list includes writing briefs and petitions - like the petition that I wrote for Melvin Looser, but we are quibbling over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin because free speech is free for everybody - not just those persons supervised by a licensed lawyer.) 247. As a result of the bar's negligence which is imputable to the legislature who rubber-stamped the bar's ludicrous unconstitutional proposals, section 6126 is void for vagueness. 248. The legitimate purview of the bar monopoly is easily seen by examination of its historical antecedent: it is a judicial function. Each court determines who steps in front of the rail - subject to the provision that the supreme court exercises control over the inferior courts and delegates testing 18 to an agency of the bar. 249. Paralegals and unlicensed attorneys often write the court pleadings - but the person whose name is at the top left corner must be licensed in that court - or pro se (speaking for himself (orally)) as was Melvin Looser. (May 2001 retrospective note: My case should have been dismissed at arraignment in Ottawa on my 3rd day of incarceration for lack of evidence. The smoking gun did not arrive for weeks. I could not prove my innocence because I could not obtain a copy of that petition 2871, the smoking gun - but in all criminal prosecutions, the burden is on the prosecution - not the defense. Petition #2871 which I wrote for Melvin Looser shows Melvin's name at the top left corner. A jury of 12 plus 2 alternates unanimously understood this simple concept - and Judge Chris Ryan should have upheld the constitution and taken time to give me due process which is required by the constitution that he swore to uphold. Also, there is a separate function of oratory which is distinct from the function of decision making. Melvin should be able to have anybody speak for him orally. It is obvious now that anybody may write his pleading for him.) 250. Calling oneself an attorney on a letterhead absent more is not within the proscription of "holding oneself out to be at attorney" because that statute (section 6126) is facially invalid. 251. In fact the statue mus be interpreted to mean "holding oneself out to be licensed" - but even that is a little murky as the following example demonstrates. 252. When famous attorney Jerry Spence writes a letter to a California court does he delete the words "Attorney at law" from his letterhead? (This example presumes that Jerry Spence is not licensed in California state courts.) 253. An attorney licensed nowhere is nonetheless an attorney. 254. Jurisdictions overlap geographically. One may be licensed in the federal courts serving Ventura while unlicensed in the state court - or vice versa. 255. Federal bar membership may not be withdrawn summarily. Authority: In Re Ming (1972, CA7 as I recall.) 256. California invented the infraction in 1969 or 1972 to diminish the right to counsel recognized in the line of right-to-counsel cases including Gideon v Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335; and Argersinger v Hamlin (1972) 407 U.S. 25, 32 L Ed 2d 530, 92 S Ct 2006. In California many traffic offenses are infractions which by definition are punishable by fine only - no jail. California refuses to provide counsel for indigents accused of an infraction - and they get away with it because of the wording of Gideon and Gideon's progeny. 257. Palaschak's alleged underlying crime pertains to an infraction case in Ventura court. Melvin Looser was ordered to pay a fine of $100. The court refused to appoint counsel for Melvin Looser who is a disabled veteran on welfare who had then suffered a recent abdominal surgery and a foot surgery. 19 258. The court told Melvin Looser that he would have to serve time in jail if he could not pay. 259. Palaschak visited Melvin looser one evening and heard his story. Palaschak told Melvin that the court could not lawfully imprison Melvin for inability to pay this fine. 260. Palaschak woke up from his sleep that night and dug though his constitutional law book and found the case of Williams v Illinois (1970) 399 U.S. 235, 26 L Ed 2d 586 and some companion cases. 261. The next day Palaschak wrote down the case citations and give them to Melvin. 262. The Palaschak thought about his oath to do his best and his statutory duty to: "Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself or herself, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed" - California business and professions code 6068-h). 263. Palaschak at the time was honoring a bar license deprivation even though it was unconstitutional. 264. Palaschak being an expert in the limitation of the bar's monopoly concluded that as long as Melvin was in pro per and put his own name at the top left corner and signed his own name, Palaschak could write a brief for him. 265. The court may not both refuse to provide counsel to a criminal defendant and at the same time prevent others from helping him. They cannot prevent Palaschak from helping Melvin Looser. 266. Without compromising my 5th amendment rights I will say that a superb brief was written petitioning the municipal court for redress of grievances and reminding the court that imprisonment would be unlawful. 267. The petition contained a half page foot note explaining that Palaschak wrote the petition but could not represent Melvin due to Palaschak's own constitutional infringement at the hands of that very traffic court which infringes parlayed into a bar suspension albeit an unconstitutional one. 268. Reserved. 269. Melvin's name appeared in the top left corner and Melvin signed the brief which evolved int a notice of appeal with the appeal brief already written and contained therein. 270. Prior to appeal stage, Palaschak sat in the audience and watched the travesty of justice as commission Covarru8bius brow beat Melvin and ignored the message of the brief. Covarrubius address Palaschak who was the sole person in the audience. Palaschak said that he could not represent Melvin. 271. Poor Melvin Looked like a puppy dog in trouble. He kept looking back at Palaschak pleading with his eyes for Palaschak to walk up past the railing and speak for him. 272. Melvin is not a lawyer and cannot argue legal points. Melvin writes at about an 8th grade level. 273. The Ventura Prosecutor bases his felony complaint on the cover letter. It contain the words "attorney at law" and was addressed to the court. 20 274. In California a disinterested part must sign the proof of service. It is ludicrous and a real problem in jail or anywhere where people don't want to get involved but it is not an attorney function. 275. Palaschak has filed numerous complaint as private attorney general That concept alone should protect his alleged assistance of Melvin Looser. 276. "Congress [and the states, by amendment 14] shall make no law. . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,. . .[or] to petition the government for a redress of grievances" - 1st amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 277. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy. . .the assistance of counsel for his defense" - 6th amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 278. The Magna Charta forbids taking a person to a distant place for trial. (Sorry that I can't quote the exact clause by I have asked for a copy of the magna charta and my request has been denied by jailers here in LaSalle county.) 279. "Specific guarantees in the bill of rights have penumbras formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance." - Justice douglas in Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 14 L Ed 2d 510, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S Ct. 1678. 280. Until Palaschak's current discipline he had never before faced bar discipline. He was admitted to the California bar in 1984. He has handled cases in Indiana, Ohio, Louisiana, Florida, Nevada, and, or course, California. Palaschak's brilliance and competence have never been questioned. 281. Palaschak has appeared on Hard Copy, Inside Edition, and The Love Connection. Summary of the 5th Cause of Action 282. There are a multitude of independent reasons why Palaschak deserves the protection of this court against extradition. A. The plaint meaning of "a person charged in any state. . . who shall flee" is perfectly clear. It is time to quite the legal fiction. Palaschak was not charged until nearly a year after he left California. B. Palaschak's crime is not within the meaning of the word as it was defined in 1789. The bar monopoly came later and is on its way out. C. Palaschak's act in using the title "attorney at law" is not different than that of any licensed profession a in a jurisdiction where he is not licensed. D. Palaschak's license will eventually be retroactively reinstated if there is justice. E. The statute defining the underlying crime is newly amended and unconstitutional. 21 1. It is void for vagueness. 2. It discriminates against the formerly licensed. F. Palaschak's "crime" is protected in a penumbra of: 1. Free speech; 2. Free press; 3. Right to petition; 4. Right to travel; 5. Magna Charta ban on dragging defendant to a trial in a distant forum; 6. Double jeopardy (already served time for traffic tickets for which the bar is now punishing him. 7. 6th amendment right to counsel; (Jus tertii permits Palaschak's 3rd party standing.) 8. Monopolies must be limited lest they cause the very harm before us. 283. The attempted extradition is an attempt by state officials acting under color of state law to violate Palaschak's constitutional rights. 284. Palaschak is entitled to the full panoply of rights under 1983. 285. The 14th amendment and the bill of rights supersedes the fugitive slave clause and the fugitive lawyer clause (the extradition clause) being latter in time and more specific. 42 USC 1983 conflicts with 18 USC 3182 (the extradition act) but the constitutional clauses resolve the conflict. The Illinois Extradition act must yield to the Bill of Rights. 286. The 9th amendment by its language incorporates the Magna Charta into the bill of rights. 287. Reserved 288. Reserved 289. Reserved 6th Cause of Action: Excessive of Bail 290. LaSalle county state's attorney David Day defamed me by stating in writing under penalty of perjury that I am a transient. 291. If fact I was born in LaSalle county. I was valedictorian. I was an honors student t the university of Illinois. I had a wonderful career as a registered professional engineer having designed machinery for Exxon and the U.S. Nave. I practiced law living in Ventura. I have been farming for 1.9 years and have lived at the same farm house for 1.9 years. I and my family have farmed the same farm for the past 66 years. 292. My public defender failed to appear at my arraignment. 293. I wrote an 11 page bail affidavit and sent it to my public defender. He ignored it. 22 294. As you can see from my Exhibit, my California bail is $5,000. It should be O.R. (Own recognizance) but the Ventura district attorney deceived the court. The court thinks that I wilfully failed to appear. The Ventura Judge is my enemy, a named defendant in a 1993 (approximately) civil rights suit. 295. My bail here in Illinois is $250,000 plus $5000 plus $5000. It should be O.R. I should have a bail hearing. 296. This excessive bail which is $ ¬ million for writing 2 words - attorney at law) violates the 8th amendment. Change of subject: 297. Incidentally the word "crime" in 1789 meant what "felony" means today due to stealthy escalation in the penalty for new crimes. "Felony" in 1789 meant one of the 7 dangerous felonies, namely: rape, murder, arson, mayhem, robbery, burglary and manslaughter. That is why the FBI agent Eley said that the crime must be a felony before he gets involved. Despite the constitutional authorization to extradite for "other crimes". The word "crime" in 1789 is somewhat equivalent to our word "felony" today due to escalation in penalties by government agencies intent on controlling the behavior of citizens. See page 1 of Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, 176501769 Volume 4: Crimes. The 1789 phrase "crimes and misdemeanors" proves that misdemeanors, being non-crimes, were outside the purview of the extradition clause in 1789 and now - although case law today mistakenly holds otherwise. Written Friday 18 June 1999: 298. This is not the first or 2nd time that the Ventura district attorney has treated Palaschak more severely than regular folks. In 1991 Palaschak ate one dose of LSD that he received in a birthday card from his secretary. In illegal search followed. Being under the influence of LSD is not a crime in California. Police illegally seized more LSD from the secretary's purse and then pleas bargained with her to obtain her testimony that Palaschak held the LSD in his hand before he at it. On that basis they charged Palaschak with 3 felonies. They dismissed them when a grand jury indicted on 2 felonies. And a misdemeanor. A jury acquitted on the felonies. A court of appeal overturned the

sole misdemeanor conviction - but then the California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal

and reaffirmed the misdemeanor conviction. See People v Palaschak (May 1995) 9 C4th 1236, 40 Cal

Rptr 2d 722, 893 P2d 717. Generally police give immunity to the end user to obtain a conviction of the

distributor in Palaschak's case they did not ask his secretary where she got the LSD in exchange for

immunity. Instead they asked her if Palaschak held it in his hand - but I digress.

Back to the 8th amendment.

299. Palaschak I entitle of redress under 1983 and the constitution.

300. The denial of counsel at arraignment , the denial of reasonable bail, the denial of a prompt bail

 

23

hearing, are all under color of law and state action.

301. The "detention"provision on the Santa Barbara federal warrant is unconstitutional (at least for my

non-crime) and may and should be declared so by this court.

302. Reserved.

303. Reserved

Farming regarding the Accompanying Request #3454 for TRO and OSC

304. The California bar has disabled Palaschak from earning a livelihood in California - and now they

seek to prevent him from earning a livelihood in Illinois.

305. For 4 generation Palaschak's family have been farmers.

306. We have farmed the current home farm for 66 years - and other farms before that.

307. Plaintiff's brother Greg Palaschak now operates the family farm.

308. Palaschak brothers Douglas, Jerry, and Greg farm approximately 2000 acres.

309. Last year Douglas received only $10,000 gross income from farming and spent nearly half of that

money on farm supplies and legal research materials.

310. Douglas is need most at harvest which lasts from September 1 to November 24th generally, later in

a wet year. If Douglas misses harvest this year (21999) then Greg will have little justification for

paying Douglas money to last over the winter.

311. Douglas has a substantial garden now being tended by his brother Jerry who departs on 25 June

1999 to return at harvest. Palaschak's garden include sweet corn which Palaschak sell during July

and August.

312. In summary, Palaschak income comes in July through November.

313. Douglas is also need at planting, but not as urgently as at harvest.

314. Reserved

315. Reserved

316. Reserved

Written June 19, 1999. 8:30 a.m.:

8th cause of action: Denial of Hearing to Test sufficiency of Allegations

317. Palaschak having been arrested without an Illinois governor's warrant and prior to the issuance of

a California requisition, is entitled to at least the process described in 725 ILCS 225/ 13 which

requires:

A. The oath of a "credible person";

B. A complaint alleging facts warranting extradition including:

"a certified copy of the sworn charge or complaint [from California] and affidavit

upon which the warrant is issued [which] shall be attached to the warrant."

 

24

318. Although adequate material was available from California, that paper would have demonstrated the

triviality o Palaschak's alleged crime and the insufficiency of the factual basis.

Paperwork was Available to Test Sufficiency of Warrant - but withheld

319. The following paperwork was available in California (having been obtained by Palaschak's then

attorney, Charter Claiborne Hughes of Santa Barbara, from the Ventura district attorney in

approximately August (an estimate without benefit of my diary) 1998 - nearly a year ago at which

time Palaschak concluded that this information would not sustain extradition:

320. A. The approximately 13 page brief #2871 explaining Melvin Looser's case and why Ventura could

not lawfully order Melvin Looser to serve jail time for inability to pay a $100 fine - as

describe herein at paragraphs #130 to #153 - because Williams v Illinois (1970) 399 U.S.

235, 90 S Ct. 2018, 26 L Ed 2d 586 forbids it.

321. B. The cover letter containing the title "attorney at law" which is the sole basis for the alleged felony

complaint. The letter exculpates Palaschak.

322. C. The police report demonstrating that commissioner Covarrubius who talk to Palaschak in the

audience (while reading the predecessor to brief #2871) obviously did not see any violation

of law. The police report names another member of the Ventura bench, Palaschak's enemy,

who took it upon himself to initiate prosecution. Palaschak forgets his name now but

speculates that he sat on the appellate panel for Melvin Looser's case. This police report

exculpates Palaschak in that it demonstrates the triviality of this alleged "felony." A judge

did not even notice it. Whoops. The notice of appeal came later.

323. D. The complaint in Ventura state court.

324. E. The arrest warrant issued by Palaschak's enemy, Judge Klopfer whom Palaschak sued in

approximately 1993, and who previously signed a malicious warrant against Palaschak in

1992. Klopfer signed a warrant reneged on a plea bargain and sent Palaschak to jail before

the end of his 1992 trial for eating LSD.

325. This warrant show a bail of $5000 - which is relevant to Palaschak's contention that his $250,000

Illinois bail is excessive.

326. F. The statement falsely implying that Palaschak wilfully failed to appear at a court hearing thereby

demonstrating that Palaschak's California bail should have been O.R. He was not given

notice to appeal prior to issuance of Klopfer's warrant.

327. Klopfer should not have issued the warrant.

328. The ulterior motive: A felony stigma will jeopardize Palaschak's planned exoneration and retroactive

(nunc pro tunc) reinstatement of California bar licensure.

329. 203 Reserved

 

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330. Although Palaschak appeared for arraignment 17 May 1999, after being arrested Friday 14 may

1999, the arraignment was a sham and pretext for the following reasons:

331. A. I was without counsel despite having requested and qualified for appointed counsel;

332. B. The complaint was patently perjured in that prosecutor David Day who signed the

complaint that very day obviously had no personal knowledge of the facts - (and

hear I speculate) having never seen the documentation described in paragraphs

194 through 200;

333. C. The only true purpose of the appearance was for Palaschak to contest extradition (or

not);

334. D. Bail was handled in a manner denying Palaschak's rights in that:

i. The only obvious basis for the high bail was the very fact of having been arrested

by the FBI - and the word "detention" on the federal warrant in the space marked

"bail;'

ii. The 44 factor pertaining to bail (as listed in 725 ILCS 5/110-5) were not discussed;

iii. FBI arrest and the words "detention" are not in the 44 factors;

iv. Judge Lanuti said "Somebody in California wants you bad" thereby completing

discounting Palaschak's statement that the California bail was only $5000 in state

court;

v. The FBI warrant was never shown to Palaschak at the hearing! Palaschak only saw

it after a week or so when Palaschak learned how to use the Illinois statutory

demand for the warrant of commitment;

vi. Later (on June 8) Deputy Karen said to Palaschak : " Our procedure on "detention"

warrants is to set bail";

vii. Illinois Prosecutor Dave Day's perjured complaint called Palaschak a "transient"

thereby triggering a high bail, but in fact Palaschak was born in LaSalle county,

graduated from the University of Illinois, and has for the past 1.9 years farmed and

lived on a farm in Streator;

viii. Palaschak was denied the right to call witnesses on his behalf;

ix. Palaschak was not told what 18 USC 1073 is. Section 1073 is the crime for which

Palaschak was arrested. One purpose of arraignment is to tell the accused what

he is accused of. If you tell him a code number but refuse to give him the book to

look up the number, than you have denied him an adequate arraignment because

you have not told him what he is accused of.

335. Reserved

 

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336. Reserved

337. Reserved

338. Reserved

339. Reserved

340. Reserved

341. Reserved

342. Reserved

343. To his credit Lanuti did not issue a warrant of commitment (apparently - based on my having a

warrant from Lanuti in response to my statutory demand to see the warrants of commitment). This

means that the only basis for detention remained the federal warrant alleging (falsely) violation of

18 USC 1073 which is flight to avoid prosecution for which I should have promptly been arraigned

in federal court as directed on the face of the federal warrant from Santa Barbara.

344. Therefore Palaschak should have been taken before a federal magistrate or released.

345. Palaschak subsequently wrote a 12 page bail motion #3396 and "mailed" it to the public defender

who copied it and did nothing more with it. (Query: Did he even file it with the court?)

346. Reserved.

347. Palaschak thereafter went to court twice.

348. One court appearance was before a different judge, Judge Chris Ryan. There Palaschak met (for

the first time) public defender Dan Bute who said that he was "too busy." There was an immediate

continuance.

349. On the 3rd and final Illinois court appearance so far, public defender But again sought a continuance

despite having received nearly 80 pages of briefs and pleadings from Palaschak.

350. Palaschak on 8 June 1999 wrote and served motion #3420 set for Monday 14 June 1999. He served

it on all parties and counsel and the court.

351. Palaschak's LaSalle County case number is 99-MR-79.

352. Motion #3420 is a Faretta motion pursuant to Faretta v California (1975 422 US 806, 95 S Ct 2525,

45 L Ed 2d 562. It is a habeas corpus petition, a demand for effective assistance of counsel, a

motion to be released on my own recognizance, and a demand for release after the 30th day

pursuant to 725 ILCS 225/15 (which is an issue previously handled by another court which held that

there is no such right).

353. June 14, 199, came and went without Palaschak ever having been called to court.

354. Palaschak believes now on the basis of chief Jailer Preci's word, that public defender Dan Bute has

been on vacation.

355. But did not inform Palaschak that he was planning to vacation, nor do any of his staff communicate

 

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with Palaschak in Bute's absence (or ever).

Extradition procedure in Palaschak's situation

356. Palaschak was not arrested on an Illinois Governor's warrant, nor on a California "requisition" (as

the term defined in 725 ILCS 225/ 3 requires a supporting affidavit from California which only

Palaschak has seen - by virtue of discovery one year ago). See paragraph #242 of this complaint.

Therefore the procedure is, by process of elimination, the procedure of 725 ILCS 225/ 13, 14, and

15, namely:

"arrest prior to requisition",

"arrest without a warrant," and

"commitment to bail to await requisition" (although, as I stated in paragraph 49 herein, the

FBI arrest was not authorized by Illinois extradition law).

357. Statute 725 ILCS 225/ 15 permits commitment (subject to fail) "not exceeding 30 days". Palaschak

has been imprisoned for 37 days as of 19 June 1999.

358. We inescapably return to the possibility that Palaschak's detention is somehow justified by 18 USC

1073 - the statue cited in the federal warrant that FBI agent Eley used as the basis for his arrest,

the warrant from Santa Barbara on 7 May 1999.

359. More realistically the procedure used by LaSalle county is the lazy man's process - and it was wrong.

360. The FBI admitted so much through it agent Eley by repeating that "the federal case is usually

dismissed."

361. Chief jailer Preci admitted so much when he admitted that "We've spent all day [9 June] trying to

figure this out". What he was trying to figure out was which warrant then committed Palaschak who

had demanded to see his warrant of commitment pursuant to his statutory right enunciated in Illinois

statute 735 ILCS 10-105 (which provides a monetary award to be paid to a prisoner who suffers

a denial of a request for a copy of a warrant of process for more than 6 hours).

362. Both Deputy Karen and Chief Jailer Preci told me that they were on the phone a long time on the

evening of June 8 when they released me and then arrested me a 2nd time - this time without benefit

of arraignment.

363. Supporting evidence: Prosecutor Day shouted at me in anger on 17 May 1999 in court outside the

presence of the Judge (and without benefit of counsel). I now see that he was frustrated and likely

angry at himself at being "found out" when I accused him of perjury afer he handed me the

perjurious badly written machine generated pretextual complaint which was silently ignored by Judge

Lanuti as describe elsewhere herein - but I digress. Back to. . .

364. Prosecutor Day's 17 May complaint did not meet the standards of ILCS 225/ 13. It lacked the

supporting documentation prescribed in this statute.

 

28

365. Bad unconstitutional Illinois discovery procedure seems to permit prosecutors to withhold

exculpatory evidence until the 60th day after arrest. Perhaps, accustomed to that slack standard,

Prosecutor Day withheld the federal warrant.

366. After 30 days, ILCS 225/17 (Illinois Extradition Act) permits optional additional commitment for up

to 60 more days - but a hearing seems to be mandated.

367. I contend that if an additional 60 days(or any time) is ordered, then a warrant of commitment must

be issued by the judge (and because Lanuti failed to issue any warrant of commitment - and no

other judge in Illinois did, then I should have been released).

368. Authority regarding the affidavit discussed in paragraph 230 above:

"Affidavit called for was one stating facts of affiant's own knowledge which would

warrant finding of probable cause; and affidavit and complaint had to be read

together." - Rafferty ex.rel. Huie Fong v Bligh (1832 CA1 Mass) 55 F2d 189 cited

in Bancroft Whitney's annotated 18 USC 3182, note 55, page 117.

369. Incidentally, my brother brought me a few paperback law books from home. My law library is in

storage. The jail rules forbid hard covered book. The jail would not provide a word processor nor

permit me to use my own word processor. We have no access to any law library or typewriter. That

is unconstitutional - but why would anybody need a law library since we are each presumed to know

the law - and if we are presumed to know the law, then why do we need to take the bar exam?

(Sarcasm is a legitimate form of argumentation.)

370. The performance of public defender Dan Bute is deficient and pathetic.

371. He is good evidence to support my contention that one could be a public defender without knowing

how to read or write. Only a few oral phrases are needed to use in court.

372. Prosecutor Day's perjurious pretextual complaint is inadequate. Authority:

"Affidavit referred to in 18 USC 3182 is affidavit which must be made before

magistrate who issues warrant of arrest; affidavits simply relating to guilt of

accused and made before notary [such as David Day's perjurious pretextual

faux imitation ludicrous senseless complaint] are surplusage." - Ex Parte

Rubens (1951) 73 Arizona 101, 238 P2d 402, Cert. Den. (1952) 344 U.S. 480, 97

L Ed 653, 73 S.Ct. 50, as cited at page 117, note 56 "Requisites and Sufficiency,

Generally". It is the very first note in this group of notes at page 117 of Bancroft

Whitney's 18 USCS 3182 annotated which annotates the extradition statute.

373. Query: Why wasn't the complaint and affidavit used to obtain the 7 May 1999 federal warrant

(accusing me of 18 USC 1073) presented to the Illinois court on 17 May, 1999?

374. Palaschak has a right to exculpatory evidence at every stage - and the right to challenge

 

29

substantiating affidavits. That right was violated by state action under color of law and therefore

Palaschak is entitled to monetary compensation and punitive damages and other relief.

375. David Day's perjurious complaint was not of his own knowledge. It was a bald baseless allegation

bolstered by a notary seal - specifically defined as inadequate in the case that I cited for authority

at paragraph #246 above.

376. Even with the provision of section 13 of the Illinois Extradition Act and the explanation provided in

the section pertaining to Extradition in volume 31A of American Jurisprudence 2nd, mere due process

requires a hearing, as enunciated in Gerstein v Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103, 95 S Ct 854, 43 L Ed 2d

54.

377. "Seemed" is the telling word in Gerstein v Pugh. There, as here, the procedure was by tradition

handed down by oral history, a hallmark of backwards anti-intellectual people.

378. Not surprisingly Gerstein had the following similarities:

379. A. "Information" (like David days - except without the perjury) was mistakenly thought adequate to

justify detention - although Lanuti did decline (albeit inadvertently) to commit on Day's

paper.

380. B. Thee was a provision for a preliminary examination in 30 days.

381. Gerstein hold that a preliminary hearing mus be held prior to detention!

382. Should we be surprised that the Gerstein case is founded on Bell v Burson (1971) 26 L Ed 90, 401

US 535 holding that a state cannot take a driver license (or presumably and bar license) without a

hearing? Palaschak's entire 10 year ordeal began with a demand for a hearing regarding a driver

license as in Bell v Burson. See paragraph #104 above herein.

383. Palaschak's invalid bar license deprivation is based on traffic tickets.

384. A void act is void ab initio - but in the interim, malicious bureaucracies prey on Palaschak attempting

to bolster their unconstitutional acts. Example: They have conducted several unwarranted raids -

hoping to find drugs - or something to bootstrap into a reaffirmation of the correctness of their

original position - and why should they not continue to conduct raids and arrests? It is difficult to

obtain redress - and there is a double standard. Compare the procedure to obtain redress to the

procedure used to extract $100 from Melvin Looser.

385. The traffic tickets are mainly 4 counts of driving on a suspended license. Two counts were

appealed. The other 2 counts missed appeal deadline by 1 day. I don't know how the appeal turned

out. I had incompetent appointed counsel named Jill Hatfield.

386. Historical fact: After Bell v Burson mandated a pre-denial hearing prior to suspension of a bar

license, the California DMV announced that they had insufficient resources to give drivers a hearing

before suspension. That is where my research train ended in 1993.

 

30

387. Reserved.

388. Palaschak asks this court for declaratory relief regarding the procedure to be used regarding

extradition in Palaschak's situation.

389. Denial of an evidentiary hearing and the imprisonment constitute a cause of action under 42 USC

1983 et seq. It was state action under color of law.

390. County action is state action for purposes of 1983 et seq. Authority: Civil rights and Civil Liberties

Litigation by Professor Sheldon Nahmod, Shepard's McGraw Hill.

391. Palaschak is entitle to redress under 42 USC 1983 et seq.

392. Reserved

393. Reserved

394. Reserved

19 June 1999. Saturday. 3:30:

9th cause of action: conspiracy to deny civil rights

395. Palaschak's prosecution by Ventura is based emotionally on his outspoken views advocating change

of laws pertaining to drugs, car insurance. And other issued that bear upon oppression by the

establishment

396. Defendants sheriff Tom Templeton, FBI agent Eley, LaSalle County, Judge Ryan, Deputy Karen,

Tom Connors of Ventura, David Day and the Ventura District attorney office conspired to imprison

Palaschak without due process of law in violation of 1983 et seq and in violation of the U.S.

Constitution.

397. Plaintiff chooses not to seek money damage against Judge Ryan; immunity is not a battle that I want

to fight now. I don't want to jeopardize the other aspects of this case. However I do seek injunctive

relief against Ryan.

398. Defendant FBI Eley conspired and is liable directly under the constitution. See Bivens v Six

Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1971) 29 L Ed 2d, 403 US 388, 91 S Ct 1999

399. Palaschak is entitled of redress.

400. Palaschak incorporates every other paragraph of this complaint in every cause of action.

401. Reserved

402. Reserved

403. Defendant LaSalle County admits overcrowding in its jail manual at page 1, to wit:

"This facility was originally designed to hold a maximum of 54 prisoners. (We now

hold nearly 99.) The jail is overcrowded and the infrastructure problems are well

know to the staff and maintenance People." - LaSalle County jail manual handed

to prisoners.

 . . .

This complaint was too long for my internet provider. Therefore I divided the complaint in to 2 parts. To continue to part 2 to go this file: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/4055v31pt2.html