Attorney Douglas Palaschak Filed when?

In Jail at 800 South Victoria, Ventura CA 93003

Pro Se

(Address as of May 2001: Box 23465 Ventura CA 93002)

lawyerdude@earthlink.net

This is a partial computerized version of this motion. I have only transcribed half of it so far. I began to transcribe

this into the computer on 21 May 2001. The original version was typewritten in the jail law library in Ventura

beginning 10 September 1999. Previous motions had been handwritten when the typewriter was unavailable or out

of ribbon. The original version did not have any tables although I did compile the main table of case by hand and

submitted it during trial for the convenience of opposing counsel and Judge Steele.

Superior Court of California

County of Ventura

People

v

Palaschak

Case #43885

Motion #3596

2nd Motion to dismiss charges (B&P 6126) as

violative of Palaschak's and Melvin Looser's rights

of Association, Counsel, Petition, Speech, and

Press which Palaschak asserts vicariously under

relaxed standing rule of Craig v Boren (1976) 50

L Ed 2d 3970.

Date: 14 September 1999

Time: 1:30

Court: 12

Related pleadings may be found at http://lawyerdude.50megs.com

Contents of this brief #3596:

Rules of Court cited herein: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

(Beginning of page 1 of original brief 3596 typewritten in jail) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Similarity to Counsel absence in the case of the Scotsboro Boys . . . . . . 1

(Beginning of page 2 of original jail typewritten version of brief 3596) . . . . . . . 2

Overbreadth . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Resumption of the Argument regarding Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

(Beginning of page 3 of original jail typewritten brief 3596) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Beginning of page 4 in the original jail typewritten version of brief 3596 . . . . . 4

Beginning of page 5 of original jail typewritten brief #3596: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The Yagman, Kunstler, and Zenger vein of logic . 7

Punishing the Messenger and the Need for Association for Mutual Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

The similarity in Yagman, Kunstler, and Palaschak cases: establishment versus the individual . . . . . . . 9

 

ii

Beginning of page 6 of original jail typewritten version of 3596: . . . . . . . . . . . 36

The Clear and Present Danger Test Has Been the Standard since 19__ . 37

Beginning of page 7 of original jail typewritten brief 3596: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

New Issue: My requests for particular research material to prepare my defense in this case in Illinois

were denied me - except for 2 to 7% of the request. Outrageously, these requests for specific

legal materials were given to the prosecution in Illinois . . . . . . . 38

Back to Eugene Debs . . 38

Beginning of page 8 of 14 in original typewritten brief written in jail: . . . . . . . 39

What is the Test in Palaschak's case for Clear and Present Danger? . . . 39

Justice Kozinski applied Clear And Present Danger test to lawyers in Yagman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

California Business and Professions code 6126 is unconstitutional in that it proscribes speech not

directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action . . . . . 39

The legitimate peril addressed by 6126 is fraud which includes an element of deceit; Palaschak

deceived no one and nonetheless was falsely accused of fraud by officials who knew no

details of the crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Beginning of page 9 of original jail typewritten brief 3596: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Prosecutor Eric Bond lied at the preliminary examination in Ventura . . . 41

Commissioner Covarrubias calls to Palaschak in the audience . . . . . . . 41

Using the words "Attorney at Law" on a letterhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

New California Rule of court 1-311 permits unlicensed lawyers to write pleadings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

We are in flux regarding the practice of law, paralegals and even free speech. . . . . . . . . . 44

Beginning of page 10 of the original jail typewritten version of brief 3596: . . . 44

Refocus on 1st Amendment and 6th Amendment and on the unconstitutionality of B&P 6126 . . . 44

In Palaschak's case, as in Yagman, the court attempts to silence criticism of the court. Overbreadth

and a multitude of free speech theories protect our right to criticize. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Who will speak up for the defenseless and oppressed? May California deny appointed counsel to

an indigent and then punish a volunteer who offers assistance of counsel? . . . . . . . . . 45

No state may abridge free speech! . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Vicarious assertion of Melvin's 6th amendment right to counsel - continued. Volunteers . . . . . . 46

 

iii

Beginning of page 11 in the original jail typewritten brief 3596: . . . . . . . . . . . 46

6th amendment creates an immunity that 6126 violates in this case . . . . . 46

The state bar act is mostly unconstitutional . . . . 46

State bar act and rules are oppressive and anachronistic . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Extradition law is similarly behind the times . . . . 47

State Bar attempts at Regulation of Speech - such as 6126 - must stop 47

Two categories of lawyer activity: #1 speech and #2 making decisions for somebody else.

   . . . . . . . . . 47

Congressional and Supreme Court protection of Advocacy: Private Attorney General . 47

Palaschak does not need to buy a license to advocate . . . . . . . . 48

Palaschak's right to speak was suspended for eating LSD, failure to pay dues, failure to buy car

insurance and a multitude trivialities with no nexus to the practice of law. . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Melvin's Looser need not take his traffic case to federal court . . 48

Beginning of age 12 of original jail typewritten brief 3596: . . . . . . . . . 49

speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Melvin Looser's 6th amendment right to counsel (asserted vicariously here by Palaschak) may not

be abridged by California's scheme to provide (or in this case not provide) pools of burned

out incompetent public defenders, and although Palaschak did not serve as Melvin's trial

lawyer, Palaschak has a right to vicariously assert Melvin's rights in Palaschak's own

defense under the Supreme Court concept of jus tertii as enunciated in Craig v Boren (1976)

50 L Ed 2d 397,429 US 190, 97 S Ct 451 . . 49

Incorporation of rights announced in brief 2871 . 50

Penumbra Doctrine - Advocacy, Counsel, Association, Speech, Petition . . . . 50

The right to disbarred counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Summary: Overbreadth as applied to Palaschak along with Clear and Present Danger Test . . . 52

Table of websites cited herein:

http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Chicago7/contempt.html . . . . 8

Table of Cases cited herein:

Argersinger v Hamlin (1972) 32 L Ed 2d 530, 407 US 25, 92 S Ct 2006 is the most recent in a long line of

cases gradually expanding the right to counsel . . . . . 46

Bell v Burson (1971) 26 L Ed 90, 401 US 535 State cannot take a driver license without hearing . 4, 10,

36

Bradwell v. People of State of Illinois, (U.S. Ill. 1872) 83 U.S. 130, 21 L.Ed. 442, 16 Wall. 130. Myra

 

iv

Bradwell was denied admission to Illinois bar because she was a married woman. U.S. supreme court

upheld this gender based discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Brandenburg v Ohio (1969) 23 L Ed 2d 430, 395 US 444, 89 S Ct 1827. Clarence Brandenburg was Ku Klux

Klan member. Clear and Present Danger test was finally used to overrule an obstruction to speech.

Brandenburg is cited all the major constitutional law treatises and the following treatises: 21 L Ed 2d 976 The

Supreme Court and the right of free speech and press, 38 L Ed 2d 835 The Supreme Court's development

of the "clear and present danger"rule and the related rule concerning advocacy of unlawful acts as limitations

on the constitutional right of free speech and press, 45 L Ed 2d 725 Supreme Court's views as to overbreadth

of legislation in connection with First Amendment rights, 86 L Ed 758 Right of petition and assembly under

the Federal Constitution's First Amendment - Supreme Court cases, 96 ALR Fed 26, 20 ALR4th 327. 39, 40

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia ex.rel. Virginia State Bar (1964) 12 L Ed 2d 89, 377 US 1, 84

S Ct 1113. Court struck down an injunction barring union from directing its members to certain favored

lawyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Brown v. Baden, 815 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, Real v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963, 108 S.Ct. 450, 98

L.Ed.2d 390 (1987) A Yagman case in which Real fined Yagman $250,000 an amount that was overturned

on appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Cole V Richardson (1972) 31 L Ed 2d 593, 405 US 676, 92 S Ct 1332. Sociologist Lucretia Cole refused

to take the loyalty oath required by Boston Hospital, was summarily discharged and ultimately prevailed at

the U.S. Supreme court. Note that all the officials who abridged Palaschak's speech presumably took an

oath to uphold the constitution - and subsequently violated their oath by refusing in all cases to even listen

to Palaschak's constitutional arguments. This case is mentioned in 7 annotations by Bancroft Whitney

including Lawyer's Edition 2d 12:1231 Indefiniteness of language as affecting validity of criminal legislation

of judicial definition of common law crime - Supreme Court cases. Note that "advertising or holding out" is

the fatally ambiguous language of B&P 6126 although 6126 already fails constitutional muster by being an

abridgment of speech, press, petition, and association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Commonwealth v Harmond (1979) 376 Mass 557, 382 NE2d 203 - consent deemed invalid where consenter

was 1) in custody, 2) had been drinking - similar to Co-defendant Jessica Jobin's situation . . . . . . . . . . 5

Craig v Boren (1976) 50 L Ed 2d 397,429 US 190, 97 S Ct 451. One of most pertinent cases to this case

    . . .49

Debs v U.S. (1919) 63 L Ed 566, 249 US 211, 39 S Ct 252 (cited in 38 L Ed 2d 835 Supreme Court's

development of the "clear and present danger" rule and the related rule concerning advocacy of unlawful

acts as limitations on the constitutional right of free speech.) . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Doe v Supreme Ct. of Florida 734 F Supp 981. Florida disciplinary gag rule held unconstitutional. . . . 44

Estate of Condon (1998) 654 Cal App 4th 1138. New York lawyers had to sue to collect fees and they

overturned the California statute that denies the right to sue to lawyers not licensed in California as I recall.

    . . . 52

Ficker v Curran (1996) 950 F Supp 123, affirmed 119 F 3d 1150. Maryland's law against attorney direct

solicitation was held unconstitutional upon summary judgment. Ironically, and stupidly, the attorney general

argued that the law was unconstitutional and then was called upon to defend the law . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

 

v

Grismore, U.S. v (Nov 1976) 546 Fed 2d 844. Aha! The case reporters deceive us! Jerome Daly, the

lawyer selected by Grismore was himself a disbarred lawyer - not a layman! . 50

Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 14 L Ed 2d 510. Dr. Griswold asserted standing to vicariously assert the

privacy rights of his patients who used birth control devices in the privacy of their bedrooms. . . . . . 3, 45

In the Matter of David Dellinger et al., Appellants, 461 F.2d 389; 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 9621 The appeal

from the Chicago 7 contempt citations upon Attorney William Kunstler in which he overturned on appeal his

4 year sentence for contempt 7

Ivins v State 129 GA App, 201 SE2d 683 - consent held invalid because consenter was in custody and

consent was merely acquiescence and consenter was given no alternative which recalls Officer Dawson's

admission that she told Jessica Jobin "We'll find it [the LSD] anyway." . . . . 5

Kelly v State 305 A2d 195 - consent deemed invalid because consenter was in custody - conflicting

testimony between officer and consenter - although we don't have a conflict - Officer Dawson admits

coercing Jessica Jobin . . . . . 5

Keyishian v Board of Regents (1967) 17 L Ed 2d 629, 385 US 589, 87 S Ct 675. Subject: Overbreadth

regarding registration of peddlers. The statute failed constitutional muster - as B&P 6126 also fails. The

case is cited in many treatises including the following: 97 L Ed 2d 903 Public employee's right of free speech

under Federal Constitution - Supreme court cases, 86 L Ed 2d 758 Right of petition and assembly under

federal constitution's first Amendment, 82 L Ed 2d 1040 Civil rights law prohibiting organization's or its

members' right of association under the First Amendment, 73 L Ed 2d 1466 First Amendment rights of free

speech and press as applied to public schools - Supreme court cases, 67 L Ed 2d 859 Supreme court's views

regarding the First Amendment right of association as applied to the advancement of political beliefs, 45 L

Ed 2d 725 Supreme Court's views as to overbreadth of legislation in connection with First Amendment

rights, 44 L Ed 2d 823 Supreme court's application of Vagueness doctrine to noncriminal statues or

ordinances, 38 L Ed 2d 835 Supreme Court's development of the 'clear and present danger" rule and the

related rule concerning advocacy of unlawful acts as limitation on the constitutional right of free speech and

press, 33 L Ed 2d 865 The Supreme Court and the First Amendment right of association, 21 L Ed 2d 976

The Supreme Court and the right of fees speech and press . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Lilburn circa1648 a.d. Found at page 160 of Ira Glasser's Visions of Liberty. In 1637, a Puritan activist

named John Lilburne imported and distributed various political tracts and was brought before the Star

Chamber. Lilburne refused to be examined under oath, claiming that it violated "the law of the land" and

invoking the Magna Carta. Condemning the oath as a procedure that was fundamentally unfair, Lilburne

said that he would not take it even "though I be pulled to pieces by wild horses." Lilburne was held in

contempt of court, publicly whipped, fined, and jailed in solitary confinement. He wasn't released until 1641.

But his crusade for fair procedures and his willingness to absorb severe punishment rather than forsake

principle inflamed the public - on both sides of the Atlantic - and Lilburne became a great symbol. He

suffered, but not without effect: In 1645 Parliament set aside the judgment again Lilburne, finding that it had

indeed violated "the law of the land and Magna Carta." In 1648 he was granted damages for his unjust

imprisonment! Lilburne led the Levelers. He was arrested again and again and died in prison at age 43.

At his very last trial Lilburne won the then unprecedented right to receive a copy of the charges

again him and to be represented by a lawyer . . . . . . 45

Marbury v Madison (1803) 2 L Ed 60, 5 US 137, a void act is void ab initio . . . 4

McHenry v Florida Bar 808 F Supp 1543. A 30 day ban on direct mail ambulance chasing held

 

vi

unconstitutional . . . . . . . . 44

Newman v Piggie Park (1968) 19 L Ed 2d 1263. Private Attorney General . . . . 2

Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 75 S. Ct. 11, 99 L. Ed. 11, the Supreme Court forbade the use of

summary contempt power post-trial by a trial judge who had become "personally embroiled" with the lawyer

whom he cited . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Powell v Alabama (1932) 77 L Ed 158, 287 US 45, 53 S Ct 55, 84 ALR 527. The Scotsboro Boys. . . . 1,

46

Rapp v Disp. Bd. Of Hawaii Supreme Court (Feb 1996) 916 F Supp 1525 pro se lawyer Rapp desired to

speak with jurors after their verdict. Hawaii disciplinary rules prohibited this without the court's permission.

Rapp sued for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Hawaii Supreme Court (as did Palaschak's client

against the California Supreme Court) and prevailed. He obtained a preliminary injunction prohibiting

enforcement of the rule . . . 44

Real v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963, 108 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed.2d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Schneckloth v Bustamonte (1973) 412 US 218, 36 L Ed 2d 854, 93 S Ct 2041 - Even the most subtle

coercion precludes consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Shelton v Tucker (1960) 5 L Ed 2d 231, 364 US 479, 81 S CT 247. Arkansas school teacher Shelton refused

to file an affidavit with the school district listing his organization affiliations for the past 5 years. The U.S.

Supreme Court ruled in favor of teacher Shelton. Note that the California bar similarly asks for lists of

affiliations and searches for communists even though the practice was held unlawful by the Supreme Court.

Shelton v Tucker is cited in 11 annotations including: Lawyer's Edition 2d 56:841 Licensing and regulation

of attorneys as restricted by rights of free speech, expression, and association under the First Amendment

(which article is the subject matter of Palaschak's lawsuit herein) and Lawyer's Edition 2d 58:904 Federal

Constitutional right of international travel (which would seem to include interstate travel and the right to refuse

to travel across country to suffer abridgment of speech rights) . . . . . . . . . . 39

Standing Committee on Discipline of the United States District Court for the Central District of California v

Stephen Yagman, defendant (9th Circuit, 1995) 55 F.3d 1430; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 12948; 95 Cal. Daily

Op. Service 3958; 95 Daily Journal DAR 6873 This was Yagman's finest hour! Yagman prevailed against

Real and Real's hatchet men disguised as a committee on discipline . 10, 39, 44

Supreme Court of New Hampshire v Piper (1985) 84 L Ed 2d, 470 US 274, 105 S Ct 1272. State may not

deny bar membership to non residents . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

United States v. Meyer, 149 U.S. App. D.C. 212, 462 F.2d 827 (1972) . . . . . . 7

United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 785 F.2d 777 (9th Cir.) (reversing and remanding for assignment

to a different judge), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 988, 107 S.Ct. 580, 93 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) This case did not

personally involve Yagman but it was Real's personal interest and the precedent he sought to punish

Yagman unfairly . . . . . . . . . . 9

United Transportation Union v State Bar of Michigan (1971) 28 L Ed 2d 339, 401 US 576, 91S Ct 1076 the

court vindicated the rights of the Teamsters to associate and refer members to its own chosen lawyers.

    . . 2-4

 

vii

Williams v Illinois (1970) 26 L Ed 2d 586, 399 US 235, 90 S Ct 2018. See also 31 ALR3d 926 Indigency of

offender as affecting validity of imprisonment as alternative to payment of fine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 52

Yagman, In Re, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir.), amended, 803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir.1986), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Constitutional Provisions cited herein:

Privileges and Immunities clause: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges

or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law, nor deny to any person with its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws" - 14th amendment in part . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 46, 52

Rules of Court cited herein:

California Rule of Court section 1-311 permits a disbarred or suspended lawyers write pleadings, briefs, and

other similar documents. The entire rule is reprinted in a footnote herein. It is a model of hedging and

backpedaling . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Table of Statutes cited herein:

California Business and Professions code 6126 fails for overbreadth. 6125, 6126, and 6127 read as

follows: "6125. No person shall practice law in California unless the person is an active member of the State

Bar." (The extradition warrant accuses me (albeit falsely) of advertising and holding myself out as practicing

or otherwise entitled to practice law after having been disbarred - which is 6126 and not 6125.) B&P 6126

(a) is a misdemeanor for some persons and not for others. "6126 (a) Any person advertising or holding

himself or herself out as practicing or entitled to practice law or otherwise practicing law who is not an active

member of the State Bar, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (b) Any person who has been involuntarily enrolled as

an inactive member of the State Bar, or has been suspended from membership from the State Bar, or has

been disbarred, or has resigned from the State Bar with charges pending, and thereafter advertises or holds

himself or herself out as practicing or otherwise entitled to practice law, is guilty of a crime punishable by

imprisonment in the state prison or county jail. However, any person who has been involuntarily enrolled as

an inactive member of the State Bar pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) of Section 6007 and who

knowingly thereafter advertises or holds himself or herself out as practicing or otherwise entitled to practice

law, is guilty of a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or county jail [which makes it a

wobbler - but in Palaschak's case the de minimis act would imply a misdemeanor without a doubt - which

would preclude extradition under federal guidelines as related by FBI agent Eley]. (c) The willful failure of

a member of the State Bar, or one who has resigned or been disbarred, to comply with an order of the

Supreme Court to comply with Rule 955, constitutes a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison

or county jail. 6127. The following acts or omissions in respect to the practice of law are contempts of the

authority of the courts: (a) Assuming to be an officer or attorney of a court and acting as such, without

authority. (b) Advertising or holding oneself out as practicing or as entitled to practice law or otherwise

practicing law in any court, without being an active member of the State Bar. Proceedings to adjudge a

person in contempt of court under this section are to be taken in accordance with the provisions of Title V

of Part III of the Code of Civil Procedure." . . . . . 3, 40

California business and professions code 6068-h: "Never to reject, for any consideration personal to

himself or herself, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed" . . . . . . 1, 48

California Health and Safety Code 11550 Being under the influence of LSD is not a violation of 11550.

    . . . . 5

 

viii

California Penal Code 647f 5

Table of Treatises cited herein:

ALR3d 31:926 Indigency of offender as affecting validity of imprisonment as alternative to payment of fine.

    . . . . 1

History of American Law, 2nd edition, 1984, Stanford University Press, Professor Lawrence Friedman. .

   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 44, 47

House of Morgan by Ron Chenow circa 1989 . . . . . . 4

In Our Defense. Ellen Alderman and Caroline Kennedy. Avon Paperbacks. New York. 1991. Available at

Barnes and Noble. $13.50. Contains bibliography and case numbers. Kennedy and Alderman discuss

Harrison Cronic in detail in the book In Our Defense on pages 259 et seq. They devote another chapter to

the McSurely case . . . . . . . . 3

Lawyer's Edition 2d 111:85 Validity under 4th Amendment of search pursuant to consent . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Lawyer's Edition 2d 12:1231 Indefiniteness of language as affecting validity of criminal legislation of judicial

definition of common law crime - Supreme Court cases. Note that "advertising or holding out" is the fatally

ambiguous language of B&P 6126 although 6126 already fails constitutional muster by being an abridgment

of speech, press, petition, and association . . . . . . . . 40

Lawyer's Edition 2d 21:976 The Supreme Court and the right of fees speech and press. . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Lawyer's Edition 2d 33:865 The Supreme Court and the First Amendment right of association . . . . . 40

Lawyer's Edition 2d 38:835 Supreme Court's development of the "clear and present danger" rule and the

related rule concerning advocacy of unlawful acts as limitations on the constitutional right of free speech.

    . . . 39

Lawyer's Edition 2d 38:835 Supreme Court's development of the 'clear and present danger" rule and the

related rule concerning advocacy of unlawful acts as limitation on the constitutional right of free speech and

press . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Lawyer's Edition 2d 44:823 Supreme court's application of Vagueness doctrine to noncriminal statues or

ordinances . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Lawyer's Edition 2d 45:725 Supreme Court's views as to overbreadth of legislation in connection with First

Amendment rights . . . . . . . 39

Lawyer's Edition 2d 50:902: Supreme Court's views as to party's standing to assert rights of third persons

(jus tertii) in challenging constitutionality of legislation. See Craig v Boren . . . 49

Lawyer's Edition 2d 67:859 Supreme court's views regarding the First Amendment right of association as

applied to the advancement of political beliefs . . . . . 39

Lawyer's Edition 2d 73:1466 First Amendment rights of free speech and press as applied to public schools -

Supreme court cases . . . . . 39

 

ix

Lawyer's Edition 2d 82:040 Civil rights law prohibiting organization's or its members' right of association under

the First Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Lawyer's Edition 2d 86:758 Right of petition and assembly under federal constitution's first Amendment

    . . . 39

Lawyer's Edition 2d 97:903 Public employee's right of free speech under Federal Constitution - Supreme

court cases . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Lawyers Edition 2nd 79:918. Supreme court's construction and application of privileges and immunities

clause of U.S. constitution. Note that this discusses article 4 - not the 14th amendment. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

My Life as a Radical Lawyer by Attorney William Kunstler circa 1995 . . . . . . . 8

The Long Fuse shows that Eugene Debs was right. Book is available in the Ventura jail library . . . . . 38

Weinreb's Leading cases in Criminal Law . . . . . . . . . 1

 

1

(Beginning of page 1 of original brief 3596 typewritten in jail)

Written on 10 September 1999.

Argument

A state may not, by invoking the power to regulate the practice of law, abridge in any way the rightof individuals facing jail to assistance of counsel. In the instant case the traffic court threatened MelvinLooser with jail for his inability to pay a $104 traffic fine. The traffic court thereby violated the rule ofWilliams v Illinois (1970) 26 L Ed 2d 586, 399 US 235, 90 S Ct 2018. See also 31 ALR3d 926 Indigency ofoffender as affecting validity of imprisonment as alternative to payment of fine. Looser is a disabled veteranof two wars, both the Korean War and Viet Nam. On the Monday of the week during which he requested nojail, he had endured surgery on his foot. He endured surgery on his abdomen in the prior month to treat ahiatal hernia as described in Looser's petition #2871 written for Looser by Palaschak. Melvin Looser, likemany people in traffic court, was denied appointed counsel.Similarity to Counsel absence in the case of the Scotsboro BoysMelvin Looser's situation is somewhat similar to that of the Scotsboro Boys as described in the movieand in Powell v Alabama (1932) 77 L Ed 158, 287 US 45, 53 S Ct 55, 84 ALR 527. The trial court in Powelltalked about appointing a lawyer but never actually appointed anybody. (The actual 1932 dialogue is inWeinreb's Leading cases in Criminal Law but that book was taken from me by Ventura Deputy Al Weiganand left behind in Illinois and lost by jailers there. We don't have any pre-1956 cases here in the jail lawlibrary collection of supreme court cases.)In the Powell pre-trial proceedings a lawyer named Roddy from Tennessee addressed the Alabamatrial court. He had not been paid to appear but he had been dispatched to the court by people who wereconcerned for the welfare of the defendants. The trial judge refused to make a "qualified appointment". Hadthis lawyer been Palaschak and the court that of the Ventura district attorney, Palaschak would have beenaccused of holding himself out as practicing or entitled to practice law where he is not licensed.Preferred rights. Private Attorney General. Jus Tertii.ADVOCACY OF THE RIGHTS OF THE OPPRESSED AND HOMELESSA fundamental premise of constitutional law is that of competing societal goals. American's highlyvalue association, speech, counsel, petition, and advocacy. We place a very high value on advocacy of therights of the oppressed and homeless. California requires all attorneys to take an oath to do their best.California demands that its lawyers defend the helpless - like Melvin Looser. Every California lawyer hasthe following duty:"Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself or herself, thecause of the defenseless or the oppressed" - California business andprofessions code 6068-h). 2Also, the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes the importance of advocacy of individual rights anddemonstrates this by recognizing the status of Private Attorney General to those who advocate the rightsof the individual human.One who " obtains. . .not for himself alone but also as a "private attorney general"vindicating a policy that congress considered of the highest priority" - Newman vPiggie Park (1968) 19 L Ed 2d 1263.Palaschak has often acted as Private Attorney General at great personal expense - and speakingup for Melvin Looser was Palaschak's natural role.The Right to Advocate and Associate and Speak and WriteIndividuals and groups who challenge the oppressive role of oppressors often suffer legal difficultiesfrom a legal system historically biased towards moneyed interests. The Teamsters Union encountered suchproblems. (Beginning of page 2 of original jail typewritten version of brief 3596) In United Transportation Union v State Barof Michigan (1971) 28 L Ed 2d 339, 401 US 576, 91S Ct 1076 the court vindicated the rights of theTeamsters to:give legal advice to its members,tell its members that certain lawyers would defray the expenses of litigation,control legal fees and limit attorney fee to 25%,give legal advice to its members, andaccept kickbacks for referring cases to lawyers.The court cited the previous case of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Virginia ex.rel. Virginia State Bar(1964) 12 L Ed 2d 89, 377 US 1, 84 S Ct 1113 where it struck down an injunction forbidding the union toassociate and refer members to its own chosen lawyers.(Once again my 2 hours in the jail law library have expired. Once again I have all the books open havingfollowed the trail of cases. I am ready to suck up some verbiage but alas I must go back to my cell. Thishappened before when I had 2 hours remaining but the ribbon expired and they did not have a spare.)Interruption for another issue: Discriminatory higher penalty for a trained person assisting alitigant.11:05 a.m. Saturday 11 September 1999:It seems that the following is an issue of first impression: May a state by a criminal statute thatpunishes the legally trained with a higher penalty than the untrained prohibit a suspended attorney ordisbarred attorney from assisting an indigent disabled veteran who has been denied appointed counsel andfaces jail for inability to pay a traffic ticket? I find no cases on point. The penumbra created by the rightsto speech, association, counsel, and petition without a doubt outweighs any state interest in punishingPalaschak for his traffic tickets and LSD consumption by prohibiting him to earn a living by speaking and 3writing. We never need reach that issue because the statute, B&P 6126, fails for overbreadth.Overbreadth"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges orimmunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any personof life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person withits jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" - 14th amendment in part.Whoops, California is enforcing a law that violates my immunity from prosecution for writing apetition and writing under the privileges and immunities clause. Whoops, Illinois did it to. The states haveconspired to deny my right to speak and petition. The constitution says that no state shall enforce such alaw as 6126 and yet California and Illinois both enforce this blatant abridgment of the right to free speech.California Business and Professions code 6126 is both vague and overbroad. It is overbroad formany reasons enumerated in the list of all the lawyers who are permitted to do the very thing that this statuteprescribes. It is vague due to the term "holding out". It is overbroad in that is proscribes advertising evenafter a lawyer has been reinstated. Even if the statute were not vague and overbroad, it would suffer thefatal constitutional infirmity of trampling on (abridging) the rights to speech, association, counsel, publication,and petition. Although we need not use such a broad argument, the stat bar act only has legitimacy in testingapplicants and in policing those offenses that nave a nexus to the practice of law. Palaschak's traffic ticketshave no nexus to the practice of law. The bar illegally requires its members to be super citizens and soldiersin the drug war. Palaschak is on the other side in the drug war.The view of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding association are expressed in Griswold v Connecticut(1965) 14 L Ed 2d 510. Dr. Griswold asserted standing to vicariously assert the privacy rights of his patientswho used birth control devices in the privacy of their bedrooms.Resumption of the Argument regarding AssociationUnited Transportation Union v State Bar of Michigan (1971) 28 L Ed 2d 339, 401 US 576, 91S Ct1076 is cited by Caroline Kennedy in her book "In Our Defense" but that book was taken from my by Ventura(Beginning of page 3 of original jail typewritten brief 3596) Deputy Al Weigand in Illinois. Illinois jailers lost the book.The organized bar has a history of oppression. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the denial ofadmission of a woman to the Illinois bar. We don't have pre-1956 cases here in Ventura jail law library. Ihad the details in my personal small jail law library in Illinois in the book History of American Law, 2nd edition,1984, Stanford University Press, Professor Lawrence Friedman. Ventura Deputy Al Weigand made meleave this book behind and then Illinois jailers lost it. (May 21. 2001 Update: The case was Bradwell v.People of State of Illinois, (U.S. Ill. 1872) 83 U.S. 130, 21 L.Ed. 442, 16 Wall. 130.)A more recent Supreme Court ruled that a bar could not deny membership on the basis of residenceout of the state in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v Piper (1985) 84 L Ed 2d, 470 US 274, 105 S Ct 1272. 4See also 79 L Ed 2d 918 Supreme court's construction and application of privileges and immunities clauseof U.S. constitution - article IV - (not amendment 14 which is the broader clause). Now, under the guise ofprotecting the public they purport forbid Palaschak, whose legal competence has never been questions andwho disbarment is void (for denial of due process and for being double jeopardy), to share his knowledgeand speak and write for his friend who, like Palaschak, is a victim of an oppressive predatory court of massproduction.The 14th amendment forbids the prosecution of this case against Palaschak. It forbids this state toabridge his right to speak and write - and the state may not do an end run around the 14th amendment bysaying that they are merely prohibiting Palaschak from "advertising of holding himself out as practicing orentitled to practice." There is no allegation that Palaschak advertised. The prosecutor said at the preliminaryexamination that Palaschak by writing this petition for Melvin Looser thereby held himself out as licensed -but the footnote in the key evidence, namely, the petition #2871 written by Palaschak, clearly states thatPalaschak is not licensed in this state court. Prosecution points to the use of the word "attorney at law" onthe letterhead but the bar may not claim exclusive right to that title and Palaschak is an attorney albeitarguably not licensed in this particular state court although under Marbury v Madison (1803) 2 L Ed 60, 5 US137, a void act is void ab initio and this is not the first time that Palaschak's license deprivation was void abinitio due to prosecution (and state bar) mistakes and malicious misdeeds.So much of the law is a struggle of the discreet insular minority against the alliance of monopolies.Example: In United Transportation Workers v Michigan it was the injured train workers versus themonopolistic railroads (having been monopolized by J Pierpont Morgan) and the monopolistic state Bar ofMichigan. Regarding the railroads and other Morgan monopolies, see House of Morgan by Ron Chenowcirca 1989. What good is an opinion of the Supreme Court if the traffic court chills, oppresses, harasses,and intimidates the only person who knows about the decision. Palaschak's problems with the bar stem fromhis attempt to vindicate his rights to due process and equal protection under Bell v Burson (1971) 26 L Ed90, 401 US 535 State cannot take a driver license without hearing. To this day he does not know how histraffic appeal ended. His miserable appointed lawyer, Jill Hatfield, did not even obtain a transcript. Thecourt would not let her withdraw from the case, but I digress.(Beginning of page 4 in the original jail typewritten version of brief 3596):The prosecution in the preliminary examination argued that Palaschak "appeared for Melvin Looser."This is absolutely untrue. (In retrospect, this call was made at the preliminary examination by judge BeckyRiley there.) (Retrospective note: The tape recording played at trial upon cross examination of bailiff Vidocaused Vido to recant his testimony in this regard. Nonetheless the prosecution had a duty to examine theevidence. The prosecution has an ethical duty to avoid presenting falsehoods to the court. It is not plausiblethat the prosecution did not know what was on the tape recording as late as the preliminary examination.) 5The evidence will show that Palaschak sat in the audience. The prosecution says that Palaschak waved hishand and tried to talk to the judge. The hand wave was only after a misstatement by Looser that could havebeen taken out of context and misconstrued as Looser's having said that Palaschak was his attorney at thathearing. The waving of a hand is ambiguous and could also have been an attempt to make it clear thatPalaschak was not Melvin's mouthpiece that day - as was abundantly clear from the moving papers.Palaschak was asked by Commissioner Covarrubius to identify himself - and Palaschak identifiedhimself as douglas Palaschak, the person who served the proof of service in this case - after the court wassilent and wondering whether the petition had been filed with the court and properly served. It was indeedproperly served by me.THERE IS A PATTERN HERE OF LOOKING FOR SOME CRIME TO PIN ON PALASCHAKIn 1991at Palaschak's LSD party police searched for a crime to assign to Palaschak. They initiallywanted to charge him with H&S 11550 - but being under the influence of LSD is not a crime. Then theyarrested him for 647f - drunk in public - but Palaschak blew 0.00 on the Breathalyzer - and was not in public.Palaschak was in his office behind closed, locked doors. The district attorney obtained testimony fromPalaschak's co-defendant that Palaschak had LSD in his hand only by using the tainted testimony from anillegal search. The district attorney contended that the search was consensual but persons under theinfluence of LSD are incapable of giving meaningful legal consent to a legal search. Commonwealthv Harmond (1979) 376 Mass 557, 382 NE2d 203 - consent deemed invalid where consenter was 1) incustody, 2) had been drinking - similar to Co-defendant Jessica Jobin's situation. Ivins v State 129 GA App,201 SE2d 683 - consent held invalid because consenter was in custody and consent was merelyacquiescence and consenter was given no alternative which recalls Officer Dawson's admission that shetold Jessica Jobin "We'll find it [the LSD] anyway." Kelly v State 305 A2d 195 - consent deemed invalidbecause consenter was in custody - conflicting testimony between officer and consenter - although we don'thave a conflict - Officer Dawson admits coercing Jessica Jobin. Schneckloth v Bustamonte (1973) 412 US218, 36 L Ed 2d 854, 93 S Ct 2041 - Even the most subtle coercion precludes consent. L Ed 2d 111:85Validity under 4th of search pursuant to consent.The issue of legal consent was not argued at the first appeal despite protest by Palaschak anddespite Palaschak having submitted supplementary briefs in addition to those of his pathetic appellatecounsel who won on appeal only to have the decision overturned on the basis of his lack of thoroughness.The appeal before the California Supreme court did not include a transcript of the critical first day of the twoday suppression hearing. The record included the 2nd day which was transcribed by a different court reporterwho thought that she was transcribing the first day. The decision should have been remanded for furtherconsideration - but due to the lack of thoroughness of appointed counsel, the California Supreme court didnot know that there were a multitude of other issues - issues which had been briefed by Palaschak but 6ignored by appointed counsel.Palaschak wrote a habeas corpus motion to the Supreme Court of California while he was in jail butthe guards intercepted the motion and refrained from mailing it to the court. Upon Palaschak's release, theygave the motion back to him with the comment "We thought that you could mail it when you got released."The point of all this is that the prosecution goes out of its way to attempt to convict Palaschak. Inmost drug cases the police make a deal with the user in order to find the supplier. In Palaschak's case thedid not even inquire as to the supplier choosing to make a deal with the supplier to convict the end user.Due to loss of his bar license Palaschak has suffered financially. He has slept in his car. When his2 cars were taken by police on two separate occasions he even slept alongside the freeway for a week. Thenhe returned to his home in Illinois only to be illegally extradited back to California (where prosecutor Eric ___had the temerity to say "We just wanted Palaschak to stop practicing law in California." Were that the casethen they should have left him in Illinois. The truth is this: They just wanted to get something on Palaschak.)The Pattern: the 1993 raid based on a lie.In 1993 district attorney investigator Glen Kitzman (who withheld the exculpatory tape recording in1999 and who was the investigator in the LSD case in 1991) raided Palaschak's office based on his falseallegation that Palaschak was unlicensed. He simultaneously issued a press release accusing Palaschakof 7 felonies - but he did not issue any press release when he discovered that he was mistaken. The districtattorney did not file any complaint against Palaschak but instead kept all his money and files and computersfor a year trying to extort a misdemeanor plea from Palaschak. After more than a year they gave hisproperty back to him.Back to the PresentToday the prosecution cannot allege any deception on Palaschak's part because his petition clearlyannounced his license deprivation. The prosecution can not charge Palaschak with practicing law withouta license because he did not do that. New rule 1-311 permits Palaschak's acts - or it is overbroad and failsconstitutional muster for overbreadth by discriminating against non-lawyers attempting to hire the suspendedlawyers that may only work for licensed lawyers under the bizarre logic of the bureaucracy of the barmonopoly.The pattern: Placing 3 prosecutions in perspectiveTherefore, as in 1991 (when they had to find something) and 1993 (when they tried to forcePalaschak to plead guilty so that he could have his computers back) they now accuse Palaschak ofadvertising or holding out that he is entitled - even though Palaschak has not had an office or advertisingfor years before 1997 when this crime is alleged to have been committed and even though Palaschak hasbeen farming and living in Illinois for nearly two years - since late 1997.Beginning of page 5 of original jail typewritten brief #3596: 7The Yagman, Kunstler, and Zenger vein of logicPalaschak began his practice as a civil rights lawyer. His first large yellow pages ad sought outvictims of bureaucratic frustration and police abuse among others. Palaschak has only been cited forcontempt of court once in his life - by angry former Judge Bradley who excessively fined Palaschak and thenhad Palaschak arrested for Palaschak's inability to pay the fine after Palaschak was late for court once. Thereal reason (as perceived by Palaschak) was Bradley's anger at Palaschak as proxy for Palaschak's clientwho was an accused sex offender - and Bradley is a former Ventura prosecutor. (Retrospect: Bradley leftthe bench under pressure after a drunk driving ticket and reportedly received another drunk driving ticket.Bradley should never have used the summary procedure but should have sent the matter to a different judge- especially since his own bailiff was a witness to a telephone conversation. Authority: The appeal from theChicago 7 contempt citations upon Attorney William Kunstler found at In the Matter of David Dellinger et al.,Appellants, 461 F.2d 389; 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 9621 citing In Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L. Ed. 11, the Supreme Court forbade the use of summary contempt power post-trial by a trialjudge who had become "personally embroiled" with the lawyer whom he cited. 348 U.S. at 17, 75 S. Ct. 11.The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, held under its "supervisory authority over theadministration of criminal justice in the federal courts" (348 U.S. at 13, 75 S. Ct. at 13) that a trial judge soembroiled could not proceed summarily after the completion of the trial but must recuse himself to allowanother judge to adjudicate the contempt. n4 The Court said: "The pith of this rather extraordinary [summarycontempt] power to punish without the formalities required by the Bill of Rights for the prosecution of federalcrimes generally, is that the necessities of the administration of justice require such summary dealing withobstructions to it." 348 U.S. at 14, 75 S. Ct. at 13. The thrust of the Offutt opinion is that where the trial judgewaits until the conclusion of trial to cite for contempt, the necessity to preserve order in the courtroom cannotsanction summary procedure. On the other hand, the "fair administration of justice" (348 U.S. at 17, 75 S.Ct. 11) will not tolerate a judge who has become personally embroiled with trial attorneys to sit in judgmenton their conduct, at least after the trial is over, merely because that course is more convenient, moreeconomical and less time consuming than having another judge conduct a hearing. See United States v.Meyer, 149 U.S. App. D.C. 212, 462 F.2d 827 (1972). I spent 2 hours in the law library searching for thecitation to the Kunstler appeal. I found it amongst the Chicago 7 trial literature on the web by using theexcite.com search engine. This demonstrated to me the weakness of legal search engines. The websitethat I found is part of:Links to famous trials at University of Missouri at Kansas City.More specifically:http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Chicago7/contempt.html.This site has the transcript of the entire trial and also has the transcripts of the several colloquies for which 8Attorney Kunstler was sentenced to prison for 4 years and 13 days. The sentenced was overturned onappeal.)Punishing the Messenger and the Need for Association for Mutual ProtectionPalaschak is more isolated than most lawyers. Had the late Attorney William Kunstler been soisolated he might have spent time in prison. Kunstler successfully defended the Chicago 7, demonstratorsat the 1968 democratic convention in Chicago. See My Life as a Radical Lawyer by Attorney WilliamKunstler circa 1995. Upon conclusion of the trial, angry judge Julius Hoffman sentenced Kunstler, the lawyerfor the defense, to 4 years in prison for alleged outrageous behavior in the case perhaps imputing to Kunstlerthe acts of his clients. Kunstler's friends rallied to his aid. He appealed and won on appeal. See In theMatter of David Dellinger et al., Appellants, 461 F.2d 389; 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 9621. See also thetranscripts and other material at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Chicago7/contempt.html.(Kunstler's partner was Morty Stavis. I had something pertinent about Stavis from CarolineKennedy's book, but I have forgotten what it is, and Ventura Deputy Al Weigan would not let me bring my8 paperback law books from Illinois and Illinois jailers in LaSalle county jail lost them. I suspect that theyput them in circulation thinking that they were paperback inmate library books.In the circa 1968 Chicago 7 case, U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark wanted to prosecute thepolice - rather than the demonstrators - but it was not his call. The local U.S. attorney in Chicago made thechoice to prosecute the demonstrators. Ramsey Clark was a witness for the defense which was led byfamous attorney William Kunstler.Later, in 1995, this same former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark would come to the defenseof Venice Civil Rights Attorney Steve Yagman who was accused of impugning the integrity of the U.S. districtcourt in Los Angeles by telling the public that one judge was an alcoholic and that another hated Jews andruled against them from the bench. Yagman's problems, as did Palaschak's, began with litigation againstan insurance company, a symbol of the establishment. See Yagman v Republic Insurance, et. al., 987 F2d 622, 25 Fed R Serv 3d 717 where the court said:"The underlying action is a civil suit brought by Yagman against fourinsurance companies seeking damages for breach of contract, various state lawtorts and bad faith. The complaint was filed on January 24, 1991 and the case wasassigned to Judge Real. On February 4, 1991, Yagman filed a motion to recuseJudge Real from sitting in the case on the ground that he was biased againstYagman. (FN1) Judge Real summarily referred the motion for randomreassignment. Judge Keller was chosen to hear the motion.Yagman's argument for recusal was based solely upon the events during andsubsequent to a 1984 defamation trial, Brown v. Baden, in which Yagman served 9as plaintiffs' attorney and over which Judge Real presided. The trial was markedby numerous heated exchanges between Yagman and Judge Real. At theconclusion of the trial, Judge Real imposed a $250,000 sanction on Yagman forhis conduct both before and during the trial.Yagman appealed the sanction to this court, arguing that the sanction was unjust,that Judge Real had demonstrated bias against him during the trial, and that JudgeReal therefore should have recused himself from presiding over the sanctionsproceeding. In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir.), amended, 803 F.2d 1085 (9thCir.1986), mandamus granted by Brown v. Baden, 815 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.), cert.denied, Real v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963, 108 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed.2d 390 (1987). Wevacated the sanction on various procedural grounds and remanded the matter withan instruction requiring the reassignment of the sanctions issue to another judge inorder "to preserve the appearance of justice." In re Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1188.We noted the tense nature of the trial, but held that Judge Real had notdemonstrated bias against Yagman and that he did not err by failing to recusehimself. Id. at 1181-82.Judge Real did not reassign the case but, instead, stayed the proceeding pendingthe outcome of a mandamus petition he had filed challenging our authority to orderthe reassignment of another case not involving Yagman. See United States v.Sears, Roebuck & Co., 785 F.2d 777 (9th Cir.) (reversing and remanding forassignment to a different judge), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 988, 107 S.Ct. 580, 93L.Ed.2d 583 (1986). Though the Court denied the Sears petition, Judge Real stilldid not reassign the case. We then issued a writ of mandamus orderingreassignment, Brown v. Baden, 815 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.1987), and Judge Realresponded by filing an unsuccessful petition for certiorari with the United StatesSupreme Court, Real v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963, 108 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed.2d."The similarity in Yagman, Kunstler, and Palaschak cases: establishment versus the individualIn all 3 cases an aggressive lawyer for the people is "put in his place" by the establishment. It hasalways annoyed me that the district attorney says that is represents the people. He does not represent anypeople. He represent the establishment at is against the people. He is for corporate ficta whether they beinsurance companies or government agencies but I digress. In some cases the establishment usesunderlings, hatchet-men, to do their dirty work. In Yagman's case Real had his clerk and his private attorneydo some of the dirty work. In Palaschak's case, Izabell Katapodis, a clerk, told the lie to Kitzman that startedthe 1993 arrest and the seizure of Palaschak's computer. In Palaschak's case the California Supreme court 10unlawfully created an unconstitutional pseudo court to remove bar hearings from the hands of ordinaryattorneys and place them in the hands of presiding officers who are selected by the prosecution who in turnis selected by the establishment.In Yagman's case, Judges Real and Keller, having lost round one, had their "disciplinary committee"try to whack Yagman again. Similarly, Ventura's Kitzman and lying federal clerk Katapodis lost in theirattempt to get Palaschak in 1993. Now Kitzman tries again. Yagman prevailed against Real in his followup battle as related in Standing Committee on Discipline of the United States District Court for the CentralDistrict of California v Stephen Yagman, defendant (9th Circuit, 1995) 55 F.3d 1430; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS12948; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3958; 95 Daily Journal DAR 6873. Palaschak tried to reach this "standingcommittee" in his own case. The clerks at federal court would not tell Palaschak the names of the committeemembers or how to reach the committee. Keep in mind that the federal bar routinely suspends attorneysstrictly on the basis of state court suspension in violation of Bell v Burson. The problem is that they don'thave adequate manpower to tackle the discipline load (which would be no load if discipline were limited toits legitimate purpose instead of being used by the establishment as a tool to enforce standards which haveno nexus to the practice of law). I here reprint the complete version of Yagman's discipline opinion by JudgeKozinski of the 9th circuit federal court of appeal:The convoluted history of this case begins in 1991 when Yagman filed a lawsuitpro se against several insurance companies. The case was assigned to Judge ManuelReal, then Chief Judge of the Central District. Yagman promptly sought todisqualify Judge Real on grounds of bias. n1 The disqualification motion wasrandomly assigned to Judge [*1434] William Keller, who denied it, Yagman v.Republic Ins., 136 F.R.D. 652, 657-58 (C.D. Cal. 1991), and sanctioned Yagman forpursuing the matter in an "improper and frivolous manner," Yagman v. RepublicIns., 137 F.R.D. 310, 312 (C.D. Cal. 1991). n2- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n1 As the basis for this claim, Yagman cited an earlier case where Judge Realhad granted a directed verdict against Yagman's clients and thereafter sanctionedYagman personally in the amount of $ 250,000. We reversed the sanctions andremanded for reassignment to another judge. In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1188(9th Cir. 1986). Though we found no evidence that Judge Real harbored anypersonal animosity toward Yagman, we concluded that reassignment was necessary"to preserve the appearance of justice." Id. On remand, Judge Real challenged our 11authority to reassign the case, and Yagman successfully petitioned for a writ ofmandamus. See Brown v. Baden, 815 F.2d 575, 576-77 (9th Cir. 1987). The mattercame to rest when the Supreme Court denied Judge Real's petition for certiorari.See Real v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963, 98 L. Ed. 2d 390, 108 S. Ct. 450 (1987). [**3]n2 The sanctions order harshly reprimanded Yagman, stating that "neithermonetary sanctions nor suspension appear to be effective in deterring Yagman'spestiferous conduct," 137 F.R.D. at 318, and recommended that he be "disciplinedappropriately" by the California State Bar, id. at 319. On appeal, we affirmedas to disqualification but reversed as to sanctions. Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1993).- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -A few days after Judge Keller's sanctions order, Yagman was quoted as sayingthat Judge Keller "has a penchant for sanctioning Jewish lawyers: me, DavidKenner and Hugh Manes. I find this to be evidence of anti-semitism." SusanSeager, Judge Sanctions Yagman, Refers Case to State Bar, L.A. Daily J., June 6,1991, at 1. The district court found that Yagman also told the Daily Journalreporter that Judge Keller was "drunk on the bench," although this accusationwasn't published in the article. See Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 856F. Supp. 1384, 1386 (C.D. Cal. 1994).Around this time, Yagman received a request from Prentice Hall, publisher ofthe [**4] much-fretted-about Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, n3 for commentsin connection with a profile of Judge Keller. Yagman's response was less thancomplimentary. n4- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n3 The Almanac is a loose-leaf service consisting of profiles of federaljudges. Each profile covers the judge's educational and professional background,noteworthy rulings, and anecdotal items of interest. One section - which manyjudges pretend to ignore but in fact read assiduously - is styled "Lawyers'Evaluation." Perhaps because the comments are published anonymously, they 12sometimes contain criticism more pungent than judges are accustomed to. Judgeswho believe the comments do not fairly portray their performance occasionally askPrentice Hall to seek additional comments; Prentice Hall's letter to Yagman wassent pursuant to such a request. The updated survey indeed produced a morepositive - and we believe more accurate - picture of Judge Keller than theoriginal survey. Compare 1 Almanac of the Fed. Judiciary 48 (1991-1) with 1Almanac of the Fed. Judiciary 49-50 (1991-2).n4 The portion of the letter relevant here reads as follows:It is outrageous that the Judge wants his profile redone because he thinks itto be inaccurately harsh in portraying him in a poor light. It is anunderstatement to characterize the Judge as "the worst judge in the centraldistrict." It would be fairer to say that he is ignorant, dishonest, illtempered,and a bully, and probably is one of the worst judges in the UnitedStates. If television cameras ever were permitted in his courtroom, the otherfederal judges in the Country would be so embarrassed by this buffoon that theywould run for cover. One might believe that some of the reason for this substandardhuman is the recent acrimonious divorce through which he recently went:but talking to attorneys who knew him years ago indicates that, if anything, hehas mellowed. One other comment: his girlfriend . . ., like the Judge, is aright-wing fanatic.SER 316 (letter dated June 5, 1991). There's no doubt that Yagman wrote thisintemperate letter, though the parties disagree about what Yagman did with it.The district court found that Yagman mailed copies both to Prentice Hall and toJudge Keller, 856 F. Supp. at 1386, and we have no basis for rejecting thisfinding.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -[**5]A few weeks later, Yagman placed an advertisement (on the stationary of hislaw firm) in the L.A. Daily Journal, asking lawyers who had been sanctioned byJudge Keller to contact Yagman's office. n5 13- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n5 The full text of the ad reads: "This office is gathering evidenceconcerning sanctions imposed by U.S. Dist. Judge William D. Keller. It would beappreciated if any attorney who has been sanctioned, or threatened withsanctions, by Judge Keller fill out the form below and mail it to us. Thank you."SER 380. The record does not disclose whether Yagman received any responses.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Soon after these events, Yagman ran into Robert Steinberg, another attorneywho practices in the Central District. According to Steinberg, Yagman told himthat, by leveling public criticism at Judge Keller, Yagman hoped to get the judgeto recuse himself in future cases. n6 Believing that Yagman was committingmisconduct, Steinberg described his conversation with Yagman in a letter to theStanding Committee on Discipline of the U.S. District [**6] Court for theCentral District of California (the Standing Committee). See SER 326.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n6 Though Yagman adamantly denies saying this to Steinberg, the district courtheard testimony from both lawyers and believed Steinberg. 856 F. Supp. at 1392.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -[*1435] A few weeks later, the Standing Committee received a letter fromJudge Keller describing Yagman's anti-Semitism charge, his inflammatorystatements to Prentice Hall and the newspaper advertisement placed by Yagman'slaw firm. Judge Keller stated that "Mr. Yagman's campaign of harassment andintimidation challenges the integrity of the judicial system. Moreover, there isclear evidence that Mr. Yagman's attacks upon me are motivated by his desire tocreate a basis for recusing me in any future proceeding." SER 329-30. JudgeKeller suggested that "the Standing Committee on Discipline should take actionto protect the Court from further abuse." SER 330. 14After investigating the charges in the two letters, the Standing Committeeissued a Petition for Issuance of an Order [**7] to Show Cause why Yagman shouldnot be suspended from practice or otherwise disciplined. Pursuant to CentralDistrict Local Rule 2.6.4, the matter was then assigned to a panel of threeCentral District judges, which issued an Order to Show Cause and scheduled ahearing. n7 Prior to the hearing, Yagman raised serious First Amendmentobjections to being disciplined for criticizing Judge Keller. Both sidesrequested an opportunity to brief the difficult free speech issues presented, butthe district court never acted on these requests. The parties thus proceeded atthe hearing without knowing the allocation of the burden of proof or the legalstandard the court intended to apply. n8- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n7 The matter had originally been assigned to a panel of three judges fromoutside the Central District. After Yagman argued that this assignment violatedLocal Rule 2.6.4, the out-of-district panel referred the matter back to ChiefJudge Real. The matter was then assigned to Central District Judges Rafeedie,Davies and Williams, who presided over all further proceedings.n8 Yagman raises other procedural objections to the district courtproceedings, among them the lack of any discovery. Though Yagman and the StandingCommittee both submitted lengthy discovery requests, the district court deniedall discovery without explanation. See SER 666, 669. While the district court hasbroad discretion over discovery matters, the record does not reflect that itexercised that discretion, as it denied all discovery in summary fashion. Thecourt thus appears to have violated Local Rule 2.6.4, which expressly makes theFederal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to disciplinary proceedings. One ofthe rules thus made applicable is Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), which, subject to somelimitations, affords both parties the right to "obtain discovery regarding anymatter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in thepending action." Because the district court may not disregard the local rules ithas promulgated, see In re Thalheim, 853 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1988), it lackedauthority to dispense with discovery altogether. 15- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -[**8]During the two-day hearing, the Standing Committee and Yagman put on witnessesand introduced exhibits. In a published opinion issued several months after thehearing, the district court held that Yagman had committed sanctionablemisconduct, 856 F. Supp. 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1994), and suspended him from practicein the Central District for two years, 856 F. Supp. 1395, 1400 (C.D. Cal. 1994).IIThe Central District provides a mechanism for judges and others who becomeaware of attorney misconduct to refer the matter to the Standing Committee, abody of twelve members of the Central District bar. See Cent. Dist. Local R.(Civil) 2.6.1, 2.6.3. The Standing Committee reviews the charges and conducts aninvestigation. If it determines that an attorney deserves discipline, it issuesa formal complaint and the case is assigned to a randomly selected panel of threejudges. See Cent. Dist. Local R. (Civil) 2.6.4. The three-judge panel then holdsa hearing on the charges with the committee acting as prosecutor.Yagman challenges the makeup of the Standing Committee on the ground thatseveral of its members had conflicts of interest that could have influenced theirdecision to pursue [**9] disciplinary action against him. n9 Relying principallyon Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 95 L. Ed.2d 740, 107 [*1436] S. Ct. 2124 (1987), Yagman argues that this denied him dueprocess.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n9 The Chairman of the Standing Committee, Donald Smaltz, represented JudgeReal in Real v. Yagman, see n.1 supra, and is alleged to have close personal tiesto the former Chief Judge. In addition, Yagman alleges that several of the othercommittee members have been either defendants or opposing counsel in actionsbrought by Yagman's clients. 16- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -We find Young readily distinguishable. The district court there appointed aprivate attorney to prosecute the defendant for allegedly violating an injunctionprotecting Vuitton's trademark. The attorney, however, had represented Vuittonin the civil action which resulted in the injunction, and continued to serve asVuitton's counsel even as he prosecuted the contempt. He was thus representingtwo clients with potentially conflicting interests: Vuitton and the UnitedStates. [**10] The Court noted that by doing so, the attorney was violatingethical standards and a federal criminal law, since he could not "discharge theobligation of undivided loyalty to both clients where both have a directinterest." Id. at 805. In such situations, the Court concluded, the temptationto use prosecutorial authority to benefit the private client is too great. Toavoid such conflicts of interest, the Court held that "counsel for a party thatis the beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed as prosecutor in acontempt action alleging a violation of that order." Id. at 809.Yagman doesn't contend that any of the Standing Committee lawyers representJudge Keller (the supposed interested party here), or that Judge Keller standsto benefit from the disciplinary action against Yagman. Nor does he argue thatthe committee members violated federal law or professional ethical standards.Thus, the concerns undergirding the Court's ruling in Young are not implicated.Moreover, even the serious conflict of interest present in Young did not resultin a denial of due process. n10 Instead, the Court invoked its supervisoryauthority to prevent federal judges from making [**11] appointments that forceattorneys to violate federal law and widely accepted ethical standards. Id. at808-09.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n10 Justice Blackmun alone concluded that appointing an interested party'sattorney to prosecute a criminal contempt action violates due process; no otherjustice would go that far. See Young, 481 U.S. at 814-15 (Blackmun, J.,concurring). 17- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Nor do we find any other support for Yagman's due process claim. The StandingCommittee itself has no authority to impose sanctions; whether and to what extentdiscipline is warranted are matters exclusively within the province of the court.The committee merely assists the district court in maintaining attorneydiscipline by relieving judges of the awkward responsibility of serving as bothprosecutors and arbiters. n11 So long as the judges hearing the misconduct [**12]charges are not biased (and Yagman doesn't claim they are), there is nolegitimate cause for concern over the composition and partiality of the StandingCommittee. Cf. Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1058 (2d Cir. 1984)(interested prosecutor's handling of criminal investigation and subsequent trialdidn't deprive defendant of due process).- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n11 Given the relatively small size of the Central District bar, it's highlylikely that Standing Committee members will have had some dealings (professionalor otherwise) with the court's judges, as well as with the attorneys subject todisciplinary proceedings. The rules nonetheless call for the committee to bedrawn from the Central District bar, presumably because those lawyers will befamiliar with local practices. The rules thus reflect a judgment that thebenefits of having a prosecuting authority composed of one's peers outweigh anyresulting loss of independence. We see no constitutional defect in this judgment.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -IIILocal Rule 2.5.2 contains two [**13] separate prohibitions. First, it enjoinsattorneys from engaging in any conduct that "degrades or impugns the integrityof the Court." Second, it provides that "no attorney shall engage in any conductwhich . . . interferes with the administration of justice." The district courtconcluded that Yagman violated both prongs of the rule. 856 F. Supp. at 1385.Because different First Amendment standards apply to these two provisions, wediscuss the propriety of the sanction under each of them separately. 18A1. We begin with the portion of Local Rule 2.5.2 prohibiting any conduct that"impugns the integrity of the Court." As the district court recognized, thisprovision is [*1437] overbroad because it purports to punish a great deal ofconstitutionally protected speech, including all true statements reflectingadversely on the reputation or character of federal judges. A substantiallyoverbroad restriction on protected speech will be declared facially invalidunless it is "fairly subject to a limiting construction." Board of AirportComm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 577, 96 L. Ed. 2d 500, 107 S. Ct.2568 (1987).To save the "impugn the integrity" portion of Rule 2.5.2, the district courtread into it [**14] an "objective" version of the malice standard enunciated inNew York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710(1964). Relying on United States Dist. Ct. v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861 (9th Cir.1993), the court limited Rule 2.5.2 to prohibit only false statements made witheither knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard as to their truthor falsity, judged from the standpoint of a "reasonable attorney." 856 F. Supp.at 1389-90.Sandlin involved a First Amendment challenge to Washington Rule ofProfessional Conduct 8.2(a), which provided in part: "A lawyer shall not make astatement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to itstruth or falsity concerning the qualifications, integrity, or record of a judge."Sandlin, 12 F.3d at 864. Though the language of the rule closely tracked the NewYork Times malice standard, we held that the purely subjective standardapplicable in defamation cases is not suited to attorney disciplinaryproceedings. Id. at 867. Instead, we held that such proceedings are governed byan objective standard, pursuant to which the court must determine "what thereasonable attorney, considered in light of all [**15] his professionalfunctions, would do in the same or similar circumstances." Id. n12 The inquiryfocuses on whether the attorney had a reasonable factual basis for making thestatements, considering their nature and the context in which they were made. Id.n13 19- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n12 Sandlin is consistent with the decisions of most state courts that haveconsidered this issue. See, e.g., Ramirez v. State Bar, 28 Cal. 3d 402, 619 P.2d399, 404, 169 Cal. Rptr. 206 (Cal. 1980); In re Terry, 271 Ind. 499, 394 N.E.2d94, 95-96 (Ind. 1979); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Karst, 428 So. 2d 406, 409(La. 1983); In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 321-22 (Minn. 1990); In re Westfall,808 S.W.2d 829, 837 (Mo. 1991); In re Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d 184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 34,573 N.Y.S.2d 39 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam). But see State Bar v. Semaan, 508 S.W.2d429, 432-33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (adopting subjective New York Times malicestandard).n13 This inquiry may take into account whether the attorney pursued readilyavailable avenues of investigation. Sandlin, for example, wrongfully accused adistrict judge of ordering his court reporter to alter the transcript of courtproceedings. Though the judge had agreed to let the reporter be deposed, Sandlindidn't wait to see what the deposition would disclose before making hisaccusation. Sandlin thus lacked a reasonable factual basis for his accusationbecause he failed to pursue readily available means of verifying his charge ofcriminal wrongdoing. 12 F.3d at 867; see also Ramirez, 619 P.2d at 404 (upholdingsanction where attorney made false statements about judges based solely onconjecture without investigating whether the allegations were factuallysubstantiated); Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d at 32-34 (upholding sanction where attorneyfalsely accused judge of misconduct during in-chambers meeting beforeinterviewing any of the individuals who were present at the meeting).- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -[**16]Yagman nonetheless urges application of the New York Times subjective malicestandard in attorney disciplinary proceedings. Sandlin stands firmly in the way.In Sandlin, we held that there are significant differences between the interestsserved by defamation law and those served by rules of professional ethics.Defamation actions seek to remedy an essentially private wrong by compensating 20individuals for harm caused to their reputation and standing in the community.Ethical rules that prohibit false statements impugning the integrity of judges,by contrast, are not designed to shield judges from unpleasant or offensivecriticism, but to preserve public confidence in the fairness and impartiality ofour system of justice. See In re Terry, 271 Ind. 499, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Ind.1979); In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 322 (Minn. 1990).Though attorneys can play an important role in exposing problems with thejudicial system, see Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958,967 (Okla. 1988), false statements impugning the integrity [*1438] of a judgeerode public confidence without serving to publicize problems that justifiablydeserve attention. Sandlin held [**17] that an objective malice standard strikesa constitutionally permissible balance between an attorney's right to criticizethe judiciary and the public's interest in preserving confidence in the judicialsystem: Lawyers may freely voice criticisms supported by a reasonable factualbasis even if they turn out to be mistaken.Attorneys who make statements impugning the integrity of a judge are, however,entitled to other First Amendment protections applicable in the defamationcontext. To begin with, attorneys may be sanctioned for impugning the integrityof a judge or the court only if their statements are false; truth is an absolutedefense. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 13 L. Ed. 2d 125, 85 S. Ct.209 (1964). Moreover, the disciplinary body bears the burden of proving falsity.See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77, 89 L. Ed. 2d783, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986); Porter, 766 P.2d at 969.It follows that statements impugning the integrity of a judge may not bepunished unless they are capable of being proved true or false; statements ofopinion are protected by the First Amendment unless they "imply a false assertionof fact." See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19, 111 L. Ed. 2d 1,110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990); [**18] Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 555 (9th Cir.1983); Restatement (Second) of Torts 566 (1977) (statement of opinionactionable "only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts asthe basis for the opinion"). Even statements that at first blush appear to befactual are protected by the First Amendment if they cannot reasonably beinterpreted as stating actual facts about their target. See Hustler Magazine, 21Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988). Thus,statements of "rhetorical hyperbole" aren't sanctionable, nor are statements thatuse language in a "loose, figurative sense." See National Ass'n of LetterCarriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284, 41 L. Ed. 2d 745, 94 S. Ct. 2770 (1974)(use of word "traitor" could not be construed as representation of fact);Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14, 26 L. Ed. 2d 6, 90S. Ct. 1537 (1970) (use of word "blackmail" could not have been interpreted ascharging plaintiff with commission of criminal offense).With these principles in mind, we examine the statements for which Yagman wasdisciplined.2. We first consider Yagman's statement in the Daily Journal that Judge Keller"has a penchant for sanctioning Jewish lawyers: me, David [**19] Kenner and HughManes. I find this to be evidence of anti-semitism." n14 Though the districtcourt viewed this entirely as an assertion of fact, 856 F. Supp. at 1391, weconclude that the statement contains both an assertion of fact and an expressionof opinion.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n14 Yagman made a similar assertion to Prentice Hall, mentioning threeincidents in which Jewish lawyers were sanctioned by Judge Keller and allegingthese incidents "backed up the claim" that Judge Keller is anti-Semitic. See SER315. Our analysis of this assertion does not differ from that of the DailyJournal remark; we focus on the latter because the district court relied on itin imposing sanctions. 856 F. Supp. at 1391.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Yagman's claim that he, Kenner and Manes are all Jewish and were sanctionedby Judge Keller is clearly a factual assertion: The words have specific, welldefinedmeanings and describe objectively verifiable matters. Nothing about thecontext in which the words appear suggests the use of loose, figurative languageor "rhetorical [**20] hyperbole." Thus, had the Standing Committee proved thatYagman, Kenner or Manes were not sanctioned by Judge Keller, or were not Jewish, 22this assertion might have formed the basis for discipline. The committee,however, didn't claim that Yagman's factual assertion was false, and the districtcourt made no finding to that effect. We proceed, therefore, on the assumptionthat this portion of Yagman's statement is true.The remaining portion of Yagman's Daily Journal statement is bestcharacterized as opinion; it conveys Yagman's personal belief that Judge Kelleris anti-Semitic. As such, it may be the basis for sanctions only if it could[*1439] reasonably be understood as declaring or implying actual facts capableof being proved true or false. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21; Phantom Touring,Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953 F.2d 724, 727 (1st Cir. 1992).In applying this principle, we are guided by section 566 of the Restatement(Second) of Torts, which distinguishes between two kinds of opinion statements:those based on assumed or expressly stated facts, and those based on implied,undisclosed facts. Restatement (Second) of Torts 566, cmt. b; see Lewis, 710F.2d [**21] at 555 (following the Restatement). n15 The statement, "I thinkJones is an alcoholic," for example, is an expression of opinion based on impliedfacts, see id. 566, cmt. c, illus. 3, because the statement "gives rise to theinference that there are undisclosed facts that justify the forming of theopinion," id. 566, cmt. b. Readers of this statement will reasonablyunderstand the author to be implying he knows facts supporting his view - e.g.,that Jones stops at a bar every night after work and has three martinis. If thespeaker has no such factual basis for his assertion, the statement is actionable,even though phrased in terms of the author's personal belief. n16- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n15 The Restatement's view has been widely adopted. See, e.g., Dunn v. GannettNew York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446, 453 (3d Cir. 1987); Orr v. Argus-PressCo., 586 F.2d 1108, 1114-15 (6th Cir. 1978); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees,Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. 220, 396 N.E.2d 996, 1000-01 (Mass.1979). Although section 566 was drafted before Milkovich clarified the famousdictum in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789,94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974), nothing in Milkovich altered the constitutional principles 23this section articulates. Phantom Touring, 953 F.2d at 731 n.13; Lyons v. GlobeNewspaper Co., 415 Mass. 258, 612 N.E.2d 1158, 1164 (Mass. 1993); Gross v. NewYork Times Co., 82 N.Y.2d 146, 623 N.E.2d 1163, 1168, 603 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y.1993). [**22]n16 In Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990), for example, thedefendant stated that plaintiff's product "didn't work," without setting forththe factual basis for his opinion. We held that the defendant could be liable fordefamation because his statement implied a specific factual assertion: that theproduct didn't perform the functions listed on the bottle. Id. at 1055; cf.Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 5 n.2 (defendant failed to disclose factual basis for hisview that plaintiff lied at court hearing).- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -A statement of opinion based on expressly stated facts, on the other hand,might take the following form: "[Jones] moved in six months ago. He worksdowntown, and I have seen him during that time only twice, in his backyard around5:30 seated in a deck chair . . . with a drink in his hand. I think he must bean alcoholic." Id. 566, cmt. c, illus. 4. This expression of opinion appearsto disclose all the facts on which it is based, and does not imply that there areother, unstated facts supporting the belief that Jones is an alcoholic.A statement of opinion [**23] based on fully disclosed facts can be punishedonly if the stated facts are themselves false and demeaning. Lewis, 710 F.2d at555-56; Restatement (Second) of Torts 566, cmt. c ("A simple expression ofopinion based on disclosed . . . nondefamatory facts is not itself sufficient foran action of defamation, no matter how unjustified and unreasonable the opinionmay be or how derogatory it is."). The rationale behind this rule isstraightforward: When the facts underlying a statement of opinion are disclosed,readers will understand they are getting the author's interpretation of the factspresented; they are therefore unlikely to construe the statement as insinuatingthe existence of additional, undisclosed facts. Phantom Touring, 953 F.2d at 730;Lewis, 710 F.2d at 555. Moreover, "an opinion which is unfounded reveals its lackof merit when the opinion-holder discloses the factual basis for the idea"; 24readers are free to accept or reject the author's opinion based on their ownindependent evaluation of the facts. Redco Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 758 F.2d 970, 972(3d Cir. 1985); see also Potomac Valve & Fitting Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co.,829 F.2d 1280, 1290 [**24] (4th Cir. 1987) ("The statement in question readilyappears to be nothing more than the author's personal inference from the testresults. The premises are explicit, and the reader is by no means required toshare [defendant's] conclusion."). A statement of opinion of this sort doesn't"imply a false assertion of fact," Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19, [*1440] and isthus entitled to full constitutional protection.We applied this principle in Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549 (9th Cir.1983), where an attorney claimed he had been defamed by an article calling hima "shady practitioner." We held that this expression of opinion was protected bythe First Amendment because the article set forth the facts on which the opinionwas based: a judgment entered against the attorney for defrauding his clients,and another judgment holding him liable for malpractice. Id. at 556. Because thearticle's factual assertions were accurate, we concluded that the plaintiff'sclaim was barred: "Where a publication sets forth the facts underlying itsstatement of opinion . . . and those facts are true, the Constitution protectsthat opinion from liability for defamation." Id.; see also National [**25]Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 396 N.E.2d at 1000; Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart &Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1306, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943 (N.Y.1977).Yagman's Daily Journal remark is protected by the First Amendment as anexpression of opinion based on stated facts. Like the defendant in Lewis, Yagmandisclosed the basis for his view that Judge Keller is anti-Semitic and has apenchant for sanctioning Jewish lawyers: that he, Kenner and Manes are all Jewishand had been sanctioned by Judge Keller. The statement did not imply theexistence of additional, undisclosed facts; it was carefully phrased in terms ofan inference drawn from the facts specified rather than a bald accusation of biasagainst Jews. n17 Readers were "free to form another, perhaps contradictoryopinion from the same facts," Lewis, 710 F.2d at 555, as no doubt they did.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 25n17 Even if Yagman's statement were viewed as a bare allegation of anti-Semitism, it might well qualify for protection under the First Amendment as mere"name-calling." Cf. Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 402 (7th Cir. 1988)(allegation that plaintiff was a "racist" held not actionable); Buckley v.Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 894 (2d Cir. 1976) (allegation that plaintiff was a"fascist" held not actionable); Ward v. Zelikovsky, 136 N.J. 516, 643 A.2d 972,983 (N.J. 1994) (allegation that plaintiffs "hate Jews" held not actionable).- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -[**26]3. The district court also disciplined Yagman for alleging that Judge Kellerwas "dishonest." This remark appears in the letter Yagman sent to Prentice Hallin connection with the profile of Judge Keller in the Almanac of the FederalJudiciary. See n.4 supra. The court concluded that this allegation wassanctionable because it "plainly implies past improprieties." 856 F. Supp. at1391. Had Yagman accused Judge Keller of taking bribes, we would agree with thedistrict court. Statements that "could reasonably be understood as imputingspecific criminal or other wrongful acts" are not entitled to constitutionalprotection merely because they are phrased in the form of an opinion. Cianci v.New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980).When considered in context, however, Yagman's statement cannot reasonably beinterpreted as accusing Judge Keller of criminal misconduct. The term "dishonest"was one in a string of colorful adjectives Yagman used to convey the low esteemin which he held Judge Keller. The other terms he used - "ignorant," "illtempered,""buffoon," "sub-standard human," "right-wing fanatic," "a bully," "oneof the worst judges in the United [**27] States" - all speak to competence andtemperament rather than corruption; together they convey nothing more substantivethan Yagman's contempt for Judge Keller. Viewed in context of these "lusty andimaginative expressions," Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 286, the word "dishonest"cannot reasonably be construed as suggesting that Judge Keller had committedspecific illegal acts. n18 See Bresler, 398 U.S. at 14 ("blackmail"). Yagman'sremarks are thus statements of rhetorical hyperbole, incapable of being proved 26true or false. Cf. In re Erdmann, 33 N.Y.2d 559, 301 N.E.2d 426, 427, 347N.Y.S.2d 441 (N.Y. 1973) (reversing sanction against attorney who criticizedtrial judges for not following the law, and appellate judges for being "thewhores who became madams"); State Bar v. [*1441] Semaan, 508 S.W.2d 429, 431-32(Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (attorney's observation that judge was "a midget amonggiants" not sanctionable because it wasn't subject to being proved true orfalse).- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n18 A lawyer accusing a judge of criminal misconduct would use a more pointedterm such as "crooked" or "corrupt." See Rinaldi, 366 N.E.2d at 1307 (accusationthat judge was "corrupt" not protected because it implied the judge had committedillegal acts).- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -[**28]Were we to find any substantive content in Yagman's use of the term"dishonest," we would, at most, construe it to mean "intellectually dishonest" -an accusation that Judge Keller's rulings were overly result-oriented.Intellectual dishonesty is a label lawyers frequently attach to decisions withwhich they disagree. n19 An allegation that a judge is intellectually dishonest,however, cannot be proved true or false by reference to a "core of objectiveevidence." Cf. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21; Rooney, 912 F.2d at 1055. "If it isplain that the speaker is expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, atheory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in possession ofobjectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable." Haynes v. AlfredA. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1227 (7th Cir. 1993). Because Yagman's allegationof "dishonesty" does not imply facts capable of objective verification, it isconstitutionally immune from sanctions.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 27n19 See, e.g., The Comeback Kids, The Recorder, Dec. 29, 1994, at 1 ("[AppleComputer's attorney] called the Ninth Circuit ruling [in Apple Computer, Inc. v.Microsoft Corp.] 'intellectually dishonest' and 'extremely detrimental to thebusiness of the United States.'"); Philip Shenon, Convictions Reversed in IslandSlaying, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1987, at A1 ("The chief prosecutor in the case[ ]said he would challenge the appeals court's decision, which he described as'intellectually dishonest.'"); Dawn Weyrich, Affirmative Action Win SurprisesMany, Wash. Times, June 28, 1990, at A1 ("William Bradford Williams . . . calledthe ruling [in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC] 'intellectually dishonest.''There is no legal reasoning to justify this decision. Judicial activism has runrampant again,' Mr. Reynolds said.").- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -[**29]4. Finally, the district court found sanctionable Yagman's allegation thatJudge Keller was "drunk on the bench." Yagman contends that, like many of theterms he used in his letter to Prentice Hall, this phrase should be viewed asmere "rhetorical hyperbole." The statement wasn't a part of the string ofinvective in the Prentice Hall letter, however; it was a remark Yagman allegedlymade to a newspaper reporter. n20 Yagman identifies nothing relating to thecontext in which this statement was made that tends to negate the literal meaningof the words he used. We therefore conclude that Yagman's "drunk on the bench"statement could reasonably be interpreted as suggesting that Judge Keller hadactually, on at least one occasion, taken the bench while intoxicated. UnlikeYagman's remarks in his letter to Prentice Hall, this statement implies actualfacts that are capable of objective verification. For this reason, the statementisn't protected under Falwell, Bresler or Letter Carriers.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n20 The primary evidence of this charge consists of testimony from one ofJudge Keller's former law clerks. The law clerk testified that a reporter calledthe chambers seeking comment on Yagman's "drunk on the bench" statement. The 28witness did not claim he had spoken with the reporter himself; rather, hetestified that the reporter spoke to his co-clerk and that he (the witness)happened to be in the room with the co-clerk when the call came in. See ER Tab32, at 35. The witness did not explain how he came to know what the reporter wassaying at the remote end of the telephone line, but presumably he was testifyingas to what the co-clerk said the reporter said Yagman said.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -[**30]For Yagman's "drunk on the bench" allegation to serve as the basis forsanctions, however, the Standing Committee had to prove that the statement wasfalse. See Hepps, 475 U.S. at 776-77. This it failed to do; indeed, the committeeintroduced no evidence at all on the point. While we share the district court'sinclination to presume, "in the absence of supporting evidence," that theallegation is untrue, 856 F. Supp. at 1391, the fact remains that the StandingCommittee bore the burden of proving Yagman had made a statement that falselyimpugned the integrity of the court. By presuming falsity, the district courtunconstitutionally relieved the Standing Committee of its duty to produceevidence on an element of its case. n21 Without proof of falsity, [*1442]Yagman's "drunk on the bench" allegation, like the statements discussed above,cannot support the imposition of sanctions for impugning the integrity of thecourt. See Porter, 766 P.2d at 969 (dismissing request for sanctions againstattorney where no proof of falsity was introduced).- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n21 The effect of this error was exacerbated by the fact that the districtcourt did not advise Yagman until after the hearing that he had to carry theburden on this issue. See p. 5844 supra. The district court thus not onlyimproperly shifted the burden of proof on a key issue to Yagman, but also deniedhim fair notice that he was expected to carry this burden at the hearing. 29- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -[**31]BAs an alternative basis for sanctioning Yagman, the district court concludedthat Yagman's statements violated Local Rule 2.5.2's prohibition against engagingin conduct that "interferes with the administration of justice." The court foundthat Yagman made the statements discussed above in an attempt to "judge-shop" -i.e., to cause Judge Keller to recuse himself in cases where Yagman appeared ascounsel.The Supreme Court has held that speech otherwise entitled to fullconstitutional protection may nonetheless be sanctioned if it obstructs orprejudices the administration of justice. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501U.S. 1030, 1074-75, 115 L. Ed. 2d 888, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991); see Sheppard v.Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600, 86 S. Ct. 1507 (1966). Given thesignificant burden this rule places on otherwise protected speech, however, theCourt has held that prejudice to the administration of justice must be highlylikely before speech may be punished.In a trio of cases involving contempt sanctions imposed against newspapers,the Court articulated the constitutional standard to be applied in this context.Press statements relating to judicial matters may not be restricted, the Courtheld, unless they pose [**32] a "clear and present danger" to the administrationof justice. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 372, 91 L. Ed. 1546, 67 S. Ct. 1249(1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348, 90 L. Ed. 1295, 66 S. Ct. 1029(1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260-63, 86 L. Ed. 192, 62 S. Ct. 190(1941). The standard announced in these cases is a demanding one: Statements maybe punished only if they "constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat tothe administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable;it must immediately imperil." Craig, 331 U.S. at 376. There was no clear andpresent danger in these cases, the Court concluded, because any prospect thatpress criticism might influence a judge's decision was far too remote. In an oftquotedpassage, the Court noted that "the law of contempt is not made for the 30protection of judges who may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judgesare supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate." Id.More recently, the Court held that the "clear and present danger" standarddoes not apply to statements made by lawyers participating in pending cases.Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075. In Gentile, the Court concluded that lawyers involvedin pending cases [**33] may be punished if their out-of-court statements posemerely a "substantial likelihood" of materially prejudicing the fairness of theproceeding. Id. The Court gave two principal reasons for adopting this lowerthreshold, one concerned with the identity of the speaker, the other with thetiming of the speech. First, the Court noted, lawyers participating in pendingcases have "special access to information through discovery and clientcommunications." Id. at 1074. As a result, their statements pose a heightenedthreat to the fair administration of justice, "since [they] are likely to bereceived as especially authoritative." Id.; see also In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604,449 A.2d 483, 496 (N.J. 1982) (noting that attorneys participating in pendingcases "have confidential information and an intimate knowledge of the merits" ofan action, and that their views "are invested with particular credibility andweight in light of their positions"). Second, statements made during the pendencyof a case are "likely to influence the actual outcome of the trial" or "prejudicethe jury venire, even if an untainted panel can ultimately be found." Gentile,501 U.S. at 1075. The Court also noted [**34] that restricting the speech oflawyers while they are involved in pending cases does not prohibit speechaltogether but "merely postpones the attorneys' comments [*1443] until aftertrial." Id. at 1076.The Court cited its celebrated decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,16 L. Ed. 2d 600, 86 S. Ct. 1507 (1966), which reversed the conviction of acriminal defendant whose right to a fair trial had been compromised by excessive,prejudicial publicity stemming from the comments of lawyers and others involvedin the trial. That decision, the Court noted, had served as a catalyst for reformefforts aimed at curbing press statements by lawyers involved in judicialproceedings. After Sheppard, a majority of states enacted rules restricting therights of lawyers to comment on matters pending before the courts. Gentile, 501U.S. at 1067-68. 31The Court in Gentile thus focused on situations where public statements bylawyers impair the "fair trial rights" of litigants, and discussed at some lengththe strong governmental interest in limiting prejudicial comments in thiscontext. See id. at 1068. The Court noted, for example, that litigants areentitled to have their cases decided by "impartial jurors [**35] . . . based onmaterial admitted into evidence before them in a court proceeding." Id. at 1070.Extrajudicial statements that might prejudice the jury's consideration of themerits "obviously threaten to undermine this basic tenet." Id. Moreover,statements likely to prejudice the fairness of proceedings in a particular caseimpose significant costs on the judicial system: "Even if a fair trial canultimately be ensured through voir dire, change of venue, or some other device,these measures entail serious costs to the system. . . . The State has asubstantial interest in preventing officers of the court, such as lawyers, fromimposing such costs on the judicial system and on the litigants." Id. at 1075.The special considerations identified by Gentile are of limited concern whenno case is pending before the court. When lawyers speak out on mattersunconnected to a pending case, there is no direct and immediate impact on thefair trial rights of litigants. Information the lawyers impart will not be viewedas coming from confidential sources, and will not have a direct impact on aparticular jury venire. Moreover, a speech restriction that is not bounded by aparticular [**36] trial or other judicial proceeding does far more than merelypostpone speech; it permanently inhibits what lawyers may say about the court andits judges - whether their statements are true or false. n22 Much speech ofpublic importance - such as testimony at congressional hearings regarding thetemperament and competence of judicial nominees - would be permanently chilledif the rule in Gentile were extended beyond the confines of a pending matter. Weconclude, therefore, that lawyers' statements unrelated to a matter pendingbefore the court may be sanctioned only if they pose a clear and present dangerto the administration of justice. Accord Hinds, 449 A.2d at 498.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 32n22 Local Rule 2.5.2 does not differentiate between true and false statements.We express no view as to the standard applicable to a narrower rule that punishesonly false statements which interfere with the administration of justice.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -The district court found that Yagman's statements interfered with theadministration of justice because [**37] they were aimed at forcing Judge Kellerto recuse himself in cases where Yagman appears as counsel. Judge-shoppingdoubtless disrupts the proper functioning of the judicial system and may bedisciplined. But after conducting an independent examination of the record toensure that the district court's ruling "does not constitute a forbiddenintrusion on the field of free expression," Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union ofUnited States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499, 80 L. Ed. 2d 502, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984)(internal quotation marks omitted), we conclude that the sanction imposed herecannot stand.Yagman's criticism of Judge Keller was harsh and intemperate, and in no wayto be condoned. It has long been established, however, that a party cannot forcea judge to recuse himself by engaging in personal attacks on the judge: "Nor canthat artifice prevail, which insinuates that the decision of this court will bethe effect of personal resentment; for, if it could, every man could [*1444]evade the punishment due to his offences, by first pouring a torrent of abuseupon his judges, and then asserting that they act from passion . . . ."Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 326, 1 L. Ed. 155 (Pa. 1788). n23Modern courts continue to [**38] adhere to this view, and with good reason. See,e.g., United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939-40 (9th Cir. 1986) (litigant's"intemperate and scurrilous attacks" on judge could not compel judge'sdisqualification); United States v. Wolfson, 558 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1977)(defendant's unfounded charges of misconduct against judge didn't requiredisqualification, because defendant's remarks "only establish[ed his] feelingstowards [the judge], not the reverse").- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 33n23 Why, the perceptive reader may wonder, does an opinion of the PennsylvaniaSupreme Court appear in the first volume of U.S. Reports? See Craig Joyce, TheRise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on MarshallCourt Ascendancy, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1291, 1295-96 (1985).- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Criticism from a party's attorney creates an even remoter danger that a judgewill disqualify himself because the federal recusal statutes, in all but the mostextreme circumstances, require a showing that the judge is (or appears to be)[**39] biased or prejudiced against a party, not counsel. United States v. Burt,765 F.2d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1985); see also In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 830 (4thCir. 1987); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1398-99 (8th Cir.1983). Were it otherwise, courts have cautioned, "lawyers, once in a controversywith a judge, would have a license under which the judge would serve at theirwill," Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1050 (5th Cir. 1975), andany "party wishing to rid himself of the assigned judge would need only hire alawyer with a certified record of abusive criticisms of that judge," UnitedStates v. Helmsley, 760 F. Supp. 338, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 963 F.2d 1522(2d Cir. 1992).Notwithstanding this well-settled rule, judges occasionally do removethemselves voluntarily from cases as a result of harsh criticism from attorneys.n24 As the district court recognized, then, a lawyer's vociferous criticism ofa judge could interfere with the random assignment of judges. But a merepossibility - or even the probability - of harm does not amount to a clear andpresent danger: "The danger must not be remote or even [**40] probable; it mustimmediately imperil." Craig, 331 U.S. at 376. The "substantive evil must beextremely serious and the degree of imminence must be extremely high beforeutterances can be punished" under the First Amendment. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 263.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n24 Chief Justice Rehnquist, for example, has declined to participate in somecases where James Brosnahan appeared as counsel, leading to speculation that 34Brosnahan's criticism of the Chief Justice during his 1986 confirmation hearingsmay have been the reason. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, The Justices' Imperial Code ofSilence, Legal Times, Feb. 9, 1987, at 9. Similarly, press reports have suggestedthat Second Circuit Judge John Walker removed himself from post-trial proceedingsin the Leona Helmsley case because of harsh criticism he had received duringSenate confirmation hearings from Helmsley's counsel, Harvard Law Professor AlanDershowitz. See Tony Mauro, The Thomas Recusal Question, Tex. Law., Apr. 19,1993, at 18. Closer to home, one Central District judge has decided to recusehimself in all cases where Yagman appears as counsel, after Yagman made baselessallegations against the judge. See Yagman, 856 F. Supp. at 1393.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -[**41]We conclude that "the danger under this record to fair judicial administrationhas not the clearness and immediacy necessary to close the door of permissiblepublic comment." Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 350. As noted above, firm and longstandingprecedent establishes that unflattering remarks like Yagman's cannotforce the disqualification of the judge at whom they are aimed. The questionremains whether the possibility of voluntary recusal is so great as to amount toa clear and present danger. We believe it is not. Public criticism of judges andthe decisions they make is not unusual, see, e.g., n.19 supra, yet this seldomleads to judicial recusal. Judge Real, for example, despite receiving harshcriticism from Yagman, did not recuse himself in Yagman v. Republic Ins., whereYagman was not merely the lawyer but also a party to the [*1445] proceedings.n25 Federal judges are well aware that "service as a public official means thatone may not be viewed favorably by every member of the public," and that they'vebeen granted "the extraordinary protections of life tenure to shield them fromsuch pressures." In re Bernard, 31 F.3d 842, 846 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994) (singlejudge [**42] opinion). Because Yagman's statements do not pose a clear andpresent danger to the proper functioning of the courts, we conclude that thedistrict court erred in sanctioning Yagman for interfering with theadministration of justice. 35- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -n25 The district court noted that, after Yagman made the remarks at issue,Judge Keller did disqualify himself in one of Yagman's cases. 856 F. Supp. at1394 n.13. Although Judge Keller stated that his recusal was motivated by thefact that he had referred Yagman for discipline rather than by Yagman'scriticism, see id. at 1387, this is beside the point. Our inquiry focuses onobjective probabilities: the extent to which the statements in question would belikely to cause a judge of average fortitude to disqualify himself. As the Courtnoted in Pennekamp, "the law deals in generalities and external standards andcannot depend on the varying degrees of moral courage or stability in the faceof criticism which individual judges may possess . . . ." 328 U.S. at 348.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Conclusion [**43]We can't improve on the words of Justice Black in Bridges, 314 U.S. at 270-71(footnote omitted):The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges frompublished criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion.For it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not alwayswith perfect good taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced silence,however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, wouldprobably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it wouldenhance respect.REVERSED.DISSENT BY:WIGGINSDISSENT: 36WIGGINS, J., dissenting.I respectfully dissent.(End of Yagman opinion.)In Palaschak's case in insurance company presumably vindictively reported to the DMV thatPalaschak has been involved in a car crash while not insured. Indeed Palaschak was rear-ended by a vanfull of cigarettes driven by a flaky young woman employed by RJR Nabisco. Their insurance settled out ofcourt and paid Palaschak for his injuries. The negligent woman driver received no discipline but the DMVsummarily suspended Palaschak's license 3 years later without a hearing. This violates the Due Processclause as enunciated in Bell v Burson.Ironically this very same Judge (Manuel Real who maliciously harassed Attorney Yagman) in 1993ruled that the summary suspension of Palaschak's federal bar license was unconstitutional. (I can't tell youthe exact date right now because it was on the computers that Kitzman unlawfully kept for a year. When Igot them back I did not have time to transfer all the data to my new computer. Also, this may havehappened before I retrieved my computers from Attorney Steve Pell who rescued them when Judge Klopfersent me to jail during my LSD trial in violation of my agreement with the traffic court.) Strangely Palaschakpresented his argument to Chief Clerk Leonard Brosnan by telephone. Brosnan asked Judge Real what todo. Brosnan then reported back to Palaschak that indeed Palaschak's federal bar license was immediatelyreinstated as having been improvidently suspended. There are more details in my various briefs that I wroteto combat the illegal seizure of my computers in 1993.Beginning of page 6 of original jail typewritten version of 3596:Similarity to Yagman and Kunstler cases: Chilling criticism of the court by imprisoning critics.Eric Bond and _____ (who requested the federal warrant) disguised the issue of court criticism andthe chilling effect punishing for writing a petition. They did so by presenting only page I of the 15 pagepetition in their request for a federal warrant. It is apparent to anybody reviewing the case (as it wasobviously apparent to Judge Becky Riley at my preliminary examination that the basis for the charge is notclear - but if it is not clear then why did she rule in favor of the prosecution? (To avoid appearance ofimpropriety the entire Ventura bench should recuse itself from this case.) Petition #2871, which is thesmoking gun in the prosecution's case against Palaschak, criticizes the court for its disproportionately highnumber of ex prosecutors on the bench and the secret and disproportionately high number of Mormons (4)on the bench. Because the district attorney Michael Bradbury is believed by Palaschak (mistakenly or not)to be Mormon there is the issue of bias. This is more than mere religious similarity; it is membership in thesame congregation. Religious test is one ting. A closed secret society of part of the bench aligned with theprosecutor is quite another. In Melvin Looser's case the prosecution was not required to even show up incourt to prosecute his traffic ticket or any motions pertaining to his ticket. Commissioner Covarrubias acted 37as both prosecutor and judge - a clear violation of his ethical duty. That very issue was the subject of petition#2871 but was never discussed in the case. None of the issues were discussed. The only question by theCommissioner was "when can you pay?".The prosecution now distances itself from the content of the petition and focuses on the very narrowissue of "holding oneself out" just as the prosecution in Yagman focuses on the very narrow issue ofYagman's having poisoned the well by forcing recusal of through criticism of the court. Is this not moredesirable than suppressing criticism for the purpose of merely ensuring that certain judges remain entitledto hear cases despite the corruption in their so hearing these cases?The Clear and Present Danger Test Has Been the Standard since 19__From the beginning I wondered if I was on base arguing the clear and present danger test.Yes, I was right on base! The Yagman case proves that there is no exception for the bar or for speech inthe courtroom; the clear and present danger applies - and Judge Kozinski of the 9th circuit specifically saidso in Standing Committee v Yagman, reprinted in its entirety above."But a mere possibility or even the probability of harm does not amount to a clearand present danger; the danger must not be remote or even probable; it mustimmediately imperil." [Craig v Harvey (1947) 331 US 367, 91 L Ed 1546, 67 S Ct1249] 331 US at 376, 67 S Ct at 1255.] "The substantive evil must be extremelyserious and the degree of imminence must be extremely high before utterances canbe punished." Bridges v California (1941) 86 L Ed 192, 314 US at 263, 62 S Ct at194, 159 ALR 134. - Judge Kozinski for the 9th Circuit in Standing Committee vYagman 555 F 3d 1430 at 1444 Column 2, issue #24.We don't have pre-1956 cases here in the Ventura jail law library and my private paperback small law librarythat I had in Illinois in jail was ordered left behind by Ventura Deputy Al Weigand, a genuinely nice guy. TheIllinois authorities apparently shuffled my expensive paperback law books in with the prisoner paperbacklibrary. In violation of the 14th amendment by enforcing a law that abridges my immunity against prosecutionfor exercising my right to speech and petition via petition #2871 for Melvin Looser. The extradition clauseupon which the Illinois authorities based their extradition is superseded and amended by the 14th amendment- just like the (beginning of page 7 in the original typewritten brief #3596 written in jail) fugitive slave clause which precedesit is amended and superseded by the 14th amendment.Beginning of page 7 of original jail typewritten brief 3596:The Clear and Present Danger TestJustice Douglas thought that the clear and present danger test was in itself an abridgment of freespeech. He was an absolutist in that regard - and rightfully so. I had the citation (it is Brandenburg ) in myWeinreb personally annotated 800 page collection of leading criminal cases seized by Ventura Deputy Al 38Weigan and lost by Ventura's co-conspirators, LaSalle county jail. A conspirator is responsible for the actsof the co-conspirators.The clear and present danger test was used circa 1917 to keep Eugene Debs, a 4 time Socialistcandidate for President, in jail for having made speeches construed as interfering with the militaryconscription for World War I. Debs urged his fellow Americans to avoid becoming cannon fodder in auseless war. In retrospect Debs was clearly correct - and our government deceived us. See The Long Fusewhich is available in the jail library but seized from my cell by Deputy Milborn in retaliation for my havingspoken up in answer to Deputy Franchi who boasted in error "I run this facility." I reminded him that CaptainPentiss seems to run the jail.World War I was a waste and only acted as a cause for World War II. Hitler played upon theresentment of Germans at the oppressive post World War I measures against them. Debs was right. Themilitary industrial complex suppressed his speech. Warren Beatty portrayed, John ___, a labor leader jailedfor speech in the movie Reds circa 1985. The military industrial complex suppressed the speech of both ofthe leaders who were right. Oppression is testosterone driven and a part of nature and therefore survives,but as civilized people with a goal toward bettering ourselves we utilize the clear and present danger testwhich can be made to work as we saw in Brandenburg v Ohio (1969) 395 US 444. In 1972 EugeneMcGovern spoke out against the war just as Debs did some 50 years earlier but nobody would have thoughtof prosecuting candidate McGovern although he did exactly what Debs did; he urged resistance to the war.New Issue: My requests for particular research material to prepare my defense in this case inIllinois were denied me - except for 2 to 7% of the request. Outrageously, these requests forspecific legal materials were given to the prosecution in Illinois.The prosecution in Illinois cooperates with the prosecution here as was evidence from Venturaprosecutor Eric Bond's having stated at the Ventura preliminary examination that Palaschak helped otherIllinois inmates while in Illinois. Illinois was the agent of Ventura. Palaschak was held under a Venturawarrant originally issued by a former defendant in a lawsuit filed by Palaschak. This former defendant,Judge Barry Klopfer, has recused himself in the past in Palaschak's cases and should have recused himselfwhen asked to review an application for an arrest warrant.Back to Eugene DebsThe prosecution of labor leader (and presidential candidate) Eugene Debs circa 1914 was justifiedon the basis that we, for better or worse, were at war. Debs v U.S. (1919) 63 L Ed 566, 249 US 211, 39 SCt 252 (cited in 38 L Ed 2d 835 Supreme Court's development of the "clear and present danger" rule andthe related rule concerning advocacy of unlawful acts as limitations on the constitutional right of free speech.)Keep in mind that Palaschak was not advocating unlawful acts; he was advocating that the local courtcommissioner follow the clear precedent established by the U.S. Supreme court holding the a court denies 1Keyishian v Board of Regents (1967) 17 L Ed 2d 629, 385 US 589, 87 S Ct 675. Subject:Overbreadth regarding registration of peddlers. The statute failed constitutional muster - as B&P 6126also fails. The case is cited in many treatises including the following: 97 L Ed 2d 903 Public employee'sright of free speech under Federal Constitution - Supreme court cases, 86 L Ed 2d 758 Right of petitionand assembly under federal constitution's first Amendment, 82 L Ed 2d 1040 Civil rights law prohibitingorganization's or its members' right of association under the First Amendment, 73 L Ed 2d 1466 FirstAmendment rights of free speech and press as applied to public schools - Supreme court cases, 67 L Ed2d 859 Supreme court's views regarding the First Amendment right of association as applied to theadvancement of political beliefs, 45 L Ed 2d 725 Supreme Court's views as to overbreadth of legislationin connection with First Amendment rights, 44 L Ed 2d 823 Supreme court's application of Vaguenessdoctrine to noncriminal statues or ordinances, 38 L Ed 2d 835 Supreme Court's development of the 'clearand present danger" rule and the related rule concerning advocacy of unlawful acts as limitation on theconstitutional right of free speech and press, 33 L Ed 2d 865 The Supreme Court and the FirstAmendment right of association, 21 L Ed 2d 976 The Supreme Court and the right of fees speech andpress.2Shelton v Tucker (1960) 5 L Ed 2d 231, 364 US 479, 81 S CT 247. Arkansas school teacherShelton refused to file an affidavit with the school district listing his organization affiliations for the past 5years. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of teacher Shelton. Note that the California bar similarly39equal protection when the rich can pay a fine but the poor must go to jail.Beginning of page 8 of 14 in original typewritten brief written in jail:When we were in a less dangerous was (namely, Viet Nam) and Melvin Looser was exposing himselfto danger for a war that in retrospect was a governmental blunder, the clear and present danger test cameonce again before the U.S. Supreme court in the case of Brandenburg v Ohio (1969) 23 L Ed 2d 430, 395US 444, 89 S Ct 1827. The U.S. Supreme Court there protected speaker Brandenburg who hurled epithetsat Jews and Blacks but did not immediately urge the lynching of any particular person there present.What is the Test in Palaschak's case for Clear and Present Danger?If there had been a danger, Ventura prosecutor Eric Bond would have argued prominently it atPalaschak's preliminary examination. The only danger in this case is the danger presented by acommissioner who would imprison Melvin Looser without benefit of counsel!Justice Kozinski applied Clear And Present Danger test to lawyers in YagmanJustice Kozinski demonstrated that the clear and present danger test can be applied to lawyers inthe court room. He applied the test in the case of Attorney Steven Yagman in Standing Committee onDiscipline v Stephen Yagman (9th Circuit, 1995) 55 F.3d 1430; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 12948; 95 Cal. DailyOp. Service 3958; 95 Daily Journal DAR 6873.California Business and Professions code 6126 is unconstitutional in that it proscribes speechnot directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.See Keyishian v Board of Regents (1967) 17 L Ed 2d 629, 385 US 589, 87 S Ct 6751, Shelton vTucker2 (1960) 5 L Ed 2d 231, 364 US 479, 81 S Ct 247, Brandenburg v Ohio (1969) 23 L Ed 2d 430, 395 asks for lists of affiliations and searches for communists even though the practice was held unlawful bythe Supreme Court. Shelton v Tucker is cited in 11 annotations including: Lawyer's Edition 2d 56:841Licensing and regulation of attorneys as restricted by rights of free speech, expression, and associationunder the First Amendment (which article is the subject matter of Palaschak's lawsuit herein) andLawyer's Edition 2d 58:904 Federal Constitutional right of international travel (which would seem toinclude interstate travel and the right to refuse to travel across country to suffer abridgment of speechrights).3Cole V Richardson (1972) 31 L Ed 2d 593, 405 US 676, 92 S Ct 1332. Sociologist LucretiaCole refused to take the loyalty oath required by Boston Hospital, was summarily discharged. The U.S.Supreme court failed her saying that the oath was vague and obligated her merely to live constitutionally.Note that all the officials who abridged Palaschak's speech presumably took an oath to uphold theconstitution - and subsequently violated their oath by refusing in all cases to even listen to Palaschak'sconstitutional arguments. This case is mentioned in 7 annotations by Bancroft Whitney includingLawyer's Edition 2d 12:1231 Indefiniteness of language as affecting validity of criminal legislation ofjudicial definition of common law crime - Supreme Court cases. Note that "advertising or holding out" isthe fatally ambiguous language of B&P 6126 although 6126 already fails constitutional muster by beingan abridgment of speech, press, petition, and association.46125. No person shall practice law in California unless the person is an active member of theState Bar." B&P 6126 (a) is a misdemeanor for some persons and not for others. "6126 (a) Any personadvertising or holding himself or herself out as practicing or entitled to practice law or otherwisepracticing law who is not an active member of the State Bar, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (b) Any personwho has been involuntarily enrolled as an inactive member of the State Bar, or has been suspendedfrom membership from the State Bar, or has been disbarred, or has resigned from the State Bar withcharges pending, and thereafter advertises or holds himself or herself out as practicing or otherwiseentitled to practice law, is guilty of a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or county jail.However, any person who has been involuntarily enrolled as an inactive member of the State Barpursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) of Section 6007 and who knowingly thereafter advertises orholds himself or herself out as practicing or otherwise entitled to practice law, is guilty of a crimepunishable by imprisonment in the state prison or county jail. (c) The willful failure of a member of theState Bar, or one who has resigned or been disbarred, to comply with an order of the Supreme Court tocomply with Rule 955, constitutes a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or county jail.6127. The following acts or omissions in respect to the practice of law are contempts of the authority ofthe courts: (a) Assuming to be an officer or attorney of a court and acting as such, without authority. (b)Advertising or holding oneself out as practicing or as entitled to practice law or otherwise practicing law inany court, without being an active member of the State Bar. Proceedings to adjudge a person incontempt of court under this section are to be taken in accordance with the provisions of Title V of PartIII of the Code of Civil Procedure."40US 444, and Cole V Richardson3 (1972) 31 L Ed 2d 593, 405 US 676, 92 S Ct 1332.The legitimate peril addressed by 6126 is fraud which includes an element of deceit; Palaschakdeceived no one and nonetheless was falsely accused of fraud by officials who knew no details ofthe crime.The peril addressed by B&P 61264 is fraud; a lawyer might victimize the public with incompetenceafter being disbarred - but that is ludicrous because one of the tenets of state bar discipline is "we don'tdisbar for incompetence." They assess competence with the bar exam - and rightfully so. Also, the bar says 41"We don't punish; we discipline." The bar seems to be entrusted with making sure, for example, that lawyersdon't disburse funds fraudulently - although criminal statutes against fraud and theft would seem to preemptthat field. Hmm. What DO the bar prosecutors do? In Palaschak's offense they imposed a 2nd punishmentfor minor traffic offenses (for which Palaschak was not guilty) and they imposed a 2nd punishment forPalaschak's having eaten LSD (which is not a crime in California). In the LSD case the California Supremecourt should have recused itself due to its members' having been sued by Palaschak on behalf of a clientfor their having violated the civil rights of a discreet insular class of people's lawyers by (among otherthings) creating an unconstitutional court and having (though court rules promulgated by the bar and thesupreme court) eliminated the superior courts and courts of appeal as forums in which lawyers can challengeunconstitutional administrative action by the bar. In doing do the California supreme court unconstitutionallybrings all challenges to "their baby" (the state bar court was created by the California Supreme Court) backto them.Beginning of page 9 of original jail typewritten brief 3596:Trying to find a crime in Palaschak's speech and writing.Let's consider fraud. The affidavit of Glen Kitzman says that Melvin Looser told Glen Kitzman thatPalaschak told Melvin that Palaschak was a disbarred lawyer. There is obviously no deceit there (exceptthat Palaschak is actually not disbarred because a void act is void ab initio).Prosecutor Eric Bond lied at the preliminary examination in VenturaAlthough Prosecutor Eric Bond told the court that Palaschak "appeared in court for Melvin Looser"at the preliminary examination, Eric Bond was either mistaken or he wilfully lied to the court, but he was notunder oath - so it is merely a mater for contempt of the state bar - and Eric Bond is not vulnerable regardingthe state bar because he is not a sole practitioner.Glen Kitzman's affidavit contradicts Eric Bond - as does Glen's testimony at the preliminaryexamination - as does Bailiff Vido's hearsay testimony. All say that Palaschak was in the audience.Commissioner Covarrubias calls to Palaschak in the audiencePalaschak did not ever speak for Melvin Looser except though the medium of petition #2871.Palaschak made is clear in the petition that he was not licensed to speak for Melvin and that he was not thereto speak for him. Palaschak did not intend to speak in court. He was only in the audience but it appearsfrom the letter of Covarrubias to the California bar that Covarrubias knew that Palaschak was not licensedeven before Palaschak appeared - which is logical because petition #2871 clearly explained the situation.Covarrubias called to Palaschak in the audience to identify himself. Palaschak was the only person in theaudience. Palaschak identified himself. Covarrubias ask Palaschak to state his "capacity" for being there.Palaschak stated that he was there as the person who served the moving papers and signed the proof ofservice. Anybody over age 18 and not a party to the action may sign a proof of service under California code 5 The following rule is overbroad and unconstitutional because it abridges speech, press,association, and petition rights - but it does provide a safe harbor at C-1 which specifically permits adisbarred lawyer to write "pleadings, briefs, and other similar documents." "Rule 1-311. Employmentof Disbarred, Suspended, Resigned, or Involuntarily Inactive Member. (A) For purposes of this rule: (1)"Employ" means to engage the services of another, including employees, agents, independentcontractors and consultants, regardless of whether any compensation is paid; (2) "Involuntarily inactivemember" means a member who is ineligible to practice law as a result of action taken pursuant toBusiness and Professions Code sections 6007, 6203(c), or California Rule of Court 958(d); and(3)"Resigned member" means a member who has resigned from the State Bar while disciplinary chargesare pending. (B) A member shall not employ, associate professionally with, or aid a person the memberknows or reasonably should know is a disbarred, suspended, resigned, or involuntarily inactive memberto perform the following on behalf of the member's client:(1) Render legal consultation or advice to theclient; (2) Appear on behalf of a client in any hearing or proceeding or before any judicial officer,arbitrator, mediator, court, public agency, referee, magistrate, commissioner, or hearing officer; (3)Appear as a representative of the client at a deposition or other discovery matter; (4) Negotiate ortransact any matter for or on behalf of the client with third parties; (5) Receive, disburse or otherwisehandle the client's funds; or (6) Engage in activities which constitute the practice of law. (C) A membermay employ, associate professionally with, or aid a disbarred, suspended, resigned, or involuntarilyinactive member to perform research, drafting or clerical activities, including but not limited to: (1) Legalwork of a preparatory nature, such as legal research, the assemblage of data and other necessaryinformation, drafting of pleadings, briefs, and other similar documents; (2) Direct communicationwith the client or third parties regarding matters such as scheduling, billing, updates, confirmation ofreceipt or sending of correspondence and messages; or (3) Accompanying an active member inattending a deposition or other discovery matter for the limited purpose of providing clerical assistance tothe active member who will appear as the representative of the client. (D) Prior to or at the time of42of civil procedure section __.Using the words "Attorney at Law" on a letterhead.Palaschak served petition #2871 upon the court by mail. Palaschak's cover letter said "DouglasPalaschak, Attorney at Law" on the top. Palaschak is indeed an "attorney at law" as distinguished from"attorney in fact". Many attorneys are not licensed by the California bar in California state courts. Someattorneys who are not licensed in California state courts are: all the judges, famous O.J. Simpson lawyerBarry Schenck, Jerry Spence from Wyoming, the late William Kunstler, and the late Abraham Lincoln. (InBrief #___ I list approximately 20 categories of persons who currently practice law in California withoutbenefit of a state bar license.)New California Rule of court 1-311 permits unlicensed lawyers to write pleadingsAs to Melvin Looser's obvious misstatement that Palaschak was counsel, Melvin was speaking inthe subjunctive tense. Melvin was orally explaining his written request to appoint Douglas Palaschak and/orFred Rogers to assist him. Melvin's oral words, context, and tone indicate (on the tape recording) that Melvindesired that Fred Rogers be the licensed counsel and that Palaschak do the writing as specifically permittedby the new California Rule of Court section 1-311 which specifically permits disbarred lawyers to writ briefsand similar papers for a lawyer5. Melvin Looser did not know about rule 1-311 - and neither did employing a person the member knows or reasonably should know is a disbarred, suspended, resigned,or involuntarily inactive member, the member shall serve upon the State Bar written notice of theemployment, including a full description of such person's current bar status. The written notice shall alsolist the activities prohibited in paragraph (B) and state that the disbarred, suspended, resigned, orinvoluntarily inactive member will not perform such activities. The member shall serve similar writtennotice upon each client on whose specific matter such person will work, prior to or at the time ofemploying such person to work on the client's specific matter. The member shall obtain proof of serviceof the client's written notice and shall retain such proof and a true and correct copy of the client's writtennotice for two years following termination of the member's employment with the client. (E) A membermay, without client or State Bar notification, employ a disbarred, suspended, resigned or involuntarilyinactive member whose sole function is to perform office physical plant or equipment maintenance,courier or delivery services, catering, reception, typing or transcription, or other similar support activities.(F) Upon termination of the disbarred, suspended, resigned, or involuntarily inactive member, themember shall promptly serve upon the State Bar written notice of the termination."The establishments version of what constitutes the practice of law is annotated to the statute but doesnot include any of the multitude of free speech cases such as I have listed in this brief and in brief 3789.The establishment's monopolistic West Publishing says: "For discussion of the activities that constitutethe practice of law, see Farnham v. State Bar (1976) 17 Cal.3d 605 [131 Cal.Rptr. 611]; Bluestein v.State Bar (1974) 13 Cal.3d 162 [118 Cal.Rptr. 175]; Baron v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 535[86 Cal.Rptr. 673]; Crawford v. State Bar (1960) 54 Cal.2d 659 [7 Cal.Rptr. 746]; People v. MerchantsProtective Corporation (1922) 189 Cal. 531, 535 [209 P. 363]; People v. Landlords ProfessionalServices (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1599 [264 Cal.Rptr. 548]; and People v. Sipper (1943) 61 Cal.App.2dSupp. 844 [142 P.2d 960].) The state bar added this footnote to its rule. The very existence of afootnote in a statute or rule indicates the convoluted nature and the uncertainty regarding this rule."[Footnote1] Paragraph (D) is not intended to prevent or discourage a member from fully discussing withthe client the activities that will be performed by the disbarred, suspended, resigned, or involuntarilyinactive member on the client's matter. If a member's client is an organization, then the written noticerequired by paragraph (D) shall be served upon the highest authorized officer, employee, or constituentoverseeing the particular engagement. (See rule 3-600.) Nothing in rule 1-311 shall be deemed to limitor preclude any activity engaged in pursuant to rules 983, 983.1, 983.2, and 988 of the California Rulesof Court, or any local rule of a federal district court concerning admission pro hac vice." This rule wasthe rule when Palaschak wrote the petition in 1997. "(Adopted July 11, 1996, effective. Aug. 1, 1996.)"43Commissioner Covarrubias.(Retrospect added 8 June 2001: When Palaschak mentioned the rule at trial, Judge Steele deniedthe existence of the rule. He even brought out a volume of the Rules of Court and challenged Palaschakto find the rule. Palaschak pointed out that the judge had brought out the wrong volume. Like many judges,Judge Steele likes to do some work off the record. Palaschak protested - but there was no court reporterthere at that time.)We are in flux regarding the practice of law, paralegals and even free speech.(This paragraph was added 8 June 2001.) In the law library in Ventura are several plaquescommemorating paralegal week. Paralegals are a vestige of gender bias. Men were lawyer; women wereparalegals - "half a legal." While the city and state give lip service to paralegals, the district attorneyprosecutes people who don't know their place. The sham is that paralegals work under the direct supervision 44of lawyers; the paralegal (sometimes the wife or girlfriend of the lawyer) has an cubicle in the lawyers officebut is not supervised - but how does one prove that? Palaschak did a sting operation after his 1993 arrestand presented the district attorney with 8 paralegals who were practicing law - but the district attorney didnothing. Professor Lawrence Friedman of Stanford in his treatise entitled History of American Law, 2ndedition, documents what we already suspected, the purpose of the bar, like any trade organization, is toprotect its turf. The 1st amendment supersedes all these petty rules and eliminates the distinction betweenthe speaking and writing rights of classes of people!Beginning of page 10 of the original jail typewritten version of brief 3596:Refocus on 1st Amendment and 6th Amendment and on the unconstitutionality of B&P 6126(Added 8 June 2001: This brief was written over several days as Palaschak was allowed access tothe typewriter and law library in the Ventura county jail. Palaschak had to waive his right to assistance ofcounsel in order to exercise his right to access to the law library. The jail rule is that people without counselget to use the law library generally at 2 hour stretches once a day. People with counsel are afforded muchless access - perhaps weekly. The law is that one does not need to give up one right to get another.)Interruption. New day. 13 September 1999. Monday. 2 pm. Even federal regulations pertaining tolawyers come under scrutiny and suffer constitutional infirmity as we see in Ficker v Curran 950 F Supp 123,affirmed 119 F 3d 1150 wherein Maryland's law against attorney direct solicitation was held unconstitutionalupon summary judgment. Ironically, and stupidly, the attorney general argued that the law wasunconstitutional and then was called upon to defend the law. Standing Committee on Discipline v Yagman,defendant (9th Circuit, 1995) 55 F.3d 1430; 1995 is a good example of federal regulations that are overbroad.In Rapp v Disp. Bd. Of Hawaii Supreme Court (Feb 1996) 916 F Supp 1525 pro se lawyer Rapp desired tospeak with jurors after their verdict. Hawaii disciplinary rules prohibited this without the court's permission.Rapp sued for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Hawaii Supreme Court (as did Palaschak's clientagainst the California Supreme Court) and prevailed. Rapp obtained a preliminary injunction prohibitingenforcement of the rule. In Doe v Supreme Ct. of Florida 734 F Supp 981 a Florida disciplinary gag rule washeld unconstitutional. In McHenry v Florida Bar 808 F Supp 1543 a 30 day ban on direct mail ambulancechasing was held unconstitutional. There are many more similar cases bu the point is abundantly clear: Thebar is an instrument of oppression and only in recent history have lawyers even asked for their 1stamendment rights. In Palaschak's case his speech and writing are protected by the 1st amendment.In Palaschak's case, as in Yagman, the court attempts to silence criticism of the court. Overbreadthand a multitude of free speech theories protect our right to criticize.The Ventura courts attempt to punish Palaschak for impugning the reputation of the court - just asthe federal court did to Yagman in Standing committee v Yagman. In Palaschak's case they use the vehicleof blatantly unconstitutional bar rules. West's summary of Yagman's case applies to Palaschak's case: 6Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 14 L Ed 2d 510.7From page 160 of Visions of Liberty by ACLU's Ira Glasser: In 1637, a Puritan activist namedJohn Lilburne imported and distributed various political tracts and was brought before the Star Chamber.Lilburne refused to be examined under oath, claiming that it violated "the law of the land" and invokingthe Magna Carta. Condemning the oath as a procedure that was fundamentally unfair, Lilburne said thathe would not take it even "though I be pulled to pieces by wild horses." Lilburne was held in contempt ofcourt, publicly whipped, fined, and jailed in solitary confinement. He wasn't released until 1641. But hiscrusade for fair procedures and his willingness to absorb severe punishment rather than forsake principleinflamed the public - on both sides of the Atlantic - and Lilburne became a great symbol. He suffered,but not without effect: In 1645 Parliament set aside the judgment again Lilburne, finding that it hadindeed violated "the law of the land and Magna Carta." In 1648 he was granted damages for hisunjust imprisonment!Lilburne led the Levelers. He was arrested again and again and died in prison at age 43.At his very last trial Lilburne won the then unprecedented right to receive a copy of the chargesagain him and to be represented by a lawyer.45"Local rule prohibiting attorney conduct which degrades or impugns integrity of courtraises overbreadth concerns under First Amendment since truthful statements thatimpugn integrity of judges are [ostensibly under this unconstitutional rule]sanctionable."Similarly B&P 6126 proscribes truthful speech including truthful holding out to be an attorney.Who will speak up for the defenseless and oppressed? May California deny appointed counsel toan indigent and then punish a volunteer who offers assistance of counsel?Palaschak vicariously asserts Melvin Looser's rights here just as Dr. Griswold6 asserted the rightsof his patients who used his prescribed contraception methods. Melvin's right to association and counsel iseven more legally elevated historically than the privacy right. It is the ancient right to counsel asdemonstrated in the 1648 Lilburn7 case cited in Melvin's petition #2871 and more recently, in 1788specifically listed in the Bill of Rights.No state may abridge free speech!In 1866 the 14th amendment was added. It reads in part:". . .nor shall any state make or enforce any law which shall abridgethe privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." - 14thamendment.One immunity of citizenship is the right to speak, right and petition. The California bar may notabridge it - nor may Illinois assist in enforcing this abridgment by arresting, holding, and extraditingPalaschak - nor may the FBI assist in denying Palaschak's rights. By bringing the sheriff with him, FBI agentEley used state action thereby putting himself under the purview of section 1983 - but the constitution is selfenacting.No enabling clause is needed. Equal protection means that no persons are immune from the law - 8Powell v Alabama (1932) 77 L Ed 158, 287 US 45, 53 S Ct 55, 84 ALR 527.46not even FBI agents.Vicarious assertion of Melvin's 6th amendment right to counsel - continued. Volunteers.Beginning of page 11 in the original jail typewritten brief 3596:Argersinger v Hamlin (1972) 32 L Ed 2d 530, 407 US 25, 92 S Ct 2006 is the most recent in a longline of cases gradually expanding the right to counsel. I can find not case square on point on the situationwhere a non-licensed volunteer stops in where the court has refused to appoint counsel - except for the caseof Powell v Alabama8 - the case of the Scotsboro boys. In the local trial prior to this 1937 decision an outof state lawyer appears before the court because some people sent him but did not pay him to do the trial.The issue of his licensure was not discussed by the Alabama court. Presumably he could have appearedpro hac vice - but California prohibits pro hac vice privilege to attorneys who have been disbarred inCalifornia - and that goes back to the large subject of oppressive bar regulations, their non-uniformity,interstate compacts to deny human rights, etc.6th amendment creates an immunity that 6126 violates in this case.Palaschak's case can be resolved before a jury on the fact. It can be resolved before a judge onnarrower, more established, grounds, such as overbreadth and vagueness of the phrase "holding oneselfout." Nonetheless Palaschak contends that the 6th amendment creates an immunity for an interveningcounsel, whether licensed or not, where the state refuses to provide counsel. To that extent Palaschakcontends that 6126 is unconstitutional as applied. (Added 8 June 2001: This is a situation of public interest.In a recent episode of The Practice a non-lawyer jail inmate was permitted to be counsel for another inmate.)The state bar act is mostly unconstitutionalB&P 6126 appears to have been part of a large revision in the bar act in 1939. It seems to havebeen enacted first with the first bar act which seems to date from 1927 although the penal code prohibitednon-lawyers from advertising as lawyers. Similarly all the regulations of "professions" had 2 driving forces:#1 the petty bourgeois wanted to keep out competition by all means; and #2 we did not want the untrainedmasquerading as doctors and posing whatever peril that would be. The legislators have always inventedsome imagined harm to justify their regulation - such as infection from unlicensed horseshoers. SeeProfessor Lawrence Friedman's book entitled History of American Law, 2nd Edition.State bar act and rules are oppressive and anachronistic(Added 8 June 2001: If you will examine the state bar act and the multiplicity of grudging rules, youwill see that the state bar act is an anachronism and oppressive. Example: the act provides that attorneysshall be entitled to counsel at hearings - similar to the wording of the 6th amendment - but their imitationjudges say that the right to counsel at bar hearings does not include the right to appointed counsel for the 47indigent - despite the nearly identical ruling and the universal application of the equal protection clause uponwhich Gideon and its progeny are founded. Example #2: Although a plethora of U.S. Supreme court caseshave established both the rights #1 of people to organize and steer other people to certain lawyers and #2of lawyers to directly solicit, the bar nevertheless protects its turf by now focusing on lawyer referral services.Example #3 I remember in law school reading that no name of a law firm could include anything but thenames of lawyers - and yet "Century Law Firm" was never arrested. Now I know: the bar keeps unlawfulstatutes on the books despite its constant expensive wasteful amendment to the bar act and rules.)Extradition law is similarly behind the times(Added 8 June 2001: Similarly, the law of extradition employs oppressive concepts and legal fictionsthat were tossed aside years ago in the more active field of criminal law. By active, I mean as measuredby the quantity of cases before the U.S. supreme court each year. Had we that number of extradition cases,some talent would eventually have drifted into the court and improved our draconian extradition laws.)State Bar attempts at Regulation of Speech - such as 6126 - must stopThe danger to not removing unconstitutional laws is this: The law is enforced by police and judgeswho are not very smart nor very interested in the law. If they could find another job that paid more andsatisfied their need to push people around, then they would take it. These idiots with authority use unlawfulstatutes to justify their unlawful actions.Two categories of lawyer activity: #1 speech and #2 making decisions for somebody else.If you give the matter some thought you will find that most attorney functions fall into 2 categories,namely: #1 speech activities and #2 making decisions in the place of another person. We must stopregulating speech activities. The court already limits the power to act in the place of another. The client isusually asked if he consents to such things as entering a guilty plea or agreeing to a divorce settlement.There is not need to prevent any person from making a speech in court for another. Indeed, I have observedthat when exotic language translators are used, the translator often assumes a lawyer function - and thecourts don't object. I do not address regulation of category 2 activities today.Congressional and Supreme Court protection of Advocacy: Private Attorney GeneralWe protect our right to speech. The Supreme Court recognizes political speech as an elevated formof speech - higher than pornography, in their opinion. Of political speech, the highest category is advocacyof the rights of another - and the court gives the name "Private Attorney General" to persons who do thatadvocacy even if the person does the advocacy for non-altruistic reasons.Palaschak does not need to buy a license to advocateBy enacting 42 US 1983 et seq in 1871, during reconstruction, Congress manifested a preferenceof advocacy of civil rights and the constitution. Part of the state bar act is consonant with Congress in thatregard. Specifically B&P 6068 requires all lawyers 9Some of the books taken were: Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law of England, 1765-1769,Lawrence Friedman's History of American Law, 2nd edition, 1985, Alderman and Kennedy's In OurDefense, California Rules of Court, Leading Criminal Cases by Weinreb, A People's History of the UnitedStates by Howard Zinn.48"Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself or herself, thecause of the defenseless or the oppressed" - California business andprofessions code 6068-h).The concept of private attorney general pertains to the situation of Palaschak. In the continuum ofspeech, pure speech, political speech, advocacy, and advocacy of preferred rights, well, Palaschak's petitionis at the preferred end of preferred rights. Most people can see the danger in permitting a state to silencethose who criticize the state.Palaschak's right to speak was suspended for eating LSD, failure to pay dues, failure to buy carinsurance and a multitude trivialities with no nexus to the practice of law.When Palaschak had no money in 1995 his license was summarily suspended. Observe that thebar does not give credit for portions of years when one's license is suspended despite having paid dues.Must Palaschak buy a license to advocate? Shortly after the invention of the printing press, England passeda law requiring the purchase of a license to print anything. The establishment always looks for ways to taxour every move. Our constitution's 1st amendment was written in the context of permanent elimination ofany tax on the right to speak, print, and petition. The state bar act is an abrogation of our right to be freefrom abridgment of our speech rights. Other state bar actions resulted from Palaschak's attempts to litigatehis own traffic tickets and vindicate his rights in traffic court. Oppressive and short-sighted trafficcommissioners and bar prosecutors maligned Palaschak's intents and called him an elitist and a scofflaw.(Added in retrospect in 8 June 2001: The bar used traffic tickets as a pretext for suspendingPalaschak's bar license. Palaschak learned that an appeal is nearly impossible in traffic court - which is whythe bad system continues. Palaschak's criticism of the court apparently offended those who opposePalaschak's attempts to correct the injustice of traffic court, namely, former prosecutor O'Neil who now sitson the appellate panel for traffic court. He is the one who recommended to his former employer, the districtattorney, that they prosecute Palaschak for his having criticized the traffic court in brief #2871, the smokinggun in Palaschak's extradition case.)Melvin's Looser need not take his traffic case to federal courtBeginning of age 12 of original jail typewritten brief 3596:There is a case that says that one is entitled to due process and justice at all courts. I would givethe exact citation but extraditing Deputy Al Weigand took my books from me and left them in Illinois wherethe deputies gave the books to the inmates9. One need not appeal a case to get justice; the first judge on 10Williams v Illinois (1970) 26 L Ed 2d 586, 399 US 235, 90 S Ct 2018. See also 31 ALR3d 926Indigency of offender as affecting validity of imprisonment as alternative to payment of fine.49the case is obligated to give Melvin Looser the benefit of precedent set down by the Supreme Court.Commissioner Covarrubias, having never actually practiced criminal law to my knowledge, is a poor personto be sitting on traffic court. He ignored the case of Williams v Illinois10 that we brought to his attention inbrief #2871. His attitude was "take it up on appeal to the people who hired me - because traffic appealscome the this same building and the same faces".The U.S. constitution pre-empts the field of speech. California and the Bar may not regulatespeech!A valid time, place, and manner regulation would not have prevented Palaschak's petition (or speechhad he spoke for Melvin) because a valid regulation addressed the place and manner and not who thespeaker is. Example of valid time, place and manner restriction of speech: "No cell phones shall be usedin the law library." (Incidentally, by giving special privileges to members of the California bar, the lawlibraries of many counties violate the rights of the very litigants who pay for the law libraries through filingfees. The law library here is run by police statists. They permit FBI agents (non lawyers) to borrow books -but lawyers licensed in the local federal court who are suffering California bar oppression may not borrowbooks. This is an example of a bureaucracy who caters to police while simultaneously ignoring actual libraryusers - who, no surprise, are not represented on the library board - but I digress. Oppression is all aroundus. My mission is to correct some of it. Civil rights victories are not won in the local court.Melvin Looser's 6th amendment right to counsel (asserted vicariously here by Palaschak) may notbe abridged by California's scheme to provide (or in this case not provide) pools of burned outincompetent public defenders, and although Palaschak did not serve as Melvin's trial lawyer,Palaschak has a right to vicariously assert Melvin's rights in Palaschak's own defense under theSupreme Court concept of jus tertii as enunciated in Craig v Boren (1976) 50 L Ed 2d 397,429 US 190,97 S Ct 451.See also 50 L Ed 2d 902: Supreme Court's views as to party's standing to assert rights of thirdpersons (jus tertii) in challenging constitutionality of legislation.California right to pursue happinessPalaschak's right to write, seek justice, and speak on behalf of the less articulate is protected by theCalifornia right to pursue happiness.Incorporation of rights announced in brief 2871Palaschak hereby asserts by incorporation all the rights asserted by Melvin Looser in petition 2871.Incorporation of rights announced in brief #1638 11Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 14 L Ed 2d 510. Dr. Griswold asserted standing to vicariouslyassert the privacy rights of his patients who used birth control devices in the privacy of their bedrooms.12See History of American Law, 2nd edition, 1985 by Professor Friedman.50Palaschak hereby incorporates by reference all the arguments in federal complaint/ brief #1638(which will be published on the website http://lawyerdude.50megs.com ) which will be as exhibit in this caseand which details the atrocities of the California bar and its co-defendant in that case, the California SupremeCourt which overloads itself by continuing as the sole agency for ultimate bar discipline while mishandlingits cases (such as People v Palaschak in which it apparently did not read the facts of the case - or rathercould not, because its appointed counsel forgot to submit one day of the transcript). As we see here, theSupreme Court is the ultimate enforcer of traffic tickets. They disbarred Palaschak in part for traffic ticketswhich were still on appeal and in part for an alleged failure to appear on speeding ticket for which Palaschakdid indeed appear a number of times at which the prosecution was not ready. At one appearance Palaschakpaid a lawyer to appear but court was canceled throughout southern California less than 24 hours before thehearing due to the Iraq war or an earthquake or the riot or something that I would have to ascertain in mydiaries.Penumbra Doctrine - Advocacy, Counsel, Association, Speech, PetitionPenumbra doctrine was enunciated by Justice Douglas, as I recall, in Griswold11. We have a royalflush of rights being violated when you hold a person on a $ 1/ 4 million bail for 4 months for writing a petitionadvocating why an indigent disabled veteran should not be imprisoned for inability to pay a $100 fine afterbeing denied appointed counsel.The right to disbarred counselAs to the right to be represented by a non-licensed lawyer, Black's law dictionary cites one case butit is not pertinent because Palaschak is not a lay person; Palaschak is a lawyer suffering retaliation from aconspiracy of defendants in a prior lawsuit. Nonetheless the case is U.S. v Grismore (Nov 1976) 546 Fed2d 844. Aha! The case reporters deceive us! Jerome Daly, the lawyer selected by Grismore was himselfa disbarred lawyer - not a layman!Professor Friedman12 observed that laymen did not practice law even when a license was notrequired. Palaschak asserts that Grismore was a bad decision and that anybody can write and speak foranybody. Otherwise there would be abridgment - and the constitution specifically forbids abridgment! (Hmm.Does the 14th amendment forbid abridgment of the 6th - or is it just the 1st?)Summary of Clear and Present Danger Test as applied to PalaschakThe First Amendment needs breathing space. This is exactly what the U.S. Supreme Court said in____. Where a statute such as B&P 6126 purports to abridge a constitutional right - especially a preferred 13The entire case is reprinted herein. Standing Committee on Discipline of the United StatesDistrict Court for the Central District of California v Stephen Yagman, defendant (9th Circuit, 1995) 55F.3d 1430; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 12948; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3958; 95 Daily Journal DAR 6873This was Yagman's finest hour! Yagman prevailed against Chief Federal Judge Manuel Real and Real'shatchet men disguised as a committee on discipline.14Brandenburg v Ohio (1969) 23 L Ed 2d 430, 395 US 444, 89 S Ct 1827. Clarence Brandenburgwas Ku Klux Klan member. Clear and Present Danger test was finally used to overrule an obstruction tospeech. Brandenburg is cited all the major constitutional law treatises and the following treatises: 21 LEd 2d 976 The Supreme Court and the right of free speech and press, 38 L Ed 2d 835 The SupremeCourt's development of the "clear and present danger"rule and the related rule concerning advocacy ofunlawful acts as limitations on the constitutional right of free speech and press, 45 L Ed 2d 725 SupremeCourt's views as to overbreadth of legislation in connection with First Amendment rights, 86 L Ed 758Right of petition and assembly under the Federal Constitution's First Amendment - Supreme Court cases,96 ALR Fed 26, 20 ALR4th 327.15314 US at 376.16Bridges v California (1941) 314 US 263, 62 S Ct 194. Contains the test: "Extremely Seriousand Very Imminent" (clear and present danger - how clear and how present). Newspaper editorial talkedabout a present case in violation of court gag order. Cited for contempt of court. Overruled as I recall.17Williams v Illinois (1970) 26 L Ed 2d 586, 399 US 235, 90 S Ct 2018. See also 31 ALR3d 926Indigency of offender as affecting validity of imprisonment as alternative to payment of fine.51right such as speech - or a super-preferred right such as political speech - or a very super preferred rightsuch as advocacy of the preferred rights of the defenseless or oppressed without counsel - then that statutefails constitutional muster and is invalid. Where preferred rights are at stake, a statute abridging them ispresumed invalid absent compelling state interest. We do not use the rational basis test here; we usethe strict scrutiny analysis which presumes that 6126 is invalid absent compelling state interest. In the caseof speech press and comments about the court, the requisite compelling state interest is measured by theclear and present danger test enunciated in Standing Committee v Yagman13 (1995) and Brandenburg vOhio14 (1969). "The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately peril." Craigv Harvey15. "The substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence must beextremely high before utterances can be punished." Bridges v California16 (1941).Melvin Looser needed assistance of counsel to share with him the fact that traffic court was actingin violation of the equal protection clause and that the issue had already been before the U.S. Supreme courtin 1970 in Williams v Illinois17.Summary: Overbreadth as applied to Palaschak along with Clear and Present Danger TestWhat is the danger posed by a wrongfully suspended lawyer (whose suspension was maliciouslyobtained by a prosecutorial lie that he has a felony conviction for LSD use when actually he had only amisdemeanor conviction overturned on appeal and then wrongfully ( and not finally) reinstated the probation 18Craig v Boren (1976) 50 L Ed 2d 397,429 US 190, 97 S Ct 451. See also 50 L Ed 2d 902:Supreme Court's views as to party's standing to assert rights of third persons (jus tertii) in challengingconstitutionality of legislation52for which mandates expungement whose license should by rights be immediately and equitably reinstatednunc pro tunc as having been void ab initio) from writing a brief which is specifically permitted by rule 1-311for an indigent who faces unlawful jail? Because the lawyer is fully licensed we must presume that there isno danger.6126 is overbroad because is punishes even reinstated lawyers. Read it yourself.6126 is overbroad because it purports to punish Barry Scheck - but we know that Barry appeared in the OJtrial and was not punished. Therefore the statute is obviously wrong. Read it.Overbreadth doctrine permits Palaschak to vicariously assert the rights of Barry Scheck and anybodyelse offended by the statute regardless of whether Palaschak is legally offended by the statute. See Craigv Boren18 and the annotations thereto.6126 would have wrongly punished the lawyers in Estate of Condon (1998) 654 Cal App 4th 1138. If Melvin had retained local counsel and persuaded Harvard Professors Lawrence Tribe and Allen Dershowitz to write his brief they could be punished under 6126 absent interpretation. Overbreadth theory says that we need have no fear. If the statute needs interpretation to save it then it must fail anyway. The First Amendment must have breathing space!You can't save 6126 by narrowing it to fit Palaschak's case. It has already posed the chilling effect that overbreadth is designed to cure. Palaschak has been in jail and has suffered arrest by abuse of process facilitated by this bad law. Palaschak has lost his farm income and his farm home."No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States." - 14th amendment.This court has a duty to honor the 14th amendment and refuse to permit prosecution for speech!This court has no jurisdiction to continue if it finds either that: #1 there is not clear and present danger; or #2: that 6126 applies to reinstated lawyers or other protected lawyers.There is no appeal by the prosecution permitted in this situation. Douglas Palaschak 14 September 1999

June 8, 2001: Here is Boren v Craig: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/craigvboren.html